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In front of you lays the ¯nal product of my ¯rst three years in the academic
profession. For me, those three years as a PhD student have been among the
best of my life. Unfortunately, an important reason for why those three years
have been so awesome is not re°ected in the chapters of this ¯nal product: the
interactions with friends and colleagues which have inspired me to write a thesis
like this. For that reason, I would like to devote the space in this preface to
thank everyone who has had a signi¯cant impact on this thesis. The order in
which the names of those who pass by is chronologically rather than in order of
importance. I use a chronological order to avoid the problems that come along
with putting weight on memorable suggestions or conversations. This preface
is merely intended to put those who helped me in the limelight, rather than to
be o®ensive to those who should have earned a spot nearer to the beginning.
The years as MPhil student
My ¯rst awareness of the existence of the academic world in economics is thanks
to Prof. Sjak Smulders. At the end of my Bachelor program in Tilburg, I
followed a course called `Growth and Technology'. Sjak Smulders told me of the
opportunity to take a Master that prepared me for a life as a researcher. The
program was called the Master of Philosophy, a two-year program which is a
preparation for a job as PhD student. Strange as it may seem now, back then I
would never have thought that there was such a thing as an `academic life'. In
my mind, a Professor was just a Professor, whether he or she was an Assistant
Professor, Associate Professor or Full Professor. Likewise, articles which I had
to read for my classes were all of similar quality; I never paid attention to the
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journals in which they were published. Thanks to Sjak Smulders, I became
aware of the exciting competition that the academic life represents.
Before starting the MPhil program that Sjak Smulders advised, I started
my regular Master in Economics. Prof. Erwin Bulte and Dr. Frans de Vries
supervised my thesis on the Porter Hypothesis. My ¯rst real contact with the
academic scene was a result of this thesis: Prof. Cees Withagen invited me to
become his research assistant for a couple of months, to try to convert my thesis
into something publishable. I view that invitation as the birth of my academic
career. Cees, many thanks again for giving me that opportunity.
After my period as a research assistant, I started the two-year MPhil program
in Tilburg, hoping to get a job as a PhD student afterwards. It was a challenging
program, but with the help of my classmates I was able to put myself through.
For me, the best memories are all those times we made homework together
(especially the Macro 1 assignments in room K414). The ones I spent the most
time with were Salima Douhou, Alexandra van Geen, Thijs Griens, Jiehui Hu,
Ting Jiang, Kenan Kalayc³, Martin Knaup, Kim Peijnenburg, Pedro Raposo,
Marta Serra Garcia, Sotirios Vandoros and Peter van der Windt. Many thanks
to all of you! Most likely, those good memories for me are still haunting the
nightmares of some of the tutors of that time. Corrado Di Maria and Willem
Woertman, thanks for never giving up on us.
The most important thing that happened to me during the MPhil program,
was an invitation by Prof. Daan van Soest. He invited me to join a research
team that he was assembling for an NWO research proposal. At that time, I had
an increasing interest in everything that had to do with experimental economics
and the environment. The topic of the proposal involved both my interests, so
I did not hesitate a moment to accept his o®er. Daan, I would like to thank
you once again for the tremendous opportunity you gave to me. At the moment
of the invitation, Daan was not yet a Full Professor, which meant that he was
not allowed to become my promoter. For that reason, we asked Prof. Charles
Noussair to become my promoter, a task which he accepted. On board of the
research team were Prof. Johan Grasman, Dr. Jana Vysrastkeva and Andries
Richter. Together with Jana, Daan and I would start the program with a paper
on the evolution of counter-rewarding in a common pool resource environment,
leading to Chapters 3 and 4. Jana, I vividly remember all the discussions we
have had while interpreting the data of our experiments. Thanks for remaining
so interested, and forcing me to present my ideas in clearer ways. Andries, I
would like to thank you too for all the comments you have given on earlier
versions of some of my chapters. Equally important, I would like to thank youPreface vii
for the fun times we had during the EAERE conference in Gothenburg. Johan,
although we have not worked together closely, I would like to thank you for your
comments on my work on occasions where we met.
A ¯nal important thing that happened to me during the MPhil program
occurred during the NAKE Workshop, organized by Prof. Jenny Ligthart. First
of all, I would like to thank Jenny Ligthart for organizing that week, it turned
out to have quit an impact on the course of my life as a PhD student (although
I don't have the counterfactual on what would have happened in case I did not
attend the workshop, I assume that attending the week resulted in an improve-
ment). During the NAKE workshop, I had a conversation with Prof. John List.
I told him about the plans that I had for my thesis, and asked him if he could
give me any tips on how to make improvements. His advice was brief: Including
a ¯eld experiment on social dilemmas would be a major improvement of my
plans. I took his advice seriously, maybe even a little bit too extreme. The
search for a place to conduct a ¯eld experiment really became an obsession, but
then in the good sense of the word. In the months that followed, everywhere I
went, I asked myself the question if I could transform the place where I was to
my `¯eld experimental lab'. At times this was a frustrating business, because
many of the `labs' I walked into turned out not to be suited for proper exper-
imentation. However, the thought that I only needed one `lab' pushed me to
continue my search.
The years as PhD student
One of the tasks a PhD student has to ful¯ll, is teaching. I always enjoyed
teaching a lot, and part of it is because I could work with colleagues who really
wanted to teach me to become a better teacher. Katie Carman, thanks for
all the time you have invested in me to become a good tutor for the course
Institutions and Incentives. My teaching improved every year, and part of it is
because of you. You were always fair in the way you distributed the grading
load, and that meant a lot to me. I would also like to thank Prof. Aart de Zeeuw
for his help in tutoring the course Environmental Economics. Although I only
taught that course one year, it was my ¯rst teaching experience, and this was
very valuable.
During my time as a PhD student, I have talked a lot about my research
with others (whether they wanted to know about it or not). Especially for
my colleagues, I must have been a constant plague. My ¯rst two go-to guys
have always been Gerard van der Meijden and Peter van Oudheusden. Fromviii Preface
macro economists, it is hard to gain approval for micro economic ideas, so they
provided an excellent benchmark for new ideas. Once my ideas had ¯nally been
granted the `Geer and Peer'-seal of approval, it was time to ¯ne tune my ideas.
Patrick Hullegie and NathanaÄ el Vellekoop were never too shy to give me their
thoughts on my research. I would like to thank all of you for helping me out
with experimental design ideas and interpreting my data.
Once my ideas were developed into its ¯nal stages, and some data had been
gathered, I consulted the more experienced colleagues. Many thanks go out
to Eline van der Heijden, Wieland MÄ uller, and Jan Potters. You have always
listened very carefully to my research ideas, and your suggestions often turned
out to result in great improvements. Eline, special thanks to you for your help
with the statistical tests I used, especially in the early stages of my PhD track.
Also to friends I was talking non-stop about new ideas for research. On Tues-
day nights (the `Boys Night Out') the audience consisted of my close friends Ad
van Amelsfoort, Marcel van Amstel, Roy Maas, Martijn van Steensel and Ferry
Vermeer. Friday/Saturday nights (the `Real Boys Night Out') were usually re-
served for my dear friends Ramon Kool, Mark Ligtvoet, Bas Postema, Jeroen
Remie and Maarten Rossou. Thanks guys, for all your comments and for never
shutting down a conversation meant to improve the quality of science. I would
like to spend some extra sentences to thank Mark Brouwers, a very good friend
of mine. It was during an evening with him in which we speculated about
the interpretation of experimental data of behavior in a common pool resource.
The new interpretation was completely di®erent from the one I presented in an
earlier version of the paper. Our speculations seemed to be supported by the
data, and the end result can be found in Chapter 4. Mark, thank you for your
valuable input!
Former classmates of the `Algemene Economie' Master proved to be a good
soundboard as well. The trip to France was ¯lled with conversations about
social dilemmas. Thanks to you all: Vincent Bosgraaf, Magiel van der Groes,
Sjoerd Kitzen, Maarten van Rossum, Emiel Suverain, Derk Timmer, Jeroen
Udo, and Bart Verbeet.
After basketball practices, I also found ways to talk about my research with
team mates. In many occasions, Joost de Bakker and Ardavan Farjami Haidari
gave me very thoughtful comments which have in°uenced my research. Thank
you very much!
Even at home I spent quite some time talking about my research. Thanks
to all my `Koetjeboe' house mates for all those conversations: Rogier Fakkeldij,
Roel Ikink, Rogier van Kalmthout, Mathieu Ottevangers, David Prinsen Geerligs,Preface ix
Joost Verlaan and Reinier Willers. It was at home where I ¯nally ended my
search for an environment suitable for ¯eld experiments. The two friends respon-
sible are Niels van den Broek and Magiel Driessers. Still obsessively searching
for a place to conduct ¯eld experiments, I overheard a conversation between
the two. They told me about a place where recreational ¯shermen spend their
leisure to catch Rainbow Trout: `de Biestse Oevers'. Their detailed talk about
this pond convinced me to have a closer look and to investigate the possibilities
to conducting a ¯eld experiment. The setting turned out to be ideal, and it
resulted in Chapters 5 through 7. Niels and Magiel, I would like to thank you
sincerely for telling me about this pond. Without your remarks, I might not
have been able to conduct any ¯eld experiments at all. Most likely, I would
have missed out on a lot of exciting adventures which made my years as a PhD
student so colorful.
As a consequence of discovering the recreational ¯shing pond to conduct
research, I had to make myself acquainted with the ins and outs of the world of
sports ¯shing. The biggest source of help was provided by my dear friend Arjen
Timmermans. Arjen, thanks for the enthusiastic help you gave me when I tried
to get to know the ¯shing habits.
Of course, I could never have conducted the ¯eld experiments without the
help of the owners of the ¯shing facility. Initially, the pond was owned by Ad and
Thea van Oirschot. Thank you very much for giving me opportunity to conduct
my ¯eld experiments, and for helping me out with letting things run smoothly
during all the sessions. After a while, `de Biestse Oevers' changed ownership
to Ben and Shirley Willems. I would like to thank you too for allowing me to
continue my research, and for your excellent assistance. Finally, I would also
like to thank the other sta® of the Biestse Oevers: Frans, Tim and Koen.
Conducting ¯eld experiments at the Biestse Oevers has always been very
labor intensive, and impossible to do single handedly. Therefore, I would like
to thank the Master students who helped me conducting the ¯eld experiments:
Stef van Kessel, Mike Groels, Paul Lude~ na Delgado and Menusch Khadjavi.
Stef, it has been a pleasure to explore and discover all facets that come along
with conducting experiments at an environment such as the pond. Your e®orts
really helped me to conduct the experiments smoothly. Mike, thanks to you
too for your help at the pond. I was impressed by the speed with which you
wrote your thesis. Paul, thank you for all the hard work you did. Especially the
night we sacri¯ced in order to make last-minute changes to the experimental
design was truly a blessing. Some of your comments were very in°uential for
the experimental design. Menusch, also your help was greatly appreciated.x Preface
Traveling such a long way to help out meant a lot to me. Finally, I would like to
thank my colleagues and friends who helped during the experimental sessions.
Alexandra, Peter, Patrick, Roel and Sander Tuit, thank you once again!
Somewhere in my second year, Daan gave me the opportunity to co-organize
the tenth Bioecon conference in Cambridge, UK. The conference was entitled
`The E®ectiveness and E±ciency of Biodiversity Conservation Instruments' and
matched perfectly the topic of my thesis. I would like thank Erwin Bulte and
Andreas Kontoleon for being part of their team, and all the help and useful tips
they gave me. Co-organizing the conference was a great pleasure for me, and it
allowed me to get to know the people involved in the scienti¯c community.
In my last year as a PhD student, I visited the University of Chicago. This
trip was truly a great experience: I took classes from Nobel laureates, and I have
met a lot of great researchers. First of all, I would like to thank Codrien Arsene
for sharing his apartment with me when I was kicked out of my hotel (long
story on miscommunication about the payment method...). Dave Herberich
and Nikki Sullivan, thank you for showing me the city of Chicago, especially
the American Football match and the shooting range were highlights. I would
like to thank Dana Chandler and Johana Muriel Grajales for spending time with
them in Chicago and talking about research. Finally, I would like to thank all
the visitors of the two presentations I gave at the Becker Center. During those
presentations, I had the impression that everyone had just one goal, and that
was to improve my paper. I never had such an experience before, and it was
truly amazing!
Special thanks to...
The last section of this Preface is devoted to the friends and colleagues who
had an enduring in°uence on my PhD thesis. It was hard to ¯t them into
the chronological order, because then I would have to mention them every other
paragraph. First of all, I want to thank Daan van Soest for being my supervisor.
Unlike many other supervisors, your door was always open for me whenever I had
questions. Of course, being my supervisor, the way you think about economic
problems has in°uenced me enormously and your critical and original view on
my e®orts to analyze data has always improved our papers. Working with you
during all experimental sessions always went smoothly (both in the lab and at
the pond), and after an experiment I always enjoyed your invitations to have a
drink at your house. I hope that we can extend our work together in the future
the way in which we collaborated during the past three years.Preface xi
Secondly, I want to thank Charles Noussair for being my second supervisor.
Charles, working with you was always a true pleasure for me. Your enthusiasm
kept my spirit high in times when I believed that our ¯eld experiments yielded
uninteresting results. Also, the quick way in which you are able to draw in-
sightful and deep conclusions from the ¯eld data that we generated, has always
impressed me. It would be great if we continue to work together in the future.
Thirdly, I want to thank John List for all that he has done for me. Thank
you for pointing out where the research frontier is, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to work together with you on tournament incentives, thank you for
inviting me to visit the University of Chicago, and thank you for writing letters
of recommendation for me. The talks that I had with you in Chicago were truly
inspiring, and they pushed me to work harder than I had ever done before.
Fourthly, I would like to thank Christian Bogmans for being such an awesome
room mate. Countless times, I had tears in my eyes of laughter. I really regret
the fact that we will probably never share a room in the future (so long for our
Hall of Fame...). Good luck with ¯nishing your thesis. I am sure that your
keen ability to translate real world problems into abstract economic models will
get you a nice place to do research.
Fifthly, I would like to thank two persons: Chris MÄ uris and David Vo· nka.
During the MPhil program you helped me a lot with hard econometric courses,
and during my PhD track you always were able to detect mistakes in my econo-
metric analyses. Also the feedback you gave me when I talked about new ideas
for experiments were really useful. It forced me to redesign my experiments
more often than I dare to admit. Without your help, I am sure that I could not
have achieved the things I have.
Sixthly, I would like to thank those who had helped me with all the L ATEXproblems
I encountered. The ones I refer to are Hendri Adriaens, Marcel van Amstel, John
Kleppe, Sander Tuit, and Ruud Hendrickx. Without you, my thesis would likely
have been written in the evil M$ Word, and we all know what a mess that would
have been...
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my mom, dad, brother
and sister for their support during those three years. Mom and dad, you always
listened very carefully to what I told you about my research, and you even read
very carefully some of the chapters of this thesis (shamefully, I have to admit
that my mom even found a mistake I made in some of the math...). Loes
thank you too for being interested in my research (I know you especially liked
the stories from the pond, told in the beautiful Tilburg dialect). It was nice
to see that the economic way of thinking in°uenced your Master thesis on thexii Preface
History of Art. Bart, I really liked the conversations we had about life as a
scientist. Those conversations always made me relativize the sometimes crazy
world of academia.
With these ¯nal words of thanks, it is time to move on to the main part of
this thesis. I hope that you will keep on reading the rest of my thesis, and that
you may enjoy it as much as I have done writing it.Contents
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Introduction
1.1 Social dilemmas and informal institutions
A variety of environmental problems are seen as the major contemporary chal-
lenges the world faces. Examples of these problems abound: Many ¯sheries
are confronted with severe drops in stock levels, leading to the collapse of the
Canadian cod stock (Milich (1999)), forests being reduced in size by thirteen
million hectares each year (FAO (2005)), and the population of wild vertebrate
species has fallen by 31% during 1970-2006 (GBO3 (2010)). One important
cause of today's environmental problems is the lack of su±ciently well-de¯ned
or enforced property rights. It is this feature of renewable natural resources that
transforms the environmental problems to a `social dilemma'. A social dilemma
is a situation in which private interests are not in line with group interests.
Environmental problems are subject to this problem; whereas the returns from
harvesting a resource accrue to the individual only, some of its costs are passed
onto others (for example in the form of lower resource stocks). Sel¯sh individ-
uals will therefore make excessive use of the resource, although all would be
better o® mitigating their harvests. Explained in di®erent terms, a sel¯sh in-
dividual would like to free-ride on others by harvesting excessively, rather than
to cooperate by providing the public good of maintaining the resource stock.
It falls to the government to overcome the problems associated with social
dilemmas. A government has the right to de¯ne and enforce property rights,
therefore, the government seems to be the right agency to deal with most of
today's environmental problems. However, scholars have taken the view that a
reduction of environmental problems can also be established through coopera-
tion of the users of a resource. There are many examples of situations where
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community members can prevent the downfall of a resource stock (see for exam-
ple Feeny et al. (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), and Ostrom et al. (1999)).
The key to which resources can be conserved without government intervention
are `informal institutions' (see for example Vyrastekova and van Soest (2005)).
Informal institutions are de¯ned as sets of self-enforcing local rules governing
the behavior of resource users. Those self-enforcing rules can take many forms,
such as ethical norms to which resource users live up to, but also sanctions or
rewards for those who deviate from an established group norm.
For government policy purposes, relying on informal institutions can be an
e±cient tool. When community members ¯nd ways themselves to cooperate in
a social dilemma, such as mitigating the harvests of a resource stock, then less
appeal has to made to a government to intervene. Needless to say, a government
can save costly expenditures when it merely has to encourage resource users to
rely on informal institutions. The aim of this thesis is to gain insights into which
informal institutions are e®ective in promoting cooperation in social dilemma
situations. An answer is sought to the following research question:
`How does behavior in social dilemmas, such as the conservation of renewable
natural resources, depend on the informal institutions in place, and what are
the implications for government policy design?'
More generally, the aim of this thesis is to study how cooperation in social dilem-
mas is a®ected by informal institutions. By merely observing social dilemmas
that are found in the real world, it is impossible to properly study the e®ects
that informal institutions have. Social dilemmas are a®ected by a multitude of
in°uences, all of which arise or disappear endogenously. Moreover, the outcomes
of social dilemmas are likely to have feedback impacts on informal institutions,
which then further in°uences behavior in social dilemmas. In order to study the
causal e®ects of informal institutions, despite the complexity that is involved
with social dilemmas in ¯eld settings, I will only focus on the e®ects that in-
formal institutions have on social dilemmas. For that reason, I will try to seek
an answer to the research question by means of experiments, both in the tradi-
tional laboratory, as in a ¯eld setting. The novel feature of experimentation is
that informal institutions can be imposed exogenously, and therefore, a causal
inference can be made on its in°uence on behavior in a social dilemma.
Conventional economic theory argues that social dilemmas could never be
solved by informal institutions, if they are costly and all individuals involved are
rational and sel¯sh. To see why this is so, note that using informal institutions
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a self-enforcing local rule to change the behavior of a fellow resource user, then
all would like someone else to pay those costs. In doing so, an individual saves
costs while still reaping the bene¯ts of the behavior change of the fellow resource
user. Of course, if all resource users are sel¯sh, then all would think alike,
and no one would make use of costly informal institutions. Anticipating that
informal institutions are not used, then no one will face the negative or positive
consequences of the self-enforcing rules. Therefore, it is to be expected that all
individuals will act sel¯shly in the social dilemma and there will be no signs at
all of altruistic behavior: `behavior by an individual that increases the ¯tness
of another individual while decreasing the ¯tness of the actor' (Bell (2008)).
Conventional economic theory predicts that those who are altruistic will go
extinct, because they have a lower ¯tness level than those who are not altruistic.
The predictions of classical economic theory come with one problem: There
are many real life situations in which individuals are able to overcome widespread
free-riding in social dilemmas. It seems as if humans in the real world are no
strangers to cooperation. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I come back to this issue.
A review is given of theoretical arguments that scholars have made that show
that individuals can overcome free-riding behavior in social dilemmas. Three
mechanisms are discussed. This ¯rst mechanism by which altruism might sur-
vive as a strategy, is called `kin selection'. The argument made is that altruistic
acts towards family members can give indirect ¯tness advantages. Someone
who is altruistic towards a brother can indirectly pass his genes on to the next
generation, if that brother has enough descendants. Somehow, this mechanism
is not satisfying, because in the real world, acts of altruism among non-related
individuals can be found as well. This has led to the second mechanism of the
survival of altruism: direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity hinges on repeated in-
teraction between two individuals. If one helps the other, then the other should
give help in return at some later date. Both individuals will then be better o® in
the long run, and therefore altruism can survive. Still, the mechanism of direct
reciprocity does not explain all acts of altruism found in real life, because altru-
istic acts seem to exist between individuals who never meet each other again.
This observation has lead to the third mechanism: indirect reciprocity. The
theory of indirect reciprocity predicts that altruism can survive if an altruistic
act received from one individual is paid back to another individual. Of course,
with such a mechanism the incentives to free-ride are huge. This problem is
overcome by reputation; only those who have performed altruistic acts in the
past become prone to receiving altruistic acts by others.
Kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity all involve interac-4 Chapter 1. Introduction
tion between just two persons. Free-riding by one leads to a loss of ¯tness to
only one other individual. However, many social dilemmas in the real world,
especially environmental problems, are in the context of groups. Free-riding by
one leads to reduced ¯tness for more than just one individual. Therefore, a ¯nal
way in which altruism can survive, is by considering informal institutions. In
Chapter 2, the theories of altruistic punishment are reviewed. Altruistic pun-
ishment can work under some conditions. For example, if punishment is not too
costly, or if a large enough share of the population are `conditional cooperators';
individuals who cooperate in the social dilemma situation and who use costly
punishment to sanction free-riders.
In this chapter, the outline of the remainder of this thesis is described. I
will describe how I study the e®ects of informal institutions on social dilemmas,
and the way it can be placed in the literature. Since the bulk of this thesis tries
to give an answer to the research question by means of economic experiments,
some background on the methodology of (laboratory) experiments is given in
section 1.2. This chapter continues by describing earlier laboratory experimen-
tal literature on the e®ects of informal institutions on social dilemmas in section
1.3. In the ¯nal three chapters of this thesis, I leave the conventional labora-
tory to do experiments in a ¯eld setting. Therefore, section 1.4 provides some
background information on the methodology of ¯eld experiments and presents a
short overview of in°uential studies on social dilemmas in ¯eld studies. Finally,
I describe how I test whether informal institutions can overcome free-riding
behavior in a ¯eld experiment in section 1.5
1.2 The methodology of laboratory experiments
Economists have tried to test whether the predictions of standard economic
theory, and those presented in Chapter 2 hold in practice. One popular way
to test theories is by means of experiments conducted in controlled laboratory
environments. In a laboratory experiment, the experimenter creates an arti¯cial
world, where subjects are put into an environment constructed for the purpose
of research. The advantage of laboratory experiments is that the experimenter
has substantial control over the environment; utility functions of agents can be
induced, and all the relevant parameters of the environment can be carefully
chosen (for example the institutional setting and the amount of information
that is available). In order for an experimenter to conduct a proper experi-
ment in the arti¯cially created world, ¯ve conditions have to be met (for a more
thorough discussion, see Smith (1976, 1982), Plott (1979), Wilde (1980), and1.2. The methodology of laboratory experiments 5
List (2006a)). The ¯rst is nonsatiation; more of the reward medium should
preferred to less (usually money is the medium of reward in laboratory exper-
iments). Second is salience; choices made in an experiment should be directly
linked to payo®s in a manner understood by participants. The third condition is
dominance; rewards in the experiment should be greater than subjective costs.
Fourth is privacy; subjects receive information on their own payo® alternatives
only. The ¯nal condition is parallelism; properties of behavior should translate
to real world settings where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold.
Having designed a clean experiment, the researcher is then able to observe
causal e®ects when changes are made to an environment. The main advantage of
conducting experiments in the laboratory is that the proper counterfactual can
be observed; the researcher knows what would have happened in an environment
in case a certain treatment would not have been implemented. A necessary
condition for this to hold, is that subjects are randomly allocated into di®erent
treatments. If this does not hold, then selection bias e®ects might confound the
causal e®ect of a treatment. In real life, selection e®ects are hard to overcome,
and hence it is hard to make causal inferences based on naturally occurring data
when a policy measure is in e®ect. For example, consider the e®ects of class
size on student performance. It is to be expected that smaller classes lead to
greater student performance, because students receive more personal attention
from the teacher. However, when looking at grades of students in small or large
classes, they are more or less the same (for more details see Finn and Achilles
(1990) and Krueger (1999)). One of the reasons is that smarter students are
put into bigger classes; selection bias confounds the direct e®ects that class size
have on student performance.
To see the problems of selection bias, consider the following (this analysis is
based on Angrist and Pischke (2009)). Let Yi represent the observed outcome of
individual i and let Y1i and Y0i represent the potential outcome of an individual
who has either undergone the treatment or not (represented by Di = 1 or Di = 0
respectively). Then:
E[YijDi = 1] ¡ E[YijDi = 0]
| {z }
Observed difference between treated
= E[Y1ijDi = 1] ¡ E[Y0ijDi = 0]
¡ E[Y0ijDi = 1] + E[Y0ijDi = 1]
= E[Y1ijDi = 1] ¡ E[Y0ijDi = 1]
| {z }
Average effect of treatment6 Chapter 1. Introduction




The term E[Y1ijDi = 1] ¡ E[Y0ijDi = 1] is the average causal e®ect of the
treatment. It shows the potential outcome of someone who has undergone the
treatment, E[Y1ijDi = 1], and the potential outcome of that same person in
case he would not have undergone the treatment, E[Y0ijDi = 1]. Of course,
in real life it is impossible to observe both outcomes at the same time. The
term E[Y0ijDi = 1]¡E[Y0ijDi = 0] is the selection bias e®ect, it represents the
average potential outcomes Y0i of those who are and those who are not treated.
In the example of class size and student performance, it could be the case that
less smart students are more likely to be put in small classes. Therefore, those in
smaller classes are likely to have worse values of Y0i, which causes the selection
bias to be negative in this example. This has the e®ect that the observed
di®erence underestimates the true e®ects of class size.
By means of randomly assigning subjects to treatments, it is as if the causal
e®ect could be observed. To see this, simply rearrange:
E[YijDi = 1] ¡ E[YijDi = 0]
| {z }
Observed difference between treated
= E[Y1ijDi = 1] ¡ E[Y0ijDi = 0]
= E[Y1ijDi = 1] ¡ E[Y0ijDi = 1]
= E[Y1i ¡ Y0i]:
| {z }
Causal effect of treatment
The trick is that E[Y0ijDi = 0] can be substituted for E[Y0ijDi = 1], because
randomization makes Di independent of Y0i. Therefore, by using randomization,
the selection biases disappears from the equation, allowing the researcher to
observe the causal e®ects of the treatment.
A large experimental literature has emerged on social dilemmas, comparing
actual behavior of subjects to the predictions of conventional economic theory
of zero cooperation. In the domain of group social dilemmas, such as those
found with many environmental problems, two experimental games dominate
the stream of research in economics. The two games are called the Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism, also known as the Public Goods game, and the Com-
mon Pool Resource game. In the Public Goods game, N individuals each receive
y tokens. Each token can be invested in either a private account, or a group
account. Returns from the private account are for the investor only. Revenues
of each token invested in the group account are divided equally among all indi-
viduals, irrespective whether or not someone contributed to the group account.1.2. The methodology of laboratory experiments 7
The pro¯t equation of the public goods game usually has the following form:
¼i = y ¡ xi + ®
N X
i=1
xi; 0 < ® < 1 < N®; 0 · xi · y;
where xi represents the amount of tokens invested in the group account. The
preceding game represents a social dilemma if two conditions hold. The ¯rst is
that individual returns of an investment in the private account are greater than
individual returns of an investment in the group account (® < 1). Secondly, the
group as a whole earns the greatest payo®s when all contribute fully to the group
account (1 < N®). Because of the ¯rst condition, conventional economic theory
predicts that no individual will invest any tokens in the group account when the
game is played a ¯nite number of times. For that reason, xi is interpreted as a
measure of cooperation.
The Common Pool Resource game is similar in structure as the Public Goods
game; N agents can invest y tokens in either a private or group account. The
main di®erences with the Public Goods game are threefold. First, the payo®
function of the group account is non-linear. Second, the Nash equilibrium and
the social optimum are in the interior. Third, the game is usually framed as a
negative externality problem. An often used pro¯t equation is the following:






where X represents the sum of tokens put in by the N agents (X =
PN
i=1 xi).
The term AX ¡ BX2 represents the yield that the common pool resource pro-
vides. Each agent i receives a share of the resource's yield equal to her share
in aggregate extraction e®ort (xi=X). Conventional economic theory predicts
that each agent will invest in the common pool resource up to the point where
private marginal costs are equal to private marginal bene¯ts. This causes each
agent to have investments equal to xNE
i = (A ¡ w)=B(N + 1). However, since
part of the costs of investing in the common pool resource are shifted onto oth-
ers, agents have an incentive to invest more than is socially optimal. In case
all agents would take into account the negative external e®ects they impose on
others, the socially optimal investment levels are xSO
i = (A ¡ w)=2BN. In this
game, xNE
i > xSO
i if N > 2, therefore, the game represents a social dilemma.
Experimental evidence overwhelmingly shows that subjects in laboratory
experiments behave di®erently than conventional economic theory predicts. The
¯rst experiments on the Public Goods Game appear at the end of the 1970's.
Marwell and Ames (1979) conduct a variant of the Public Goods game described
above; all members of the group received an equal bonus, provided enough was8 Chapter 1. Introduction
contributed to the group account. The authors ¯nd that subjects for whom
it is less costly to contribute donate more to the public account. No evidence
was found on the e®ects of group size; subjects donated similar amounts to
the group account, irrespective of the number of group members. Isaac et al.
(1985) also consider the e®ects of di®erent costs of providing the public good,
and they also ¯nd that subjects who can supply the public good cheaper are
more willing to do so. In some treatments, the authors provide information
to the subjects about the equilibrium outcomes. They ¯nd that this leads the
subjects to contribute more to the group account. Isaac and Walker (1988b)
delve deeper into the e®ects of group size. In their design, all members of the
group either have big costs to contribute, or small costs to contribute. They
¯nd that groups with small costs contribute more than groups with big costs.
However, the e®ects of group size are negligible, given the costs to contribute.
One of earliest studies on the Common Pool Resource game is conducted by
Walker et al. (1990). They ¯nd that, compared to the social optimum, very
small payo®s are obtained. When subjects are given more tokens to invest into
the group account, subjects do not hesitate to use them, leading to even lower
payo®s for all involved.
Two stylized facts have emerged from hundreds of studies on the Public
Goods game and Common Pool Resource game (see Ledyard (1995) for an
overview of experiments conducted on the Public Goods game and Ostrom
(2006) for an overview of the Common Pool Resource game). The ¯rst is that
when the games are played repeatedly, considerable levels of cooperation are ob-
served in the initial periods of the experiment; usually between forty and sixty
percent of endowment is allocated to the group account. Secondly, a downward
trend in cooperation is observed. As more and more periods are played, contri-
butions to the group account become less, but many studies report substantial
contributions in the last period.
The two stylized facts have in°uenced theorists to explain why behavior
of humans di®ers from that of the rational and sel¯sh actor usually assumed
in theoretical models. The ¯rst fact, positive cooperation in early stages of
the experiments, is interpreted as evidence that subjects have other-regarding
preferences (see Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), and Andreoni and Samuelson (2006)). The second fact, a decline in
cooperation over time, is interpreted as subjects making fewer errors over time
(Palfrey and Prisbey (1996), Andreoni (1995), and Houser and Kurzban (2002)),
reputation building (Andreoni (1988), Sonnemans et al. (1999), and Brandts
and Schram (2001)), and as conditional cooperation (Neugebauer et al. (2007)).1.3. Informal institutions in the lab 9
1.3 Informal institutions in the lab
Although more cooperation is observed in the two social dilemma games than
conventional economic theory predicts, economists have begun to search for
factors that promote cooperation. Especially the search for informal instruments
has spun a large literature. Among the most studied is peer-to-peer punishment,
while peer-to-peer reward has received more attention lately. Punishment allows
subjects to make a positive cost to reduce the earnings of other group members,
after everyone learns about the contribution and earnings of each group member.
Conventional economic theory predicts that the instrument will never be used.
Agents would like to free-ride o® the e®orts of others. Free-riding is possible,
because bene¯ts of potential behavior changes in the social dilemma situation
by someone who is punished, accrue to all agents, even to those who have
not made the costs of punishment. If the game is ¯nitely repeated, backward
induction leads agents to refrain from using costly punishment. This works
as follows: In the last period of the game, punishment cannot enforce future
cooperation. Therefore, in the last period of the game, no punishment will
be used. Anticipating this, agents will all free-ride in the last period. In the
next to last period, agents anticipate that other group members will free-ride
in the next period, and hence, costly punishment will have no e®ect on future
play. Therefore, punishment will be ine®ective in the next to last period. This
reasoning continues all the way to the ¯rst period, causing punishment not to
be used. A disadvantage of punishment is that welfare e®ects are ambiguous.
Punishment might lead to an increase in cooperation, but since punishment
reduces earnings of both the user and the receiver, it might be the case that all
are worse o® than in case of no punishment.
Yamagishi (1986) is the ¯rst to study punishment in the Public Goods game.
In his design, subjects play a period of the Public Goods game ¯rst. Then, af-
ter learning who contributes least, everyone can invest in a new public pot. If
enough contributions are made, then the public pot is used to reduce the earn-
ings of the group member with the lowest contribution in the Public Goods stage.
Yamagishi ¯nds that contributions to the public pot are signi¯cant, contrary to
what economic theory predicts. Moreover, subjects start to increase their con-
tributions in the Public Goods game, hoping to avoid being punished. Fehr
and GÄ achter (2000, 2002) implement a slightly di®erent version of punishment.
Rather than contributing to a public pot, each subject can spend resources to
punish group members directly, independent of whether or not some threshold
is reached. In their in°uential studies, the authors ¯nd that punishment is fre-10 Chapter 1. Introduction
quently imposed, and that contributions to the public good rise quickly. This
¯nding is surprising, because groups change in composition between periods. A
strategic motive of punishment seems therefore not plausible, because interac-
tion with the same individual is ruled out. Punishment does not always work,
it seems to depend on cultural aspects as well. Herrmann et al. (2008) repeat
the punishment setup of Fehr and GÄ achter (2002) in sixteen di®erent countries
over the world. In most of those countries, punishment promotes cooperation.
However, in some countries, perverse punishment is the rule rather than the
exception; those who contribute most to the public good receive punishment.
Punishment in the Common Pool Resource game is ¯rst studied by Ostrom
et al. (1992). They ¯nd that punishment is e®ective in promoting cooperation.
However, in combination with communication, almost full levels of cooperation
are obtained by most groups.
Observing that punishment is e®ective in promoting cooperation, some re-
searchers have studied how costs of punishment in°uence its use. Using a
strangers matching protocol, Carpenter (2007) shows that punishment is like
an ordinary good. After every three periods, the price of punishment changes;
the cheaper punishment becomes, the more it is used. Nikiforakis and Normann
(2008) ¯nd something similar, using a partner matching protocol. The authors
¯nd that punishment can lead to welfare improvements if it is su±ciently cheap.
Only when the cost bene¯t ratio is 1:3 or better, does punishment lead to a wel-
fare improvement.
The previous studies have shown that punishment is used often, and that
it leads to considerable increases in cooperation. Contrary to what economic
theory predicts, the second-order free-rider problem of punishment seems not
to be an issue. The question then becomes how subjects respond to punishment
when given the opportunity to take revenge, by allowing for counter-punishment.
Conventional economic theory predicts that costly counter-punishment should
not be feared, because free-riding motives will make individuals refrain from
using it. Nikiforakis (2008) shows, by building on the design of Fehr and GÄ achter
(2000), that revenge indeed is widespread. In his design, Nikiforakis adds a
second punishment stage after the ¯rst punishment stage. Roughly a quarter of
the subjects engage in costly counter-punishment. When allowing for counter-
punishment, welfare levels are lower than when only one stage of punishment is
present. A similar study to Nikiforakis (2008) is conducted by Denant-Boemont
et al. (2007). They conduct a no-revenge treatment in which subjects do not
learn who punished them, but everyone receives information on who punished
other group members, and by how much. It turns out that subjects have no1.3. Informal institutions in the lab 11
problem overcoming the third-order problem of free-riding; those who fail to
punish others become punished themselves.
Given the success punishment has in establishing cooperation, a logical al-
ternative instrument to consider is reward. Rewards have two major advantages
over punishment. The ¯rst advantage is that rewards do not lead to losses in
welfare. Whereas punishment is costly for both the sender and receiver, reward
is costly for the sender, but those costs are o®set by the gains to the receiver.1
Secondly, in real life everyone is free to use rewards. No law hinders some-
one from giving money to another individual, or to provide help in knowledge
speci¯c tasks. The same cannot be said of punishment, because the right of co-
ercion typically lies with the government. Hence, using punishment is in many
societies not allowed.
Unlike the undivided succes of punishment, rewards do not lead to an un-
ambiguous increase in cooperation. Failure or succes of rewards seem to depend
crucially on the cost-bene¯t ratio. A mere transfer of rewards, those with a
cost-bene¯t ratio of 1:1, does not promote cooperation. This has been shown
by Sefton et al. (2007) in the Public Goods game. In their design, groups are
formed using the partner matching protocol. Although initially rewards have
a positive e®ect on cooperation, this e®ect does not last long. Interestingly,
rewards were given to those who contributed more than the group average, but
there was no correlation between the number of rewards received and the degree
of above average contributions to the group account. Similar conclusions in the
Common Pool Resource game are drawn from the study by Vyrastekova and
van Soest (2008). Transfer rewards do not have a positive impact on cooper-
ation when the same individuals meet each other in multiple periods. Things
change when net-positive rewards are used; these are rewards with lower costs
for the sender than the bene¯ts for the receiver. Vyrastekova and van Soest
(2008) use a 1:3 cost-bene¯t ratio and ¯nd a signi¯cant increase in cooperation
compared to the baseline scenario without cooperation. Further evidence that
net positive rewards promote cooperation is provided by Rand et al. (2009).
In their Public Goods experiment, they form groups consisting of the same in-
dividuals who keep their identity each period. The authors ¯nd that rewards
do a better job in promoting cooperation than punishment does. Sutter et al.
(2010) compare punishment and reward in the Public Goods game, using either
a 1:1 ratio, or a 1:3 ratio. Like the results of Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008),
Sutter et al. (2010) ¯nd that net-positive rewards promote cooperation. In ad-
1An exception would be the case where the costs of a reward are bigger than its bene¯ts,
but such rewards have not been tested in laboratory experiments.12 Chapter 1. Introduction
ditional treatments, subjects have the possibility to vote on whether they want
to have a reward instrument or not, or a punishment instrument or not. Sub-
jects vote more often in favor of reward than in favor of punishment. Groups
who vote for reward attain greater levels of cooperation compared to a base-
line without instruments. However, the greatest levels of cooperation are found
in groups that vote for punishment. Contrary to the results of Sutter et al.
(2010), GÄ urerk et al. (2004) ¯nd that an endogenous choice of reward does not
promote cooperation. In their design, subjects can chose in which group they
would like to participate, in a baseline group with no instruments, a punishment
group or reward group. The authors ¯nd that contributions in the endogenous
punishment treatment come close to the social optimum, while contributions in
the endogenous reward treatment are even lower than those of the exogenous
reward treatment.
All in all, most studies on net-positive rewards show that an increase in
cooperation can be established. However, the way in which rewards are studied
in the laboratory does not seem to ¯t the way it is likely to be used in the real
world. Firstly, all of the above studies on rewards, with the exception of Rand
et al. (2009), use a partner matching protocol where identity labels are shu²ed
between periods. This procedure ensures that subjects become anonymous the
period after they have made their reward decisions. Conceptually this makes
sense, because subjects have no way to base their reward decision other than on
observed behavior in the social dilemma. However, when it comes to reward in
real life, someone who uses rewards has all the incentives to reveal his identity
and build a reputation. This would naturally translate into a partner matching
design where identity labels are constant over the periods, like in Rand et al.
(2009). Secondly, it is expected that in real life rewards are not arti¯cially
stopped after one opportunity. Like punishment, it seems realistic that the use
of rewards calls for opportunities of immediate direct reciprocity.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, a Common Pool Resource experiment is con-
ducted with two, rather than one, reward opportunities. Adding an additional
reward stage can have two e®ects. The ¯rst is that subjects are given an ex-
tra opportunity to show that they approve of cooperative play in the common
pool resource. Anticipating this can lead subjects to be even more coopera-
tive than in a game with only one stage of reward. The second e®ect can be
that subjects lose their interest in the common pool resource, and engage in
a (safer) bilateral exchange of reward tokens. A crucial factor of importance
is the degree of anonymity. When subjects are able to track the identities of
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counter-rewards becomes attractive. However, when subjects are made anony-
mous between the periods, such a mechanism is impossible. It could be the
case that in those scenarios, rewards are used in an enforcing way to promote
cooperation; only those who cooperate receive rewards. The ¯rst part of the
analysis in Chapter 3 considers the e®ects of two stages of reward in a partner
matching protocol where identity labels are kept constant over the periods. We
¯nd overwhelming evidence that the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst; subjects
try to engage in a bilateral exchange of reward tokens. Whereas the reward
instrument is used almost maximally, cooperation in the common pool resource
is virtually absent. The analysis proceeds by considering the partner matching
protocol where identity labels are randomized between periods. It turns out
that a large share of the subjects again engage in a bilateral exchange of reward
tokens. Although our design hinders the ability to do so, subjects overcome this
problem by systematically exerting the same e®ort levels in the common pool
resource. This e®ort level serves as a `signal' which is picked up by other users
of the resource who are active in the bilateral exchange of rewards. Cooperation
in this treatment is slightly greater than the sel¯sh equilibrium, but not signif-
icantly so. The reason of the small increase in cooperation has nothing to do
with an intrinsic motivation to cooperate, but it is because of the wide array of
e®ort levels chosen by subjects to distinguish themselves from others. Finally,
in another treatment the stranger matching protocol is used, where subjects are
put into di®erent groups after each period. In this treatment, the use of the
reward instrument approaches zero, and cooperation levels are worse than the
outcome predicted for the sel¯sh optimum.
Chapter 4 of this thesis extends Chapter 3, by taking a closer look at the
partner matching protocol with randomized identity labels. In this chapter, the
two stages of reward treatment is compared by a treatment with only one stage
of reward, taken from Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008). Interestingly, although
rewards only promote cooperation in the treatment with one stage of reward,
greater levels of rewards are used in the treatment with two reward stages.
The reason is that in the treatment with two stages of reward, many subjects
engage in a bilateral exchange of rewards. The way in which those rewards are
used, in combination with the use of the common pool resource, gives insights
into the social preferences of the subject pool. One-third of the subject pool
behaves cooperatively in the common pool resource, while also being generous
in terms of sending rewards and counter-rewards. Those subjects are classi¯ed
as `pro-social'. Half of the subject pool can be classi¯ed as `strategic money
maximizers', they are not acting cooperatively in the common pool resource,14 Chapter 1. Introduction
but do send out rewards in the ¯rst reward stage. When it comes to the second
reward stage, they defect when it comes to counter-reward those who have
rewarded them. Finally, one-sixth can be classi¯ed as homo economicus; these
subjects show no signs of cooperation in the common pool resource and hardly
use any reward tokens in either of the two reward stages.
1.4 The methodology of ¯eld experiments
Although laboratory experiments are a popular tool in an economist's tool kit,
the use of it does not come without criticism. The most heard criticism is
that of a lack of `external validity'; laboratory experiments are too stylized,
and are therefore not representative of the real world (see Falk and Heckman
(2009) for a discussion). One way, for example, in which conventional laboratory
experiments di®er from real world scenarios, is the fact that in many studies,
(mostly Western undergraduate) students are used as a subject pool. Students
do not seem to be representative of the average population (see Henrich et al.
(2010) for a review). Another way in which real world scenarios might di®er
from conventional laboratory experiments, is that subjects who participate in
experiments are aware that they are being scrutinized. Especially in the area of
social preferences, knowing that one is scrutinized by a researcher could in°uence
subjects to make more pro-social decisions (see Levitt and List (2007, 2008) for
an elaborate discussion). To address the criticism on conventional laboratory
experiments, the use of ¯eld experiments is becoming more popular. Field
experiments are experiments like laboratory experiments, but conducted in a
natural environment. A drawback of moving to the ¯eld is that control is lost
over the experiment; a researcher is not able to induce utility functions like
in the laboratory. In return, ¯eld experiments have a better external validity
because they are more realistic than conventional laboratory experiments.
To adequately measure behavior in a ¯eld experiment, the ¯ve conditions
mentioned in section 1.2 have to be met. Another building block that is im-
portant in ¯eld experiments is randomization of subjects into treatments. Only
then, causal inference can be made from observed data, because randomization
allows the researcher to observe the proper counterfactual. Harrison and List
(2004) propose six factors that are important to determine the ¯eld context of
¯eld experiments. These factors are the composition of the subject pool, the
information that the subjects bring to the task, the commodity, the task or
trading rules applied, the stakes, and the environment in which the subjects op-
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di®erent ¯eld experiments. By adding more and more of the six elements to the
conventional laboratory experiment, Harrison and List propose a methodologi-
cal procedure to `build a bridge from the laboratory to the ¯eld'; a step by step
procedure that allows a researcher to study di®erences between conventional
laboratory experiments and behavior in the ¯eld. The ¯rst step outside the
conventional laboratory is what is termed an artifactual ¯eld experiment. An
artifactual ¯eld experiment is the same as a conventional laboratory experiment,
with the exception that the conventional student subject pool is replaced by a
non-standard subject pool. The non-standard subject pool brings a di®erent
set of information to the experiment than students usually have. The second
step in the bridge is the framed ¯eld experiment. In a framed ¯eld experiment,
natural context is provided to the task of the artifactual ¯eld experiment. This
is done by changing the nature of the commodities used in the experiment, the
task or trading rules, and the stakes of the game. Finally, the last step of the
bridge is termed a natural ¯eld experiment. A natural ¯eld experiment adds to
the framed ¯eld experiment in the following way: The experiment is conducted
in the natural environment known to the subjects, while they are not aware
that they are being scrutinized. Natural ¯eld experiments are in a sense the
most interesting experiments, because they use randomization and have natural
realism of the task.
Comparison across the di®erent types of ¯eld experiments allows a researcher
to track di®erences between the conventional laboratory and naturally occur-
ring real world settings. This makes the bridge proposed by Harrison and List
ideal to gain insights in the external validity of conventional laboratory exper-
iments. Di®erences in behavior between a conventional laboratory experiment
and artifactual ¯eld experiment gives insights in the di®erences between stu-
dents and subjects of the real world setting of interest. Comparing the results
of an artifactual ¯eld experiment with a framed ¯eld experiment shows possi-
ble di®erences between a stylized context-free experiment and an experiment
that has more context and more realistic commodities; an intermediate step
towards the natural ¯eld experiment. Finally, di®erences in behavior between
a framed ¯eld experiment and a natural ¯eld experiment shed light on what
e®ects scrutiny have on behavior.
Some studies are conducted that address the external validity issues raised by
critics of conventional laboratory experiments. In the domain of social dilem-
mas, studies that conduct artifactual ¯eld experiments on the Public Goods
game or Common Pool Resource game show that behavior is similar to that
observed in conventional laboratory experiments. For example, Barr (2001)16 Chapter 1. Introduction
conducts a one-shot Public Goods game with a sample of inhabitants of rural
Zimbabwe. She ¯nds that the subjects contribute positive amounts of tokens
to the public good. When allowing for punishment, subjects cooperate more.
Ru²e and Sosis (2007) conduct a one-shot public goods game with religious
individuals in Israel. They ¯nd that the subjects have positive levels of coop-
eration, and that the more someone engages in religious activities, the greater
the level of cooperation. Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) conduct a Common Pool
Resource experiment with rural villagers of Colombia. They ¯nd positive levels
of cooperation. As expected, individuals become less cooperative if they have
experience with the game, and if they are less familiar with their group mem-
bers. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008) conduct a Public Goods game with Brazilian
¯shermen. Fehr and Leibbrandt compare the behavior of the ¯shermen in the
laboratory to the mesh sizes of the ¯shing nets they use when they catch ¯sh
in their daily lives. Using nets with larger mesh sizes is interpreted as evidence
for cooperation, because such nets cannot catch small ¯sh. The authors ¯nd a
positive correlation; those who cooperate in the laboratory are also more likely
to cooperate in the ¯eld.
Two natural ¯eld experiments on social dilemmas deserve extra attention.
The ¯rst is the study by Erev et al. (1993). The authors conduct an experiment
at a fruit picking farm under three conditions. In the ¯rst condition, students
are hired to pick oranges. The revenues that they make depend on the number
of oranges they pick themselves. In the second condition, students have to
pick oranges in teams. The team production has some features of a public
goods game; all the revenues that the group make are shared equally. Finally, a
treatment is conducted in which students are placed in teams where revenues are
shared equally. A bonus is rewarded to the team with the greatest output. The
results show that cooperation among students is possible; team production is
greater when a bonus is provided. Teams in the bonus condition pick on average
more oranges than students in the individual treatment. A second natural ¯eld
experiment is conducted by Bandiera et al. (2005). They monitor fruit pickers
under di®erent circumstances. In one treatment, the earnings of each worker
depend on own productivity only. They compare the results to a treatment
where each worker's earnings are proportional to the total output. Therefore, a
worker who picks more than an average worker imposes a negative externality on
others. The authors ¯nd that workers internalize their externality by working
less hard in the second treatment. Pure altruism is ruled out, because the
¯nding disappears when the workers cannot be monitored by colleagues.
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, the external validity of the Public Goods game is1.4. The methodology of ¯eld experiments 17
explicitly tested by conducting a framed ¯eld experiment. External validity of
the Public Goods game is tested by building the bridge proposed by Harrison
and List (2004). The setting of the ¯eld experiment is a privately owned recre-
ational ¯shing facility, called `De Biestse Oevers'. At this ¯shing facility, regular
costumers can pay a ¯xed amount to ¯sh for four hours at rainbow trout. A
convenient feature of this trout is that it is a hunting ¯s which actively pursues
bait. Hence, a ¯sherman can catch more ¯sh by exerting more e®ort; the process
of constantly casting and reeling in bait. The properties of the rainbow trout
make `De Biestse Oevers' an ideal setting to conduct experiments. Not only can
output be monitored, but also the e®ort levels that ¯shermen exert.
In the ¯eld experiment described in Chapter 5, ¯shermen are placed in groups
of four. Each ¯sherman is allowed to catch up to two ¯sh in each of the six pe-
riods. All ¯sh caught are for the ¯shermen to take home, but a social dilemma
is created by paying each other group member for each ¯sh that a ¯sherman
foregoes catching. This treatment is compared to a treatment where no incen-
tives are provided to reduce the catch of ¯sh. The results are very much in line
with what conventional economic theory predicts: Fishermen ¯sh with the same
intensity and catch similar amounts of ¯sh in the private incentive treatment
as they do in the public goods treatment. The analysis continues by exploring
the di®erences with behavior usually observed in Public Goods games in the
lab; cooperation in early periods which diminishes as the periods go by. The
¯eld experiment is translated to a laboratory game, and played with students
and a sample of the pool of ¯shermen. Finally, the laboratory game is played
outside the traditional lab; at the recreational ¯shing site itself. The results
show that behavior in all laboratory treatments is in accordance with the two
stylized facts. Therefore, neither the subject pool, nor the physical environment
cause the di®erence in behavior with the ¯eld setting. An additional ¯eld ex-
periment is conducted which represents a dynamic version of the Common Pool
Resource game. The advantage of this design is that the medium of reward is
kept constant: Catching ¯sh now results in less ¯sh in the future, rather than
less money for others. Again, we ¯nd no evidence of cooperation. The results
show it is hard for cooperation to occur in situations which require e®ort of
participants to free-ride, and where group members are anonymous and cannot
communicate with each other.18 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.5 Informal institutions in the ¯eld
To the best of my knowledge, no controlled ¯eld experiment on social dilemmas
has ever been conducted that explicitly tests the e®ectiveness of informal instru-
ments. The most popular and e®ective instrument that promotes cooperation
in the laboratory is monetary punishment. Given the absence of cooperation in
the ¯eld experiment of Chapter 5, the setting used there provides an extreme
case in which to test monetary punishment. Two experiments on monetary
punishment are presented in Chapter 6. The ¯rst experiment adds a monetary
punishment stage to the Public Goods game conducted in Chapter 5. The ex-
periment is divided into two parts, the ¯rst two periods are the baseline game
with no punishment, followed by four periods with punishment opportunities.
Secondly, monetary punishment is added to the dynamic version of the Com-
mon Pool Resource game. Subject play three periods of either a baseline game,
or three periods of the same game with punishment. After each period, sub-
jects receive feedback on the catch and earnings of each fellow group member.
Then, they each receive an endowment of three euros, added to their earnings.
The subjects are allowed to spend those three euros; each euro spent, reduces
the earnings of a fellow group member with three euro. The results show that
punishment has no e®ect on cooperation. Fishermen ¯sh with the same inten-
sity and catch similar amounts of ¯sh, irrespective of punishment opportunities.
Strikingly, almost no use of the punishment instrument is made. The data
suggest that ¯shermen are averse to using monetary punishment. The e®ect
that monetary punishment has in conventional laboratory experiments does not
carry over to our ¯eld experiment. This means that there are situations where
monetary punishment alone does not have the desired e®ects on cooperation.
Although monetary punishment is the natural candidate in the lab, it might
seem strange in the ¯eld setting of Chapter 5 and 6. The media of reward in
those experiments are ¯shing time, and money. For this reason, the e®ects of
punishment and reward are further explored in Chapter 7. Rather than using
money as a punishment mechanism, ¯shing time is the medium of exchange.
In this chapter, a variant of the Public Goods game of Chapter 5 and 6 is
presented. The experiment consists of two parts. In part 2, ¯shermen can ¯sh
unconstrained for up to 150 minutes. Each ¯sh they catch is theirs to take
home, and a bonus of two euros per ¯sh is given in addition. After each half
hour, the stock of ¯sh is replenished to give the ¯shermen the opportunity to
catch as much as possible. Part 1 consists of three periods of thirty minutes
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allowed to catch up to two ¯sh. Each ¯sh that a ¯sherman catches is his to
take home, but the consequence of each ¯sh caught is that the other three
group members face a ten minute reduction of ¯shing time in part 2. The
results of this treatment are very similar to the results presented in Chapter
5 and 6; ¯shermen try to catch as much ¯sh as possible, there are no signs
of cooperation. In two additional treatments, the e®ects of punishment and
reward are tested. At the end of each of the three periods in part 1, subjects
receive information about the catch of each group member. Then, each subject
is allowed to reduce his own ¯shing time in part 2 by up to three intervals
of ¯ve minutes. In the punishment treatment, each interval used reduces the
¯shing time of a targeted group member with ¯fteen minutes. An increase of
¯fteen minutes can be provided to group members in the reward treatment.
Note that a 1:3 ratio is used in both treatments. Experimental evidence from
the laboratory shows that this ratio should be su±cient to establish an increase
in cooperation. However, the results show no evidence at all of an increase in
cooperation. Fishermen ¯sh with the same intensity as they do in the baseline
treatment with no informal institutions. Also when a di®erent medium of reward
is used, punishment and reward have no e®ect on cooperation in our ¯eld setting.
In Chapter 7, a closer look at the use of rewards and punishment is provided.
Rewards are used more often, but only punishment is used in an intuitive way;
those who catch more ¯sh are punished more often. For rewards, this is not
the case, there is no correlation between catch an rewards received. The use of
punishment suggests that subjects do not use it hoping to change behavior of
fellow group members. Rather, punishment seems to be used in order to vent
some frustrations by the victims of free-riders. Research in the ¯eld of neuroe-
conomics shows that punishment in itself gives pleasure to subjects, because it
feels nice to take revenge (see for example de Quervain et al. (2004), Singer
et al. (2006) and Fehr and Camerer (2007)).
The ¯nal chapter of this thesis provides a short conclusion. The lessons
learned are summarized, and some policy implications are presented as well as
lessons to be learned for the scienti¯c community. Finally, some attention is




One of the big puzzles in understanding today's society is the observation that
many social systems are developed around, and built on cooperation among
individuals.1 For cooperation to exist, individuals have to engage in altruistic
actions. Altruism is de¯ned as `behavior by an individual that increases the
¯tness of another individual while decreasing the ¯tness of the actor' (Bell 2008,
p.367{368). The overwhelming evidence of cooperation in today's society seems
to be at odds with the traditional view of natural selection: Only the strong
who maximize their own ¯tness survive and reproduce. This interpretation of
natural selection leaves no room for altruism and cooperation.
In this chapter, I will present a summary of three important mechanisms
of the existence of altruism: kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reci-
procity.2 Kin selection theories are based on the notion that an altruistic act to
someone genetically closely related yields indirect survival advantages. A sacri-
¯ce for family members increases the degree to which they are able to reproduce.
1Science Magazine ranked the question `How did cooperative behavior evolve?' sixteenth
in the top 25 questions that science faces the next twenty years (Pennisi (2005a)).
2Other mechanisms of the existence of altruism are explored in the literature as well.
Examples are network reciprocity (see for example Lieberman et al. (2005) and Durrett and
Levin (1996)), group selection (see for example Wilson (1975) and Wilson and Sober (1994)),
`green beard' models (see for example Riolo et al. (2001) and Jansen and van Baalen (2006)),
and voluntary participation to the game (see for example Hauert et al. (2002b) and Hauert
et al. (2002a)). Although each mechanism provides interesting insights on the emergence of
altruism, they are far removed from the chapters that follow. The interested reader is referred
to Nowak (2006).
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In this way, the genes of the altruist are passed on to the next generation in
an indirect way. Direct reciprocity works on the mechanism that if I help you
now, you can help me in the future. If we can credibly commit to a promise
to help in the future, then both of us will be better o® in the long run. Indi-
rect reciprocity occurs when an altruistic favor is not necessarily returned to
the actor by the recipient, but by someone else. Reputation is the key to the
evolution of altruism: Only those who help others are helped in return. Besides
these three mechanisms of the evolution of altruism, altruistic punishment is
considered. Altruistic punishment is not a mechanism, but an instrument that
can empower agents to help others. Punishment is especially e®ective in group
settings where one's actions re°ect on unrelated group members, both directly
and indirectly.
Before discussing the mechanisms of evolution, the dominant model showing
why people might not want to engage in altruistic actions is discussed brie°y.
This model is known as the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Its elegant form has been
used widely by economists, psychologists, and evolutionary biologists to model
cooperation among humans. This model forms the basis underlying the three
mechanisms addressed in this chapter. The Prisoner's Dilemma receives extra
attention, because it is the underlying model behind some of the chapters that
follow. In those chapters, I will present results on economic experiments which
are designed to test cooperation of individuals.
2.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma: A model of a world
without altruism
In the economics discipline, theoretical models are built around a speci¯c actor:
rational economic man.3 The most important aspect of this actor is that he
behaves `rationally'. Rationality refers to the ability to make optimal choices.
That means that rational economic man has the power to maximize his own
wellbeing at minimum costs, given the information available. One advantage of
assuming that agents are rational is that it makes theoretical models tractable
and solvable. Another advantage is that the rationality assumption is closely
related to the argument of natural selection: Only the strong and sel¯sh shall
survive. In the game theory literature, the rationality assumption is often in-
terpreted as meaning that rational economic man is sel¯sh. A rational agent
3The term economic man was used for the ¯rst time by Ingram (1888) to comment on
earlier work by John Stuart Mill (1836). See Persky (1995) for an overview of the history of
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only cares about his own wellbeing. However, including preferences for others
into the wellbeing of a rational actor does not violate the assumption of an
agent maximizing his utility. One can model the wellbeing of others into the
wellbeing function of rational economic man. For the remainder of this chapter,
I will use rationality as if it implies sel¯shness, as is most frequently done in the
economics literature.
A powerful theoretical demonstration of this mechanism is provided by an
in°uential paradigm called the Prisoner's Dilemma. It describes a game where
individuals can choose to help each other, but helping comes at a cost.4 In this
game, two players are confronted with a dilemma: they simultaneously have to
make a choice to either `cooperate' or `defect'. In its simplest form, choosing
to cooperate comes at an individual cost c, but there are no personal bene¯ts.
Cooperation does give the other player a bene¯t b. Note that this is precisely
like the de¯nition of an altruistic action stated earlier. It is assumed that the
recipient's bene¯ts are greater than the costs made by the decision maker, so
b > c. Therefore, if both players cooperate, each player earns a pro¯t of b¡c > 0.
If both players defect, each player earns a pro¯t of 0. The dilemma of this game
is made apparent by the payo®s resulting from one player who defects, while the
other cooperates. In this case, the cooperating player has a pro¯t of ¡c, while
the defecting player has a pro¯t of b. This dilemma becomes a `social dilemma'
when the payo®s of two cooperators are greater than the payo®s of a cooperator
and a defector; defection then results in a pro¯t for the defector, but a loss to
the population as a whole. Table 2.1 below presents the payo® matrix which





Cooperate b b ¡ c
Table 2.1 Payo®s for Player 1 in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Assuming rationality, the predictions of this game are straightforward. For
the moment, take as given that Player 2 commits to cooperate. In this case, it
is in Player 1's best interest to defect, because the personal payo®s of defecting
(b) are greater than the payo®s of cooperating (b ¡ c). Now, let's assume that
4The structure of this simple game has been developed by Merill Flood and Melvin
Dresher. Later, Albert Tucker converted the game to a situation in which two prisoners
simultaneously were given the option to reduce their sentence at the cost of increasing the
sentence of the other. See Poundstone (1992) for more details on the origin of this game.24 Chapter 2. Cooperation and Evolutionary Approaches
Player 2 commits to defect. Also in this case Player 1 is better o® to defect
and have pro¯ts of 0, rather than to cooperate and have pro¯ts of ¡c. Hence,
independent of the action of Player 2, Player 1 when defecting is always better
o®. Because the game is symmetric in payo®s to both players, Player 2 applies
the same logic and chooses to defect no matter what Player 1 chooses. Although
both players always defect, they both would be better o® cooperating. The sum
of payo®s when both defect is 0, while the sum of payo®s when both cooperate
is 2 £ (b ¡ c) > 0.
For the game above, it can be shown that defecting in the Prisoner's Dilemma
is an `evolutionarily stable strategy' (ESS) in a population of agents who either
always defect, or always cooperate. An ESS is a strategy which, if most agents
in the population adopt it, no other strategy can yield greater payo®s (Smith
and Price (1973)). To see that defecting is an ESS in the game above, consider
the ¯tness of each strategy in a population with a fraction of p cooperators and
(1¡p) defectors (parts of the analysis are due to McElreath and Boyd (2007)).
It is assumed that agents interact randomly in this population. The ¯tness of
an agent who always cooperates is given by:
U(C) = u0 + p(b ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p) ¢ (¡c) (2.1)
= u0 + pb ¡ c:
Similarly, the ¯tness of a defector is given by:
U(D) = u0 + pb + (1 ¡ p) ¢ 0 (2.2)
= u0 + pb:
Therefore, for any given level of cooperators, the ¯tness of a defector is always
bigger. To model the evolution of frequencies of strategies in a population,
usually the replicator equation is used (see Taylor and Jonker (1978)). The
intuition behind the replicator equation is that natural selection favors those
strategies which have a greater than average payo®. A general form of the
replicator equation is given as follows:




where pi is the fraction of agent's using strategy i in a population with N
strategies. In the example above, the payo®s to defectors are greater than the
payo®s to cooperators. Hence, defectors must have a bigger payo® than the
average payo®, which eventually leads to the extinction of cooperators in the
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The Prisoner's Dilemma yields stark predictions on how humans behave in
a situation where altruism makes everyone better o®. However, the problem is
that there is much real world evidence that humans show altruistic behavior.
Examples that humans are altruistic and protect the environment are over-
whelming (see for example Ostrom (1990), Somanathan (1991), and Baland
and Platteau (1996)), and studies with laboratory experiments provide a large
body of evidence that humans are willing to forego pro¯ts to help others. Ex-
periments with the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma show that humans do choose
to cooperate (see for example Rapoport and Dale (1967), Andreoni and Miller
(1993), and Tversky (2004)). One explanation that is o®ered as to why humans
might want to show altruistic behavior is because humans care about those they
are closely connected to. This idea is better known as kin selection.
2.3 Kin selection: Cooperation among related
agents
The model described above shows that in a population of pure cooperators
and pure defectors, random interaction between the two types causes defectors
to have greater levels of ¯tness. Therefore, defectors will invade a population
of cooperators; greater levels of ¯tness cause the defectors to produce more
o®spring. But how about the situation when cooperators interact with and care
about their relatives? If a cooperator is not able to produce more o®spring in a
direct way, perhaps this is possible indirectly. When asked if he would sacri¯ce
his life for a brother, John Haldane famously replied: `No, but I would to save
two brothers or eight cousins.' Haldane (1932, 1955) noted that an altruistic act
could cause one's brother to produce more o®spring, thereby indirectly passing
genes along. For genes to pass on to the next generation, one could sacri¯ce his
life for a brother, if this brother has two or more o®spring. One could sacri¯ce
his life for a nephew, if this nephew will have eight or more o®spring.
With the previous analogy in mind, a population of cooperators can prosper
when interaction between agents is not random, but conditional on type (this
analysis is based on McElreath and Boyd (2007)). For this purpose, rewrite
equation (2.1) and (2.2) as follows:
U(C) = u0 + Pr[CjC](b ¡ c) + Pr[DjC] ¢ ¡c; (2.3)
= u0 + Pr[CjC]b ¡ c;
U(D) = u0 + Pr[CjD]b + Pr[DjD] ¢ 0; (2.4)
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where Pr[CjD] represents the probability that someone is paired with a coop-
erator, given that he himself is a defector. Equation (2.3) can be rewritten by
using that Pr[CjC] + Pr[DjC] = 1. In case cooperators gain a larger share in
the population over time, the return to cooperation has to be greater than the
returns to defecting. This is the case when:
Pr[CjC]b ¡ c > Pr[CjD]b; or
(Pr[CjC] ¡ Pr[CjD])b > c: (2.5)
The link to Haldane's observation can be seen by interpreting the conditional
probabilities in terms of relatedness. Rather than interacting randomly, relat-
edness in°uences the probability that two agents meet. This is modeled by
incorporating the variable r into the conditional probabilities. The variable r is
a number between zero and one, a fraction that represents the probability that
two agents share the same strategy because they stem from common descent.
In terms of genes, r is one for full twins, and is one-half for full-siblings. For
half-siblings r is one-fourth, and for cousins it is one-eighth. The probability
that a cooperator meets another cooperator is given by Pr[CjC] = r +(1¡r)p.
The ¯rst term of the right hand side is the probability that two cooperators have
the same strategy because they stem from the same parents. The second term
presents the probability that two unrelated cooperators have the same strategy.
In a large population, it is likely that some individuals happen to have the same
strategy. The other conditional probabilities are given as follows:
Pr[DjC] = (1 ¡ r)(1 ¡ p);
Pr[DjD] = r + (1 ¡ r)(1 ¡ p);
Pr[CjD] = (1 ¡ r)p:
By substituting these probabilities into equation (2.5), we arrive at the following
condition for cooperation to be a successful strategy:
rb > c: (2.6)
This last equation is famously known as Hamilton's rule and was ¯rst established
by William Hamilton (1964a, 1964b). The interpretation of Hamilton's rule is
that altruism can sustain when the bene¯ts of an altruistic act, discounted by
the fraction of genes shared between the agents, are greater than the costs of
the act.
Kin selection provides powerful insights into patterns of altruism for insects
(for example, see Foster et al. (2005)). Examples can be found in the case of
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Seely (1995)). When it comes to the human species, the theory has less succes
in explaining real world behavior. One form of criticism is due to Sherwood
Washburn (1978). It is known that humans share many alleles, and that these
alleles don't change much over time.5 This means that the relatedness among
humans is very high, and that altruism should be observed in an overwhelming
amount of instances. However, although altruism does occur in real life, it is
less frequent than predicted by kin selection. Support for this claim is provided
by Segal and Hershberger (1999), who conduct a laboratory experiment on the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. As subjects, they use monozygotic and dizygotic
twin pairs. In line with what kin selection predicts, more cooperation is found
between monozygotic twins than between dizygotic twins. However, in contrast
to kin selection theory, for both types of twins it is found that more defection
has occurred than cooperation. Another study on the e®ects of relatedness is
done by Charness and Gneezy (2008). They conduct a laboratory experiment
on the dictator game, ¯rst conducted by Kahneman et al. (1986). In the
dictator game, a subject receives an endowment of money. The subject can
then decide how much to send to an anonymous recipient. In a way, this game
is a stripped down version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game; only one player
makes a decision to `cooperate' or to `defect'. A rational and sel¯sh actor would
never send any money to a recipient, but kin selection predicts that giving to
related individuals might be possible. Two variants of the dictator game are
played. In the ¯rst treatment, dictators are told that the possible recipient
shares the same family name. The second treatment has no such information.
Charness and Gneezy ¯nd that 42 percent of the dictators give at least half of
their endowment to a recipient who shares the same family name. In contrast,
in the treatment where this information is not provided, twenty percent of the
subjects make such allocations. The results suggest that closer social distance
does make dictators more altruistic. Note, however, that the subjects are not
aware whom they are giving money to. Therefore, the data does not permit a
stringent test of kin selection.
Another form of criticism is that kin selection does not explain all altruistic
behavior observed real life situations (this holds for insects as well, see Wilson
(2005)). Many acts of altruism in real world settings are among non-relatives.
In these cases, the reward of an altruistic act in the form of passing on genes
to the next generation are forgone.6 Hence, understanding why strangers are
5Science Magazine ranked the question `Why do humans have so few genes?' third in its
top 25 challenges that science faces the next twenty years (Pennisi (2005b)).
6As noted by Trivers (1971), engaging in altruism because there is an indirect bene¯t of
passing on genes is not in line with the strict de¯nition of altruism. Pure altruism holds no28 Chapter 2. Cooperation and Evolutionary Approaches
altruistic needs to go beyond explanations of being related. One explanation
of altruism lies in the prospects of future interactions between agents: If I help
you now, you can help me in some future time. The ideas around this principle
are referred to as direct reciprocity.
2.4 Direct reciprocity: Returning favors as a
mechanism of altruism
The analysis of the previous section shows that kin selection can help to sustain
altruism in a population characterized by ¯xed strategies. One aspect of the
analysis is that interaction between agents is one-shot and that relatedness
in°uences the probability of an interaction. In real life situations however, it is
likely that the same individuals meet more than once, while these individuals are
not related to each other. An altruistic act by one individual towards another
can be pro¯table if that favor is returned at some later date. This idea, known as
direct reciprocity, has ¯rst been posed by Robert Trivers (1971). One important
condition is that the bene¯ts of an altruistic act to the receiver are greater than
its costs for the actor. If this is the case, the net bene¯ts of the two individuals
will be positive and both will be better o® helping each other.
The notion that it pays to engage in direct reciprocity has led scholars to
search for strategies that maximize payo®s in a sequence of Prisoner's Dilemma
games. One of the earliest ideas on such a strategy is due to the folk theorem:
If a game is played repeatedly in¯nitely often, and the players do not discount
future periods too much, an outcome can be reached in which all players have
optimal payo®s. One way in which such an outcome can be reached is when
all players play the grim trigger strategy. This strategy holds that players
cooperate with each other until one player defects. From the period that one
player defects, all players punish all other players by defecting for the remainder
of the game.7
The disadvantage of the grim trigger strategy is that it is unforgiving: Co-
operation cannot be restored after a defection. A more forgiving strategy could
possibly attain greater pro¯ts. In the late seventies, Robert Axelrod organized a
computer tournament where contestants could write a program which indicated
a strategy of play in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In total, a program was played for
a sequence of two hundred periods; each program played ¯ve periods against all
bene¯ts at all for the actor, only bene¯ts for the receiver.
7For a proof of the folk theorem, see Friedman (1971) and Rubinstein (1979). See Fuden-
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other programs. The strategy that attained the greatest average payo® was the
so called Tit-For-Tat strategy (TFT), proposed by Anatol Rapoport (Axelrod
and Hamilton (1981), Axelrod (1984)). This strategy holds that a player begins
with cooperating and mimics the move of the other opponent in the next period.
If the opponent has previously cooperated, TFT directs to cooperate, and vise
versa. One of the successes of this strategy is that it defends against defectors
by punishing uncooperative behavior. In addition, the strategy is successful
in cooperating with cooperators. Especially when both players play the TFT
strategy, cooperation will be maintained throughout the whole game. An im-
portant feature of the strategy is that defection by one player can be restored.
All that has to happen is for that player to cooperate at some time in the future.
However, this may be problematic because usually a player does not cooperate
against an opponent who has defected in the previous period. In case such a
defection is made unintended, for example due to an error by one of the players,
the TFT strategy leads to suboptimal payo®s (Fudenberg and Maskin (1990)).
New strategies which overcome the problem of an erroneous defection have
been developed. One of those is called Tit-For-Two-Tats (TFTT) (see Boyd
and Lorberbaum (1987)). This strategy holds that defection is chosen when an
opponent defects two consecutive times. This strategy outperforms TFT when
occasional one-time defections are made. Another proposed strategy is Generous
TFT (GTFT). Whenever the opponent has defected in the previous period, the
GTFT strategy chooses to cooperate with a certain probability. Nowak and
Sigmund (1992) show that a population of TFT strategies can be invaded by
GTFT when there is a one percent probability that an agent mistakenly defects
after having observed cooperative play by the opponent.
Finally, a strategy called Pavlov, or `Win-Stay, Lose-Shift' is proposed (see
Kraines and Kraines (1989, 1995, 2000), and Nowak and Sigmund (1993)). This
strategy is to cooperate if both players have cooperated, or if both players
have defected in the previous period. When in the previous period the player
cooperates while the opponent defects, the player defects in the next period.
Likewise, when in the previous period the player defects while the opponent
cooperates, the player defects in the next period. An important feature of this
strategy is that cooperation is easily restored when two Pavlov players meet.
In case one player mistakenly defects, the other player will defect in the next
period. The two defecting players will then switch back to cooperation in the
following period. The Pavlov strategy resembles the `carrot-stick' mechanism in
bringing up children (Nowak and May (1995)). Good behavior remains in place,
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that like the TFT strategy, TFTT and GTFT cannot invade a population of
pure cooperators (Nowak and Sigmund (1989)). This is not true for the Pavlov
strategy; a pure cooperator will be exploited because no switch will be made to
cooperation. In contrast, Pavlov players do not fare well against pure defectors,
because Pavlov players try to restore cooperation in every other period (Nowak
and May (1995)).
To summarize, direct reciprocity explains why altruism can evolve. When
altruistic actions are returned in kind on some future date, even cooperation
among non-related individuals can be established. Many phenomena in real
world settings can be described by acts of direct reciprocity. One could think of
giving tips in restaurants, friends taking turns to babysit each other's children,
carpooling, and the like. From experiments conducted in labs an overwhelm-
ing amount of evidence shows that individuals are willing to engage in direct
reciprocity. For example, in the ultimatum game (GÄ uth et al. (1982) and Roth
(1995)), a proposer is asked to share an amount of money with a responder. The
responder then has the power to veto the proposal, in which case neither of the
two subjects receive any money. Typically, the responder o®ers an amount be-
tween twenty and ¯fty percent, while the responder rejects o®ers below twenty
percent. In the trust game (Berg et al. (1995)), a proposer has to choose how
much money of a given endowment to send to an anonymous responder. The
experimenter triples the money, and gives the responder the possibility to send
money back. Assuming rational agents, it is expected that no money is sent
between two individuals. The typical ¯nding is that the proposer sends around
¯fty percent of his endowment, and that the responder sends about ¯fty per-
cent of the tripled amount back. Finally, in the gift exchange game (Fehr et al.
(1993)), a proposer sends an amount of money to a responder, and the respon-
der has the option of returning a costly favor. In this game, the general ¯nding
is that more money sent translates into more costly favors.
Although direct reciprocity is able to explain real world behavior which can-
not be explained by kin selection, direct reciprocity does not cover all instances
of altruism. In many real world situations, individuals engage in altruistic ac-
tions which cannot be directly returned. For example, giving to charity and
volunteer services have in common that the actor makes a cost, while others
reap the bene¯ts. The ones who receive the bene¯ts usually do not have a way
to return the favor. Through an indirect way these altruistic actions can lead
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2.5 Indirect reciprocity: Reputation as a mech-
anism of altruism
The notion that altruism can be sustained through indirect reciprocity has ¯rst
been put forward by Richard Alexander (1979, 1987). He notes that cooperation
can be established, with reputation and status as driving factors. A necessity
for this to occur is that humans constantly `assess and reassess each other'.
Therefore, indirect reciprocity is closely related to the evolution of social norms.
In evolutionary game theory, indirect reciprocity is modeled as follows (see
Nowak and Sigmund (2005), and Nowak (2006)). Two agents meet randomly,
one in the role of possible donor and the other in the role of recipient. The donor
can decide to make a costly transfer to the recipient. In doing so, the donor
makes a cost of c, while the bene¯ts to the recipient are given by b. As in the
previous models, it is assumed that b > c, so the net e®ect of an altruistic action
is positive. After the agents have met, each will be matched to a di®erent agent
in the population. Agents will never meet each other more than once to ensure
indirect reciprocity: An altruistic act can never be returned in kind. In order to
establish cooperation, a mechanism of reputation is needed. A reputation can be
established by having agents, other than the decision maker, observe and judge
the decision maker's behavior. Basically, the mechanism of reputation forming
concerns what is considered a good act, or what is considered a bad act. The
way in which a reputation is built, depends on the level of sophistication of the
population. Three levels are distinguished (Brandt and Sigmund (2004)).
First-order sophistication only looks at the decision of the decision maker.
The decision is judged as good by bystanders when the decision maker provides
the bene¯t, and it is judged as bad otherwise. In Boyd and Richerson's (1989a)
model, agents in a population are formed in a circle. Each agent has to make a
decision to help the agent left of his. Di®erent TFT-like strategies to cooperate
are explored, depending on the actions of either the right neighbor or the left
neighbor. The authors show that cooperation can be established only when
unrealistic scenarios hold. For example, the number of agents in a circle must
be small and the cycles of help have to be long lasting. However, Nowak and
Sigmund (1998a, 1998b) drastically change the model of indirect reciprocity,
and show that cooperation can be established under less stringent assumptions.
In their in°uential model, agents are endowed with an `image score' and inter-
action between agents is random. Whenever an agent decides to provide help,
the score is increased by one. Refusing to provide help reduces the score by
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only those with at least a score of k are provided help. Nowak and Sigmund
show that when all agents in the population can monitor each other, coopera-
tion is stable. The strategy of giving help to recipients with at least an image
score of zero invades all strategies in the population which direct to give to a
recipient with an image score greater than zero. The same result holds when
only a fraction of the population can observe each other, but the evolution of
cooperation is slower in this case. Brandt and Sigmund (2004) show that when
agents can form networks, ¯rst-order sophistication is enough for altruism to
evolve. A network of an agent, that is, the number of acquaintances, grows each
period and being in a network informs an agent of the status of a potential re-
cipient. Discriminating agents can establish a cooperative equilibrium whenever
the information available and the probability of a future period are big enough.
When it comes to ¯rst-order sophistication, not helping a defector lowers
the status of the potential donor. For this reason, the evolutionary succes of an
agent who discriminates against defectors may be in danger (Ferriµ ere (1998)).
But, it may be regarded as fair whenever someone refuses to help a recipient who
has not helped others in the past. Second-order sophistication deals with this
problem. Status is derived by considering the action of the decision maker, and
by considering the status of the recipient. This idea has been proposed by Robert
Sugden (1986), basing strategies on the notion of `standing'. All players begin
with good standing, but lose this reputation when help is refused to an agent
with the standing status. The standing status can be gained back whenever
help is provided to someone in good standing. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001)
show that the standing strategy can result in the evolution of altruism. The
standing strategy usually outperforms agents who base their decision on image
scores alone. The reason is that when it comes to the standing strategy, it
su±ces to keep your own reputation just above the critical level of receiving
help. Both image scorers and standing strategists will provide help to someone
in good standing. However, agents who use the standing strategy can exploit
the cooperative acts of image scorers who are always seeking for a better image.
Finally, third-order sophistication is explored. Assessing whether a decision
maker's action is good is based on the act of the decision maker, the status of
the recipient, and the status of the decision maker. Dealing with these three
assessment points causes the number of strategies to become large in number.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004) evaluate in total 4,096 strategies, all based on one or
more of the elements of third-order sophistication.8 In their simulations, they
8Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004) consider binary scores only. A strategy has two modules; an
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¯nd that eight of them lead to a system in which altruism invades a population
of agents. These so called `leading eight' behavioral rules have two principles
in common. The ¯rst principle is that helping altruists is considered good,
while not helping them is considered bad. Second, defection against defectors
is considered good. The standing strategy is classi¯ed as one of the leading
eight, because it adheres to both rules. Image scoring does not address the
second rule, and therefore it is not part of the leading eight rules to sustain
cooperation. Brandt and Sigmund (2004) conduct a similar exercise. In their
model, as opposed to Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004), it is assumed that interactions
are for a short time, rather than for an in¯nite time. Next to that, Brandt
and Sigmund assume that the images derived from observing the act of the
decision maker are private, whereas they are public in the model of Ohtsuki and
Iwasa. The qualitative conclusions of both analyses are similar. Like Ohtsuki
and Iwasa, Brandt and Sigmund conclude that agents directed by standing
outperform agents directed by image scoring.
The theoretical prediction that indirect reciprocity leads to altruism has
been tested with laboratory experiments. A widely used experiment is called
the Helping game, with a setup very similar to the model of Nowak and Sigmund
(1998b). Subjects are placed in a room and are matched in pairs of two in each
period . The decision maker has to make a choice between cooperating at a
cost c, while providing a bene¯t b > c. In case of a defection, both players earn
zero. A considerable amount of laboratory evidence is gathered which supports
indirect altruism as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Information
about donors' decisions are provided in the form of image scores.
Wedekind and Milinski (2000) and Wedekind and Braithwaite (2002) show
that when students play the Helping game, the amount of money donated is
correlated with the image score of the recipient. Milinski et al. (2002) provide
similar evidence. In addition, they ¯nd that when decision makers contribute
to charity (UNICEF), they tend to attract more rewards from others. All three
studies provide the entire history of the recipient. Bolton et al. (2004) conduct
the Helping game with varying amounts of information, mimicking ¯rst and
second-order sophistication. When decision makers don't have any information
about the recipient, a surprising amount of positive cooperation is observed.
depends on the decision maker's own score (good or bad) and the recipients score. Since there
are 4 combinations of the action module, there are 24 = 16 action modules. The assessment
module, deciding how to assess the action of both agents when they were decision makers in
the previous period, depends on the score of the decision maker (two possibilities), the score
of the recipient (two possibilities), and the action of the decision maker (two possibilities).
Hence, there are eight combinations possible and therefore 28 = 256 assessment rules. In
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Information that resembles ¯rst-order sophistication leads decision makers to
provide more help, but most help is provided when subjects have second-order
information. Finally, Seinen and Schram (2006) ¯nd evidence of indirect reci-
procity when long periods of play are considered and players have ¯rst-order
information. They show that di®erent norms evolve in di®erent groups; what
some groups interpret as a fair reputation is di®erent from other groups. These
studies are in line with the image score model of Nowak and Sigmund.
Evidence is mixed regarding the robustness of the image score model of
Nowak and Sigmund against the standing strategy proposed by Leimar and
Hammerstein (2001). Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) vary the degree to
which information about a decision maker is available to others. They show that
when past actions of decision makers are made public, they cooperate about
twice as much as when this information is held private. It can be concluded
from this evidence that donors cooperate because of strategic concerns. Rather
than trying to `do the right thing', donors are looking for a return on their
investment. Engelmann and Fischbacher ¯nd that 15% of the subjects act in a
purely strategic way and are not reciprocal. Interestingly, these subjects have
the greatest payo®s of all participants of the experiment. Evolution is likely
to favor the subjects who play this strategy, rather than the agents who are
reciprocal. Milinski et al. (2001) conduct the Helping game where they provide
¯rst-order information in one treatment, and second-order information in the
other. In both treatments, subjects are equally averse to donate to players who
have defected in their last period. This is in line with a strategy based on image
scoring, but not with the standing strategy. The authors conclude that subjects
have di±culties in dealing with the vast amount of second-order information.
Therefore, the subjects return to the easier rule of image scoring.
Up to know, we have seen that kin-selection, direct reciprocity and indirect
reciprocity can lead to the evolution of cooperation among humans. Although
examples of the three approaches are found abundantly in real life situations,
the fact that humans directly and frequently interact in group settings is not
captured fully in these models. Kin-selection and direct reciprocity assumes
that individuals meet in pairs of two. Indirect reciprocity comes closer to group
interaction, but it leaves out the possibility of direct interaction between two
agents in a group. In the next section, altruistic behavior in group settings is
considered. It is shown that altruism can be sustained in groups when agents
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2.6 Altruistic punishment as an instrument to
sustain cooperation
Many real world situations resemble a Prisoner's Dilemma game, with the ex-
ception that more than two players are involved. These are situations in which
the actions of one individual have positive or negative consequences for a group.
For instance, one could think of a ¯sherman catching a ¯sh in a lake, a factory
polluting the environment to produce output, or someone driving a car from
home to work. Like in a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma, each individual fac-
ing an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma has an incentive to defect rather than to
cooperate. Cooperation is hard to establish in such cases, because strategies
like Tit-For-Tat have unwanted side e®ects. Punishing defectors by defecting
in kind, has the undesirable property that those who don't deserve to be pun-
ished face the consequences as well. Yet, there are many examples of situations
where humans who interact in groups repeatedly engage in cooperative behav-
ior. Hardin (1968) mentioned that `mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon' can
ensure that humans act in the best interest of the group, rather than in their
own best interest. Such mutual coercion is referred to as `altruistic punishment';
behavior in which individuals punish others at a cost to themselves in order to
provide a public good (see for example Fowler et al. (2005)).
Adding punishment to an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma changes the payo®s
of the game. Consider a population of n agents, of which a fraction p cooperates,
thereby giving bene¯ts b to all other agents at a personal cost c. The bene¯ts
of a cooperator are given by bp¡c, while the bene¯ts of a defector are given by
bp. After the actions of all agents have been observed by all, cooperating agents
have the possibility to punish defectors. Punishment comes at a personal cost k,
and reduces the payo®s of each defector by x > k. The payo®s to a cooperator
in case of a punishment decision are given by bp¡c¡k(1¡p), while the payo®s
to a cooperator who does not punish are given by bp¡c. The payo®s to defectors
are given by bp¡xy, where y is the number of cooperators who punish. In case
the cost-bene¯t ratio of x and k is su±cient, punishing defectors can lead them
to cooperate.
The game presented here faces two problems in sustaining cooperation (Sig-
mund (2007)). First, consider a population consisting of defectors, and coop-
erators who all must punish the defectors. In case the population consists of
a few defectors and many punishers, defectors disappear from the population
because of the tremendous amount of punishments they receive. However, when
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go extinct because they have to make too much punishment costs. Hence, a
system of punishers cannot be invaded by defectors, but a system of defectors
cannot be invaded by punishers either. Second, consider the case where coop-
erators can choose to punish. Payo®s to cooperators who do not punish are
greater than payo®s to cooperators who punish. This so called `second-order
free-riding' problem causes cooperators to refrain from punishing, which causes
all agents to defect when choosing to cooperate. A solution to the second-order
free-riding problem is to give agents the possibility to punish those who have not
punished defectors. However, this merely raises the question who will punish
those who have failed to punish the non-punishers, and so on.
Boyd and Richerson (1992) show that cooperation can be established in
a population of defectors, cooperators and punishers, provided that the costs
of punishment are low and that the population is small. Cooperation can be
established only under some unrealistic parameter conditions (for example, for
certain cost-bene¯t ratios of punishment) When a population becomes too big,
punishment becomes too expensive for punishers.
The result that punishment does not stabilize cooperation in large societies
is quite unsatisfactory.9 Large populations have more to gain from positive spill-
overs, such as providing insurance or bene¯ting from the returns from schooling.
For the punishment strategy to work in large populations, interactions between
groups are needed. Boyd et al. (2003) argue that groups of agents can learn from
each other and migration between groups can lead to the evolution of altruism.
The intuition is that in populations where punishment is common, cooperators
have a greater ¯tness level than defectors. Therefore, cooperation is especially
likely to survive when cooperating agents of other populations migrate into a
large population where punishment is common. Henrich and Boyd (2001) show
that when agents randomly interact and copy strategies of agents from other
groups, i-th order punishment can stabilize cooperation. For this to hold, it
is assumed that strategies spread through a population because the most fre-
quent strategies are copied, rather than the strategies that are most successful
in terms of payo®s. In addition, if second-order free-riding is occurs because of
rare mistakes, then the payo® di®erences between punishers and non-punishers
is relatively small. The more stages of punishment added, the more unlikely
it becomes that an agent mistakenly forgot to punish another agent who mis-
takenly forgot to punish. Hence, the more punishment stages, the smaller the
payo® di®erences between punishers and i-th order free-riders. It becomes then
9Also in an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma where punishment is not allowed, cooperation is
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more attractive to become a punisher, which makes it possible for cooperation
to survive as a strategy.
Another way in which punishment can stabilize cooperation, is by imple-
menting the probability of a natural disaster which wipes out an entire popula-
tion. Gintis (2000) considers the repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma where
each period there is a probability that the game ends. In such a setup, co-
operation will emerge only when the probability that a new period emerges is
su±ciently large. Add to the model the state of nature: a good state or a bad
state. In the bad state, the probability that the game ends is larger than in a
good state. When all agents defect, the game ends with certainty. This leads
to a downward spiral. In a scenario where the probability of future interaction
is small, defecting becomes an attractive strategy. More defection however, in-
creases the probability that the game ends with certainty. Altruistic punishers
can induce defectors in the bad state to switch to cooperation: When the costs
of punishment are su±ciently small, defectors face a credible threat that their
strategy makes them worse o®. Self-interested agents respond by cooperating,
which increases the probability of future interactions.
A more elaborate model on the interactions between cooperation and the
collapse of a population is given by Sethi and Somanathan (1996). Rather than
considering a simple n-player Prisoner's Dilemma, they consider the evolution of
a natural renewable resource stock. Cooperation can be established in a popula-
tion of defectors, punishers and cooperators but this is linked to the parameters
of the model. When the revenues that the resource yields are greater, costs
of harvesting are lower, or when costs of technology are lower, the gains from
defecting are bigger.10 Finally, Richter et al. (2008) consider the e®ects of non-
monetary punishment on the evolution of cooperation in a renewable resource.
Agents harvest a resource and those who extract more face social consequences
by means of signals of disapproval by others. These signals of disapproval can
help to promote cooperation. However, when costs of disapproval are high, so-
cieties with a propensity to harvest more than is socially optimal cannot reverse
this pattern and will deplete the resource.
The e®ects of punishment on cooperation in social dilemmas, like the n-
player Prisoner's Dilemma, have been examined by numerous experiments. The
main work horse is the so called Public Goods game (Marwell and Ames (1981)).
10For more on the e®ects of technology on harvesting levels, see Richter et al. (2009).
In their model, they show that an initial increase in technology causes defectors to increase
their harvest levels up to the point where they cannot exploit more due to a time constraint.
A further increase in technology causes cooperators to increase their harvest levels as well,
making payo® di®erences with defectors smaller. Through `moral persuasion' by cooperators,
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In this game, participants are placed in groups of usually four anonymous per-
sons. Each person receives an endowment of tokens, which can be allocated to
either a private or a public account. A token invested in the public account
is multiplied by a number larger than one, and then evenly divided among all
group members. For the investor, each token invested in the public account
therefore yields one half token. A token invested in the private account yields
a bene¯t of one token to the investor only. In a one-shot version of this game
the dominant strategy is to invest all tokens in the private account, because the
marginal bene¯ts of each token are higher in that account. Usually, the experi-
ment lasts for a number of periods ranging between one and ¯fty. The typical
¯nding in this game is that subjects contribute between forty and sixty percent
of their tokens to the public account in the ¯rst period. As the periods go by,
contributions to the public good approach zero (Ledyard (1995)). This pattern
can be explained by assuming that some agents in the population are purely
sel¯sh, while others are reciprocal altruists (Fehr and Fischbacher (2003)). Re-
ciprocal altruists start by cooperating, but feel the urge to punish the sel¯sh
agents. The only way in which reciprocal altruists can do this, is by holding
down on cooperation. A single sel¯sh agent can therefore cause a breakdown of
cooperation in an entire population.
Providing subjects with the possibility of punishment has dramatic e®ects
on the establishment of cooperation. Yamagishi (1986) is the ¯rst to address
the e®ects of punishment to the Public Goods game. After each subject has
made a contribution to the public good, subjects can allocate tokens to another
`punishment' account. The tokens collected by this account are used to punish
the group member who contributed the least to the public good. Sel¯sh agents
would never sacri¯ce their tokens to punish some else, hoping to free-ride on
the e®orts of others. However, a substantial amount of punishment is found by
Yamagishi and punishment causes subjects to start to cooperate. Even when
punishment is costly to perform, but merely acts as a signal of disapproval, the
instrument causes subjects to become more cooperative in a public goods game
(Masclet et al. (2003)). Ostrom et al. (1992) study the e®ects of punishment
in the Common Pool Resource game, a non-linear version of the Public Goods
game. The authors ¯nd that punishment causes subjects to harvest the resource
less severe than the sel¯sh equilibrium. In combination with communication,
punishment causes almost all agents to harvest at socially optimal levels.
One reason for punishment to occur in the setup of Yamagishi (1986) and Os-
trom et al. (1992) is that agents interact with each other for multiple periods.
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and make them cooperative. However, punishment is e®ective even when sub-
jects meet only once (Fehr and GÄ achter (2000, 2002)). Fehr and GÄ achter show
that negative emotions play a crucial role in the decision process of subjects to
engage in punishment. Economic principles play a role as well. Punishment is
in°uenced by the cost-bene¯t ratio of the instrument, as well as the income of
the punisher. Carpenter (2007) estimates a demand curve of punishment and
¯nd it is inelastic with respect to prices and income. The inelastic form of the
demand function provides further evidence that social motives play a bigger role
than economic motives. Although subjects use more punishment the cheaper
it becomes, those with a greater income do not punish more than those with a
low income.
Finally, some light is shed on the evolutionary stability of the sanctioning
institution. This is shown in an experimental setup where subjects can choose
each period whether they would like to have a sanctioning system present or not
(GÄ urerk et al. (2006)). The authors ¯nd that although subjects are hesitant to
favor punishment, after ¯fteen periods most of the subjects favor punishment,






Nowadays, the world is confronted with a variety of pressing environmental
problems, including depletion of ¯sheries, tropical deforestation, and biodiver-
sity loss. At the heart of these problems is the lack of su±ciently well-de¯ned
and enforced property rights which tend to result in overexploitation of the
resource under consideration. The bene¯ts of extracting an extra unit of the
resource are private, whereas its costs (for example the increased scarcity be-
cause of lower levels of regeneration) are borne by all. Absent cooperation, each
individual resource user ignores the costs she imposes on other resource users,
and hence, from a social welfare point of view, puts too much e®ort into resource
harvesting. This is observed to occur even if access to resources is limited to a
speci¯c group of individuals.
Over the past two decades, a substantial number of economic experiments
have been conducted to assess the relative e®ectiveness of self-regulatory instru-
ments in sustaining cooperation in multi-person social dilemma situations, such
as linear public good games and non-linear common pool resource games. In-
1This chapter is co-authored with Daan van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova
2We would like to thank Chris MÄ uris and David Vo· nka for their useful input.
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struments tested in economic laboratory experiments include ostracism (Masclet
(2003), Maier-Rigaud et al. (2010)), peer-to-peer rewards (Sefton et al. (2007),
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), Rand et al. (2009)), and verbal expressions
of approval or disapproval (Masclet et al. (2003)). Most attention, however,
has been paid to the e®ectiveness of peer-to-peer punishments; see for example
Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992), and Fehr and GÄ achter ((2000), (2002)).
O®ering subjects the opportunity to impose monetary sanctions on their peers
signi¯cantly increases subjects' contributions to the public good, and this is
even the case if punishments are not only costly to the punished, but also to the
subject imposing them (GÄ achter et al. (2008)). To economists, these results are
surprising because the experimental games are set up such that subjects should
not be willing to provide the second-order public good of punishing free-riders in
any of the periods, and hence e±ciency in the social dilemma should be equally
low with and without the opportunity to impose punishments.
The external validity (or real world relevance) of the experimental punish-
ment mechanism results has been challenged on two grounds. The ¯rst is that
punishments may not be used so eagerly if there is an opportunity for revenge.
Nikiforakis (2008) conducted an experiment with two punishment stages (in ad-
dition to the social dilemma stage) rather than just one, so that subjects can
use the second punishment stage to directly reciprocate to sanctions received
in the ¯rst. The consequences for play in the social dilemma stage are quite
dramatic. Faced with the threat of potential retaliation hardly any sanctions
are imposed in the ¯rst punishment stage. The subjects correctly predict this
happening and hence the e±ciency in the social dilemma stage does not di®er
from the e±ciency level that materializes absent any punishment stages (see also
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008)). Hence,
peer-to-peer punishments may be able to sustain cooperation in the real world,
but only if punishers can hide their identity.
The second ground on the basis of which the real-world relevance of peer-
to-peer punishments has been challenged is that in most societies, the use of
force is the exclusive right of the government: Typically, individual citizens
are not allowed to actually impose either physical or monetary punishments on
their peers (Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008)). That means that peer-to-peer
rewards may be empirically more relevant than peer-to-peer punishments, and
a relatively small literature has emerged analyzing the e®ectiveness of rewards
in sustaining cooperation (see for example, Sefton et al. (2007), Vyrastekova
and van Soest (2008), Sutter et al. (2010) and Rand et al. (2009)). When using3.1. Introduction 43
the same design features as the standard punishment experiment,3 rewards are
observed to increase cooperation in the social dilemma stage if and only if the
bene¯ts of receiving a reward are larger than the costs of giving it,4 but less so
than the punishment mechanism.
This chapter contributes to the experimental economics literature on the
(relative) e®ectiveness of the reward mechanism in sustaining cooperation in
multi-person social dilemmas by exploring to what extent o®ering subjects the
opportunity to counter-reward increases or decreases the mechanism's e®ective-
ness. While in the real world individual agents have incentives to hide their
identity in case they punish another agent in a social dilemma, the opposite
holds in case of rewards; the benefactor usually has good reasons to reveal her
identity to the recipient. Also, in most real-world social dilemmas agents are
likely to be well aware of the history of (at least a subset of) their fellow agents'
behavior in the social dilemma as well as of the history of whom they received
`rewards' (in the form of gifts, or help). So when we conduct a social dilemma
experiment in which we allow subjects to directly reciprocate not just to other
subjects' behavior in the social dilemma but also to rewards received in the past
and present, does this increase e±ciency in the social dilemma even more?
While it may seem obvious that the answer to this question should be a±r-
mative, we argue that the mechanism may not be so straightforward. If subjects
systematically reward those who act cooperatively in the social dilemma stage,
the returns of doing that can be twice as high than if there is just one single
reward stage. But because the costs of sending a reward token are smaller than
the bene¯ts of receiving one, exchanging reward tokens is a pro¯table enterprize
by itself. One may wonder to what extent subjects are willing to potentially
jeopardize a mutually pro¯table (bilateral) exchange of reward tokens by with-
holding rewards if another agent decides to act less cooperatively in the social
dilemma. There is a danger that the other agent may decide to stop sending
reward tokens in response.
If subjects do not view the decrease in the number of reward tokens received
as a just punishment for their acting less cooperative in the social dilemma
3By standard design, we mean a repeated public goods game with one reward stage after
every period. The group composition remains the same, but the subject's identity labels
change between periods.
4While this condition seems restrictive, it likely to be met in a large variety of situations.
Note that the term `reward' is typically thought to refer to a gift given (money, an object,
or time) that increases the recipient's welfare. Because agents' marginal valuation of objects,
time (for example, like assisting a community member in getting his harvest o® the land)
and even money can di®er, the recipient's valuation of the `reward' may well be higher than
the provisioning cost incurred by the benefactor; see for example Vyrastekova and van Soest
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stage, they may retaliate by withholding rewards too. In that sense, withhold-
ing rewards can be viewed as a second-order public good, and the question is
whether or not subjects are willing to provide it.
In this chapter we analyze the behavior of subjects in a ¯nitely repeated
game in which, in every period, subjects ¯rst decide on their investments in a
standard non-linear Common Pool Resource game, after which there are two
stages in which they can send reward tokens to one or more of their fellow
group members. Regarding the way in which groups are formed, we follow the
literature in keeping group composition constant within and between periods,
but we deviate from standard procedure by also keeping each subject's identity
label unaltered both within and between periods. That means that, consistent
with many real world instances, the design allows each subject to base her reward
decisions not only on her fellow group members' behavior in the multi-person
social dilemma in the current period, but also on the number of reward tokens
she received from them in the current as well as in previous periods. We use the
so-termed Partner Fixed (PF) matching, where Partner refers to the fact that
group composition is constant throughout the experiment, while Fixed refers to
the fact that each subject receives a unique identity label that remains constant
throughout the experiment too.
The results regarding the e®ectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation
are surprising. While we ¯nd that the average number of reward tokens sent
by each subject is close to the maximum level in both reward stages in all
periods but the last, e±ciency in the non-linear Common Pool Resource game
is low, even lower than predicted by standard game theory. Indeed, we ¯nd
that subjects establish relationships with one another in which each partner
systematically sends reward tokens to the other. These mutually pro¯table
exchange relationships are formed early on in the experiment and are long-
lasting. We also ¯nd that the establishment of these connections is largely
independent of the partners' behavior in the social dilemma in the early periods
of the experiment.
Based on this data, we hypothesize that subjects view the use of reward
tokens as an alternative way of making money, rather than as a means to a®ect
their peers' behavior in the social dilemma, and conjecture that rewards alone
are unlikely to be able to sustain cooperation in real-world multi-person social
dilemmas. To gain further insight in the underlying mechanism, we run the
same experimental game using two alternative matching protocols. The ¯rst
is Stranger matching, where group composition changes between periods (but
not within periods), and the second is Partner Random matching, in which3.1. Introduction 45
group composition remains ¯xed throughout the experiment but the subjects'
identity labels are randomly reshu²ed between periods. Contrary to Partner
Fixed (PF) matching, Partner Random (PR) and Stranger (S) matching are
not conducive to establishing multi-period bilateral exchange relationships, if
rewards are given at all. As subjects are allocated randomly to sessions using
one of the three matching protocols, we can infer whether the use of reward
tokens is predominantly driven by altruistic considerations (as these are the
only reason to send reward tokens in the Stranger sessions), by both altruistic
and conditionally cooperative motivations (as they may both play a role in the
PR sessions), or whether strategic money-maximizing reasons play a role too
(as all three motivations can play a role in the PF sessions).
The evolution of play in the social dilemma stage in the Stranger and Partner
Random sessions as well as the associated pattern of use of reward tokens in
both session types strengthen our conclusion from the Partner Fixed sessions
that rewards are used predominantly as a means to make money via bilateral
exchange. Systematically using a social dilemma experiment without the option
to reward as a baseline, we ¯nd that having two reward stages does not result
in an increase in e±ciency in the social dilemma stage in the Stranger matching
protocol. Moreover, if rewards are given, many subjects spread them equally
over all other members of their group and hence `rewarding' is independent
of their peers' behavior in the social dilemma stage of the same period. In
the Partner Random sessions, subjects actually ¯nd a way to establish long-
run bilateral exchange relationships despite the reshu²ing of subject identi¯ers
between periods: They use their decision in the social dilemma stage to signal
their identity to the rest of the group. Therefore, we conclude that rewards are
not likely to be e®ective in sustaining cooperation in multi-person social dilemma
situations in the real world. The reason is that subjects systematically prefer
establishing two-person relationships of cooperation to providing the second-
order public good of using the reward stages to sustain cooperation in the multi-
person social dilemma.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we present the two main
treatments of this experiment as well as three matching protocols implemented.
In section 3.3 we present the data for the Partner Fixed sessions as this matching
protocol is empirically the most relevant one. In section 3.4 we present the
results of the other two matching protocols, Partner Random and Stranger, as
they provide additional support for our claim that rewards are not likely to be
e®ective in sustaining cooperation in real-world social dilemmas. Section 3.5
provides a discussion of the results, and section 3.6 provides some conclusions.46 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
3.2 The game and its experimental design
In this section we present the experimental design. Section 3.2.1 contains the
model, and section 3.2.2 describes the experimental procedure.
3.2.1 The game
In line with the game developed by Ostrom et al. (1992), we implement a
non-linear Common Pool Resource game with N > 1 identical players. The
game is repeated T ¸ 1 times, and in every period t = 1;:::;T each player
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng can allocate a ¯xed amount of `e®ort', e, between a social
dilemma activity and an alternative economic activity, the outside option. The
amount of e®ort player i puts into the social dilemma activity in period t is
denoted by xi;t and is from the set of integers f0;1;:::;eg. The marginal return
on the amount of e®ort allocated to the outside option, e¡xi;t ¸ 0, is constant
and equal to w. The private marginal bene¯ts of e®ort allocated to the social
dilemma activity are equal to A ¡ BXt, where Xt =
PN
i=1 xi;t is the aggregate
amount of e®ort put into the social dilemma activity by all N players in period
t. The baseline game consists of one stage only, the social dilemma stage, which
we will refer to with superscript s1. Player i's total payo®s in stage s1 of period
t are thus equal to:
¼s1
i;t = w(e ¡ xi;t) + [A ¡ BXt]xi;t: (3.1)
Because @¼s1
i;t=@xj;t < 0 for all j 6= i, this game is a (non-linear) public
bads game. If T = 1, the symmetric individual Nash e®ort level is xNE =
(A ¡ w)=B(N + 1), while the socially optimal individual e®ort level is equal to
xSO = (A ¡ w)=2BN. Since xNE > xSO if N > 1, there is a social dilemma.
If the game is repeated a ¯nite number of times (T ¸ 2), the standard game-
theoretic prediction is that all players choose the Nash equilibrium e®ort xNE in
all periods 1;:::;T. Using backward induction, if it does not pay to cooperate in
the last period of a ¯nitely repeated game, then it also does not pay to cooperate
in any previous period either.
The game described above captures a social dilemma in which there are no
instruments to a®ect the behavior of one's peers other than one's own social
dilemma e®ort level. Hence it serves as a baseline against which we can test
the impact of players having the opportunity to reward their peers. We refer to
this baseline game as 0SR, re°ecting that there are zero reward stages.
The game that allows for rewarding is modeled as follows. The ¯rst stage
(s1) in this game is identical to the (¯rst) stage of the baseline game (0SR), and3.2. The game and its experimental design 47
hence a player's payo®s in this stage are given by equation (3.1). The social
dilemma stage is then followed by two identical reward stages, s2 and s3. We
will refer to this game as 2SR, re°ecting that there are two reward stages in
this game. A reward stage is set up as follows. Each of the N players receive z
reward tokens which she can keep herself, or give to one or more of her fellow
group members. Every token that the player keeps, increases her payo®s by
1 point. Every token that is sent to a fellow group member, increases that
group member's payo®s by r points, where r > 1. Player i's payo®s in stage s
(s = fs2;s3g) in period t are therefore given by:
¼s








ji;t; s = fs2;s3g; (3.2)
where ps
ij;t is the number of reward tokens that player i sends to player j (j 6= i)
in stage s (s = fs2;s3g) in period t. Hence, the total individual payo®s in





Aggregate payo®s are maximized if all player choose e®ort level xSO = (A¡
w)=2BN in every period, and if they always send all their z reward tokens
in both reward stages to their fellow group members, because r > 1. The
standard game-theoretic predictions are, however, that no reward tokens are
sent in either s2 or s3 in any period (i.e., ps2
ij;t = ps3
ij;t = 0 for all j 6= i, and
for all t = f1;:::;Tg). Applying backward induction, there is no reason for a
sel¯sh player to send reward tokens in s3 of period T, and hence there is no
reason to send reward tokens in stage s2 of that period either. As a result, there
is no reason for sel¯sh players to choose any e®ort level other than the Nash
equilibrium one, xNE, in period T, and hence there are no reasons for sel¯sh
players to send reward tokens in either of the two reward stages in period T ¡1
either. That means that the game unravels, and e±ciency in the social dilemma
activity (s1) is expected to be equal to the non-cooperative level independent
of whether players have the opportunity to send reward tokens.
According to social orientation tests, only about 30 percent of humans be-
haves consistently with the assumption of `homo economicus' in laboratory ex-
periment; see for example Fischbacher et al. (2001). Altruists may be willing
to always give rewards because of the warm-glow associated with it, or because
it increases group welfare; conditional cooperators may use the reward stages
`properly' by giving rewards to those player who act cooperatively in the social
dilemma stage. Thus, if players are endowed with a richer set of preferences
than homo economicus, the above standard game-theoretic predictions may be
refuted. It may also be the case that players are predominantly interested in
their own material welfare, but that they realized that others could be recip-48 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
rocating to the rewards received. Hence, they may prefer to establish bilateral
ties of cooperation by exchanging reward tokens. The use of reward stages to
increase cooperation in the multi-person social dilemma is more complex in the
sense that it requires cooperation; a single person seizing to reward in order
to punish free-riding in the social dilemma not only remains exposed to the
free-rider in the social dilemma, but also may jeopardize the future exchange of
rewards with the free-rider in the bilateral reward exchange.
In real world social dilemmas agents typically have good knowledge of the
(past and present) behavior of (at least a subset of) their fellow community
members in the social dilemma activity, and also whether and from whom they
received `rewards' (in the form of gifts, or help) now or in the past. That means
that from the range of matching protocols typically used in economic experi-
ments, the Partner Fixed protocol is the most plausible one. In this matching
protocol, group membership does not change throughout the experimental ses-
sion, and also identity labels remain ¯xed not only within but also between
periods. In this setup, all of the above reasons to send reward tokens may ma-
terialize, and we can assess the net result of their interaction by comparing the
e±ciency in the social dilemma stage in the 2SR treatment to that in the 0SR
treatment. To have an adequate benchmark, we therefore have player play both
the 0SR and 2SR treatments sequentially in every Partner Fixed (PF) session,
with 0SR being played ¯rst.
However, we can gain additional insight into the relevance of the various
potential strategies by having player play 0SR and 2SR using two alternative
matching protocols. In one, group composition remains constant throughout the
experiment but identity labels are randomly changed between periods (Partner
Random, PR). In sessions with this matching protocol, player cannot base their
reward decisions on whether or not they received rewards from a speci¯c fellow
group member in the past. In the other, new groups are formed randomly
in every period (termed the Stranger (S) matching protocol), so that player
with altruistic motivations are the only ones who are likely to give rewards. So,
whereas the 0SR and 2SR treatments with PF matching are the most important
ones, we also implement the two treatments using PR and S matching protocols.
3.2.2 Experimental design
The experiments were conducted at Tilburg University's CentER laboratory.
Subjects were students of Tilburg University of di®erent nationalities with a
background in business, economics, law, or social sciences. Each subject par-
ticipated in only one session. The experimental parametrization of the game is3.2. The game and its experimental design 49
given in Table 3.1, and Table 3.2 summarizes the predictions of the associated
socially optimal and Nash equilibrium levels of both e®ort and number of re-
wards sent. Subjects earned on average e16.86 including a show-up fee of e5 for
a session lasting roughly two hours and interacted via computers, programmed
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Variable Description Value
N number of individuals per group 5
T number of periods of the stage game 15
w return on investments in the private activity 0.5
A parameter of the social dilemma's revenue function 11.5
B parameter of the social dilemma's revenue function 0.15
e individual endowment of e®ort 13
z individual endowment of `reward' tokens 12
r value of reward tokens received 3
Table 3.1 Experiment parametrization.
Variable Description Value
x¤ symmetric individual socially optimal extraction level 6
X¤ aggregate socially optimal extraction level 30
xNE individual Nash equilibrium extraction level 10
XNE aggregate Nash equilibrium extraction level 50
p
SO;s
ij indiv. socially optimal no. of rewards sent in stage s = fs2;s3g 12
p
NE;s
ij indiv. Nash equilibrium no. of reward tokens sent in stage s = fs2;s3g 0
Table 3.2 Social optimum and Nash equilibrium values of all decision variables
for the given experiment parametrization.
In each session, subjects played both 0SR and 2SR, and both games were
implemented using the same matching protocol (i.e., PF, PR or S). In the in-
structions participants were informed about the matching process in their ses-
sion, and 0SR and 2SR were referred to as Task 1 and Task 2, respectively.
Participants were told that they would participate in two tasks, but they re-
ceived the instructions for Task 2 only after Task 1 was ¯nished.5 The tasks
were framed neutrally. The e®ort decision was described as `investing tokens
in option 1 or 2', where options 1 and 2 were the social dilemma activity and
the outside option (with constant marginal bene¯ts w), respectively. In Task 1,
subjects played 15 periods of the game 0SR. The experimenter read out loud
the instructions for this task. Subjects were given the payo® function of e®ort in
the social dilemma (see equation (3.1)), but they were also given a payo® table
5The instructions can be found in Appendix 3.A.1.50 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
in which they could look up, for every aggregate amount of e®ort put in by the
other group members, what payo®s they would earn for a speci¯c amount of ef-
fort invested. We did not inform the subjects about the socially optimal or the
Nash equilibrium e®ort levels. Before the start of the experiment subjects were
presented with a short test; the participants answered all questions correctly
without much di±culty. After Task 1, the same sequence of events took place
for Task 2, consisting of 15 periods of the 2SR treatment.
The information structure in every period of Task 1 (0SR) and Task 2 (2SR)
was as follows. At the end of stage 1 of Task 1, subjects were informed about the
individual e®ort decisions of all other group members, and about their associated
pro¯ts. In Task 2, subjects received the same information as in Task 1, but
they were also informed, at the end of every reward stage, about the number
of reward tokens they had received from other subjects as well as about the
associated payo® consequences.
As explained above, the 0SR and 2SR treatments were run using three dif-
ferent matching protocols: PF, PR and S. The various sessions are summarized
in Table 3.3.
Session Subjects Groups Average Earnings
Partner, with ¯xed identity labels (PF) 50 10 e19.60
Partner, with random identity labels (PR) 55 11 e18.11
Stranger (S) 80 4 sessions e14.30
Table 3.3 Summary of all treatments.
3.3 Analysis of play in the PF sessions
In Figure 3.1(a) we present the aggregate e®ort (averaged over all groups) in
the social dilemma stage in the 0SR treatment (periods 1-15) as well as that in
the 2SR treatment (periods 16-30) that were obtained using the Partner Fixed
matching protocol. This ¯gure suggests that adding two reward stages to a
standard Common Pool Resource game does not increase e±ciency in the social
dilemma. The average aggregate e®ort level in the 2SR treatment is above the
Nash equilibrium level of 50 tokens in all 15 periods, and it is also not lower than
average aggregate e®ort in the 0SR treatment.6 Indeed, we do not even ¯nd the
reward stages to have an impact at the moment that they are introduced: The
6When omitting the ¯rst three periods of 0SR, the Wilcoxon test on e®ort levels in 0SR
and 2SR (with N1 = N2 = 10) yields a p-value of 0.58. When including the ¯rst three periods,
average e®ort in the 0SR treatment only just fails to be signi¯cantly below that in 2SR as the
p-value of the associated Wilcoxon test is 0.11.3.3. Analysis of play in the PF sessions 51
average aggregate e®ort levels in period 15 and 16 are not statistically di®erent
(as the relevant Wilcoxon test with N1 = N2 = 10 yields a p-value of 0.72).
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1 (a) Average aggregate e®ort in the social dilemma stage in the PF
sessions. (b) Average number of reward tokens sent per subject in stage 2 and
stage 3 in the PF sessions.
The lack of impact of having two reward stages, however, cannot be at-
tributed to subjects' refusing to use the reward options, as standard game the-
ory would predict. On the contrary, Figure 3.1(b) shows that in period 16, on
average, subjects give away about two-thirds of their endowment of reward to-
kens in both the ¯rst and second reward stage. The ¯gure also shows that the
number of reward tokens sent even increases towards the maximum of 12 tokens
as the game proceeds. The average number of reward tokens sent in stage 3 of
every period is only just below the average number sent in the ¯rst reward stage
and follows the same trend over time, except for the very last period.
Additional support that the reward institution does not promote cooperation
is obtained by means of a regression analysis, presented in Table 3.4. In the
model, the di®erence in stage 1 e®ort between two consecutive periods, xi;t+1 ¡
xi;t, is the dependent variable. As independent variables, the sum of stage 2
reward tokens that subject i has received is included, as well as the sum of stage
3 reward tokens received. Furthermore, the di®erence in e®ort levels in period
t between subject i and the average of the other group members, xi;t ¡ x¡i;t,52 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
is included which takes into account the regression to the mean which subjects
might display, independent from the rewards they receive. The table shows that
Dependent variable:













Table 3.4 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in stage 1 e®ort.
Standard errors, clustered at the group level, are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level.
the two variables of the number of reward tokens received are insigni¯cant. This
means that the average subject is not willing to lower stage 1 e®orts in the next
period if he or she has received reward tokens in the current period. Subjects
do tend to conform to the group average stage 1 e®ort levels. A subject who has
greater e®ort levels than the group tends to lower his e®ort slightly in the next
period. The reverse case also holds; those who invest less than the group average
tend to increase their investments in the next period. The above analysis gives
rise to the following three results.
Result 1 Behavior in the social dilemma stage in the ¯rst period of 2SR is, on
average, even less cooperative than predicted by standard game theory, but
the average subject gives away more than two-thirds of her endowment of
reward tokens in the ¯rst reward stage in all periods.
Result 2 While e±ciency in the social dilemma stage remains equally low over
all 15 periods of 2SR, the propensity of subjects to send reward tokens
increases over time.
Result 3 The number of reward tokens sent in the second reward stage of 2SR
is smaller than that in the ¯rst reward stage in all but the ¯rst period,
but not substantially so (except for the very last period).3.3. Analysis of play in the PF sessions 53
Results 1 and 2 suggest that it is unlikely that the decision to send reward
tokens is motivated by a desire to compensate one's peers for their cooperative
behavior in the social dilemma. Instead, the temporal increase in rewards ex-
changed (result 2) and the fact that almost an equal number of reward tokens
are sent in the second reward stage as in the ¯rst (result 3) suggest the following:
Subjects recognize that exchanging reward tokens is pro¯table and that they
base their decision to send reward tokens more on the history of reward tokens
received than on the development of cooperation in the social dilemma stage.
However, these results are obtained on the basis of aggregate data, and
these may hide important di®erences at the individual level. To uncover the
underlying mechanism, we ¯rst analyze the persistence in the number of rewards
exchanged between subjects. We introduce the following de¯nition:
De¯nition Subjects i and j (j 6= i) are said to have a connection of length ¿
in period t, denoted by Connectionij;t = ¿, if ¿ is the number of periods
between periods 16 and t in which subject i sent a strictly positive number
of reward tokens to subject j in both stage 2 and stage 3, and vice versa.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the frequency with which connections with a certain
duration occur in the data, evaluated in period 30. Because we have 10 groups
of 5 participants in the PF sessions, the maximum number of connections is
equal to 100.7
Although there are quite a few short-run connections, the persistence in
reward and counter-reward is remarkable. Of the maximum duration of 15
periods, almost ¯fty percent of all connections have a length of 10 periods, or
more. This suggests that subjects are unwilling to provide the second-order
public good of ceasing to send reward tokens to induce cooperation in the social
dilemma stage. This is even more evident from the fact that all but one subject
in the PF sessions had at least one connection with a length of 10 periods,
or more. Consistent with intuition, Figure 3.2(b) indicates that the number
of tokens sent is larger the longer the connection is in place.8 This ¯nding is
intuitive: The longer a bilateral relationship exists, the more trustworthy the
agents have proved to be, hence the more reward tokens they send to each other.
The persistence in rewarding raises the question how connections are formed.
What is the role of the behavior in the social dilemma stage in every period?
7Each subject can start a connection with 4 other group members. Because connections
consist of two subjects, the maximum number of connections is (10 £ 5 £ 4)=2.
8The Spearman correlation coe±cient between the length of the connection and the aver-
age number of tokens sent is 0.90 in the ¯rst reward stage (N = 100;p < 0:01), and 0.91 for
the second reward stage (N = 100;p < 0:01).54 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2 (a) Fraction of connections which last ¿ periods. (b) Average number
of reward tokens sent between two subjects in a connection which lasts ¿ periods.
Is it really true that the number of reward tokens received is independent of a
subject's e®ort decisions? To analyze this, we use regression analysis to explain
the number of rewards sent in the two reward stages. To mitigate potential
endogeneity problems, we run regressions for every period of 2SR separately.
Let us ¯rst analyze the decisions of subject i to send reward tokens to subject
j (j 6= i) in the two reward stages of the ¯rst period (t = 16). The key explana-
tory variables here are whether or not subject j acted cooperatively in the social
dilemma stage of the ¯rst period, where cooperation (non-cooperation) can be
de¯ned as subjects choosing an e®ort level that is below (above) their groups'
average as measured by Maxf0;x¡j ¡ xjg (Maxf0;xj ¡ x¡jg). These variables
are included in the analysis of both reward stages (s2 and s3). In addition, we
also include p2
ji;t (for t = 16) as an explanatory variable in the second reward
stage (s3) of the ¯rst period, because the decision to send rewards in this stage
may also depend on the number of rewards subject i received from subject j in
the ¯rst reward stage.
The results are reported in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3.5. We ¯nd that
the subjects are quite prone to sending reward tokens in the ¯rst reward stage
(s2), as evidenced by the magnitude of the intercept. However, they do so but
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erage other group member. We ¯nd no direct impact from subject j's e®ort
decision on subject i's propensity to send reward tokens in stage 3.9
Next, we focus on behavior in the second period of 2SR (t = 17); see columns
(iii) and (iv). Regarding sending behavior in the ¯rst reward stage (s2), we use
the same controls as in column (i), but we also add the number of reward tokens
subject i received from subject j in the second reward stage of period 16 (that
is, p3
ji;t¡1 where t = 17). The results of columns (iii) and (iv) are striking:
Behavior in the social dilemma stage no longer shows up signi¯cantly, while the
coe±cient on the number of rewards received in the previous reward stage is
positive and signi¯cant.
We replicate this analysis for the third period of 2SR (t=18) and, arbitrar-
ily, the tenth period (t=25), and the same pattern emerges. Behavior in the
social dilemma stage of the current period does not a®ect the number of re-
ward tokens exchanged; what matters is the number of reward tokens received
from one's partner in the previous reward stage. Additional support for this
conclusion comes from the temporal pattern of the magnitudes of the intercept
(the constant term) and of the speci¯cations' explanatory power (as measured
by their R2). The `exogenous' propensity to send reward tokens decreases over
time (as evidenced by the constant term becoming smaller),while the speci¯ca-
tions'explanatory power increases. We summarize these results as follows.
Result 4 In the regressions explaining the number of reward tokens sent in
the ¯rst and second reward stage in every period, we ¯nd that (i) e®ort
only matters in the ¯rst period of 2SR, (ii) the coe±cient on the number
of reward tokens received from the other subject in the previous reward
stage increases as the game proceeds, (iii) the `exogenous' propensity to
send reward tokens decreases over time, and (iv) the explanatory power
of the models increases over time.
We conclude that the participants in the Partner Fixed sessions do not use
the reward stages to enforce cooperation in the social dilemma stage, but to
increase their own private earnings by establishing bilateral relationships.
9There may be an indirect e®ect, though, because the number of reward tokens subject i
receives from subject j in the ¯rst reward stage (p2
ji;t) is likely to be a®ected by subject i's
e®ort decision. This indirect e®ect is not likely to be very large, though, because of the very
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3.4 Additional evidence on the motivation to
use reward tokens
The analysis of the results obtained by using the PF matching protocol sug-
gests that the reward institution is used predominantly to establish mutually
pro¯table exchange relationships rather than as a true reward for cooperative
behavior in the social dilemma stage. Let us now see whether we can ¯nd ad-
ditional support for this conclusion when using the Partner Random (PR) and
Stranger (S) matching protocols. To what extent are the results in the PF ses-
sions driven by the fact that there is perfect information about the behavior of
one's fellow group members in the social dilemma stage (current, and past) and
in the reward stages (current and past)? In Figure 3.3(a) we present the results
of the average aggregate amount of e®ort invested in the social dilemma stage
s1 in the PR and S sessions, and the numbers of reward tokens sent in s2 and
s3 are shown in Figure 3.3(b). Note that for ease of comparison we also include
the results for the PF sessions.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3 (a) Average aggregate e®ort in the social dilemma stage in the PF,
PR and S sessions. (b) Average number of reward tokens sent per subject in
stage 2 and stage 3 in the three matching protocols.
Starting with Figure 3.3(b), the number of reward tokens sent in the two
reward stages di®ers between the three matching protocols, and the results are58 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
consistent with intuition. Most rewards are sent in the PF sessions and least in
the S sessions, and within each session type, the number of reward tokens sent
in the second reward stage is below that in the ¯rst reward stage.
If our interpretation of the PF data is incorrect and subjects use the reward
options to a®ect their peers' behavior in the social dilemma stage, the patterns
observed in Figure 3.3(b) should result in the average aggregate e®ort being
highest in the Stranger sessions and lowest in the PF sessions. As is clear from
Figure 3.3(a), these predictions do not play out in the experiment. Whereas
the average group e®ort is indeed highest in the S sessions, it is lowest in the
PR sessions, not in the PF sessions. Even more surprisingly, having two reward
stages does not result in a signi¯cant reduction in the average aggregate e®ort in
the PF and S sessions (with the p-values of the associated Wilcoxon tests being
0.58 and 0.72, respectively), but it does in the PR sessions (at p < 0:03).10
Additional support for the low e®ectiveness of the reward instrument is pro-
vided by means of a regression analysis, reported in Table 3.6. The regression
analysis is meant to capture the e®ects of rewards received by subject i on that
subject's next period e®ort levels, similar to the regression analysis of the PF
matching design reported in Table 3.4. The dependent variable is the change
in a subject's stage 1 e®ort between two consecutive periods, xi;t+1 ¡ xi;t. The
same explanatory variables are used as in the regression analysis of the PF
matching design: stage 2 rewards received, stage 3 rewards received and a re-
gression to the mean variable. As can be seen from Table 3.6, the sum of stage
3 tokens received has a signi¯cant impact on stage 1 e®ort in the next period in
the PR design. However, given its low coe±cient, the economic signi¯cance of
the variable is low as well. For every eighteen reward tokens received, a subject
is willing to reduce stage 1 e®ort in the next period by only one token. The data
reveals no instance of a subject who receives this amount of rewards in stage 2
in any period.11 In the Stranger design, both the stage 2 and stage 3 reward
variables are insigni¯cant, showing that the reward instrument is ine®ective in
enforcing cooperation in the social dilemma stage. The above analysis gives rise
to the following two results.
Result 5 The propensity to send reward tokens is lowest in the S sessions, and
10These tests are all based on comparison of the average aggregate e®ort data in 0SR and
2SR for each of the three matching protocols, omitting the ¯rst three periods of 0SR to control
for learning.
11Taking the upper limit of the 95%-con¯dence interval shows that a subject is willing to
reduce stage 1 e®ort with one token if ten reward tokens are received in stage 2. The data
show that in twenty percent of all reward choices, a subject has received ten or more stage 3

















Table 3.6 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in stage 1 e®ort.
Standard errors, clustered at the group level for the PR matching and clustered
at the session level for Stranger matching, are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤:
signi¯cant at the 1%-level,
¤¤: signi¯cant at the 5%-level.
e±ciency in the 2SR treatments is not higher than in the 0SR treatment
in these sessions.
Result 6 Whereas the number of reward tokens sent in either reward stage of
the PR sessions is about half the number sent in the same stage in the PF
sessions, e±ciency in 2SR is higher than in 0SR in the PR but not in the
PF sessions.
To uncover the underlying mechanism, let us ¯rst have a closer look at the
reward decisions made in the ¯rst period of 2SR (t = 16) in the three session
types. The most obvious way to check whether subjects base their decisions in
the ¯rst reward stage on their peers' behavior in the social dilemma stage is
to analyze whether they sent reward tokens discriminatively, or not. Aggregate
e®ort is high in the ¯rst period of 2SR in all three session types, but obviously
this may hide large di®erences in individual e®ort decisions. Is it the case
that subjects send their reward tokens to the ones investing least in the social
dilemma stage? Or did most subjects spread their tokens equally over all four
other group members in an attempt to ¯nd partners to exchange tokens with
in the second reward stage (in all three session types) or also in later periods
(which is feasible only in the PF sessions)?
Let us ¯rst calculate the share of subjects who equally divide whatever num-
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stage of period 16. In the PF sessions this share is 0.34 while it is 0.42 in the S
sessions. But this behavior occurs least frequently in the PR protocol, as only
a share of 0.16 of the subjects indiscriminately spread their reward tokens over
their peers.
So, the share of subjects using the ¯rst reward stage indiscriminately is quite
high in both the PF and the S sessions, and especially so in the latter. In these
S sessions, the average individual e®ort level in the ¯rst period of 2SR is 11 (and
hence, is above the Nash equilibrium level and not lower than in period 15; see
also Figure 3.3(a)). Still, more than 40 percent of the subjects decide to spread
the rewards they sent in that period equally over all four other group members.
More speci¯cally, 58 percent of the subjects in the S matching protocol send
reward tokens to all four other group members, and conditional on doing so,
72 percent of those decide to spread them equally. These observations are not
consistent with subjects basing their reward decisions on their peers' behavior
in the social dilemma.
Result 7 In s2 of period 16 of the S sessions, 58 percent of the subjects sends
reward tokens to all four other group members, and 40 percent of the
subjects sends an equal number of reward tokens to all four other group
members. Because aggregate e®ort in period 16 is not signi¯cantly below
that in period 15, this behavior is inconsistent with subjects rewarding
their peers for their pro-social behavior in the social dilemma stage. It is
consistent with subjects willing to incur small costs in the hope of ¯nding
other subjects willing to reciprocate in s3 to reward tokens received in s2.
So we ¯nd that in period 16, rewards are sent most indiscriminately in
the S sessions and most selectively in the PR sessions. Result 7 suggests that
subjects try to ¯nd partners willing to reciprocate to rewards received within
the same period, while result 6 suggests that there is real e±ciency improvement
associated with the more selective reward behavior in PR matching. Let us see
whether we can reconcile the two results.
To do so, let us ¯rst have a closer look at the subjects' individual behavior
in the social dilemma stage in each of the three session types. We calculate the
variance in e®ort within groups over all 15 periods. The average variance of
e®ort within groups is equal to 2.1, 2.5 and 1.9 in the PF, PR and S sessions,
respectively. We ¯nd that the within-group variance is highest in the PR ses-
sions,12 and closer inspection of the temporal pattern (available upon request)
12Based on a Mann-Whitney test, taking each average variance in a period as an obser-
vation, we ¯nd that the variance in PR matching is higher than in the other two matching3.4. Additional evidence on the motivation to use reward tokens 61
reveals that it does not really decline over time either. This suggests that con-
vergence to symmetric e®ort levels is least strong in the PR matching protocol.
This is surprising because if rewards are used to induce cooperation in the social
dilemma stage, we would expect the patterns and variances to be identical in
the PR and PF sessions. If the reward stages are used to induce cooperation,
all one needs is information on the e®ort decisions of one's peers in the current
period, not of previous periods.13
To explore the di®erences in convergence of e®ort levels within groups be-
tween the three matching protocols, we calculate the number of periods in which
a subject chooses a particular e®ort level in the social dilemma stage in each of
the three, and also, conditional on choosing the same e®ort level for a number
of periods, what e®ort level was chosen. The results are shown in Figure 3.4(a)
and Figure 3.4(b), respectively.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4 (a) Fraction of subjects who choose the same e®ort level in the social
dilemma stage for 8 periods or more. (b) Distribution of e®ort levels chosen by
subjects who choose the same e®ort level for 12 periods or more.
designs in the 2SR treatment. Comparing PR with PF yields a p-value smaller than 0.01
(N1 = N2 = 15). Variance in PR is also greater than in S (N1 = N2 = 15;p < 0:01).
13Even though subject labels are randomly reshu²ed between periods in the PR sessions,
group composition itself remains ¯xed. If other subjects are sensitive to changes in the number
of reward tokens received, using the reward stages yield the same returns to the decision
maker in the PR and PF sessions. Hence, if the reward stages are used exclusively to support
cooperation in the social dilemma stage, plays should be identical in all stages of PR and PF.62 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
In Figure 3.4(a) we present the frequency of subjects choosing the same
e®ort level for eight periods or more for the three matching protocols. Focusing
on the frequencies of subjects choosing the same e®ort level for 12 periods or
more, the PR matching protocol is clearly overrepresented. Again, if rewards
are used to induce cooperation in the social dilemma stage, we would expect
the patters to be identical in the PF ad PR sessions. This conjecture does not
play out in the data, though. Almost 50 percent of the subjects in the Partner
Random sessions choose the same extraction e®ort level for 12 periods (out of
a maximum of 15) or more, while the numbers in the PF and S sessions are
32 and 35 percent, respectively. Conditional on choosing the same e®ort level
for 12 periods or more, Figure 3.4(b) presents the distribution of e®ort levels
chosen. Here, the subjects of the S and PR sessions are clearly overrepresented
at e®ort levels above the Nash equilibrium (i.e., x > 10), with frequencies of 82
percent and 81 percent, respectively. This is only 36 percent in the PR sessions:
Subjects in the PR sessions pick a wide variety of e®ort levels between four and
ten tokens (with a cumulative frequency of 64 percent).
So, of the three sessions types, we ¯nd that in the PR sessions (i) the vari-
ance in e®ort levels chosen in a group remains highest throughout 2SR, (ii) the
persistence in choosing a speci¯c e®ort level below the Nash equilibrium level is
most pronounced, and (iii) the use of reward tokens in the ¯rst reward stage is
most selective. Combined with the fact that the number of reward tokens sent
in the ¯rst and second reward stages remains fairly constant throughout the ex-
periment, one explanation might be that subjects use the social dilemma stage
to signal their identity, in order to overcome the problem of subject identi¯ers
being reshu²ed between periods. This would explain the observations that the
variance in e®ort levels chosen in groups is higher in PR than in PF.
We now supply two pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
e±ciency gain the PR sessions is due to signaling rather than to rewards be-
ing used to enforce cooperation (see also result 6). We do so by means of
non-parametric tests regarding reciprocity in the number of reward tokens sent
between `signalers', and by means of a regression analysis aimed at explaining
the use of reward tokens in the ¯rst and second reward stages.
Before we are able to present these additional pieces of evidence, we ¯rst
need to de¯ne a `signaler':
De¯nition A `signaler' is a subject who chooses the same e®ort level in the
social dilemma stage for twelve periods or more in the 2SR game.
Obviously, the cuto® point of 12 periods is arbitrary, but our results are3.4. Additional evidence on the motivation to use reward tokens 63
very robust against using a cuto® point of 10 periods too (results available
upon request).
Our ¯rst piece of evidence supporting the claim that the e±ciency increase
in the PR sessions is due to subjects signaling their identities is the way in
which two signalers exchange reward tokens. If tokens are used as a way to
sustain cooperation in the social dilemma, one expects the `partner' with a
higher (lower) e®ort level in the social dilemma stage to give more (fewer) reward
tokens to the `partner' systematically choosing a lower (higher) e®ort level. If
subjects simply view their partner's e®ort level as a signal of their identity, there
would be no systematic di®erence in the number of reward tokens sent by the
two partners.
We test this by analyzing the number of reward tokens exchanged between all
pairs of signalers with unequal e®ort levels in the social dilemma. We compare
the number of rewards sent by the partner in each pair with the lower e®ort
level to the number of rewards sent by the partner with the higher e®ort level.14
Note that we include all subjects choosing the same e®ort level for 12 periods or
more, independent of whether that level is below or above the Nash equilibrium
level. The results speak against the enforcement-use of reward tokens as we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no di®erence in the number of rewards sent
in either the ¯rst or the second reward stage, with p-values of 0.33 and 0.61
respectively (Wilcoxon tests, N1 = N2 = 20).
Result 8 Di®erences in e®ort levels chosen by two `signalers' in the PR sessions
does not a®ect the net °ow of reward tokens sent between the partners in
a `signaling' relationship.
Second, we try to explain the number of reward tokens sent in both the ¯rst
and second reward stage using regression analysis. Table 3.7 contains the results
of a hurdle model explaining the number of reward tokens sent by subject i to
subject j (j 6= i) in the ¯rst and in the second reward stage in period t. In the
¯rst step of the hurdle model we estimate the probability that subject i decides
to send (or not to send) a strictly positive number of reward tokens to subject
j, while the second step estimates the actual number of tokens sent. In columns
(i)-(iv) of Table 3.7 we present the results of the hurdle models for the ¯rst and
second reward stages while using just explanatory variables that are related to
(relative) e®ort in the social dilemma stage. Additionally, we include a period
variable to control for potential trends in the use of reward tokens. The controls
14From the 55 pairs of signalers, 35 are pairs in which both partners have the same e®ort
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used are Maxf0;x¡j ¡ xjg and Maxf0;xj ¡ x¡jg as our measures of subjects
acting more or less cooperatively in the social dilemma stage than the rest of
their group. Also we include Maxf0;xi ¡ xjg and Maxf0;xj ¡ xig as subjects
may be reluctant to send reward tokens to other subjects acting not only much
less cooperatively than they do themselves, but maybe also to subjects acting
more cooperatively. Such subjects are unlikely to send reward tokens in return.
At ¯rst sight, the results seem to suggest that subjects indeed condition their
decision to send reward tokens in both reward stages on the behavior of their
peers in the social dilemma stage. In both reward stages, subjects are more likely
to send rewards (and also a larger number of rewards) to fellow group members
who put in less e®ort than the group's average. There is also some evidence
that they are less inclined to send reward tokens to a fellow group member in
the ¯rst reward stage the more aggressive that group member behaves in the
social dilemma stage (relative to the group average). However, the e®ect is not
very strong because of two reasons.
First, the coe±cient estimates on Maxf0;x¡j ¡ xjg are statistically highly
signi¯cant but economically quite small. Comparing all e®ort levels within a
group, the di®erence between an individual's and group's e®ort levels is equal to
one or zero in about 78 percent of the cases. Therefore, the hurdle model predicts
that the probability of sending a stage 2 (stage 3) reward token based on stage
1 behavior is in the order of nine (seven) percent in most cases. Conditional on
sending reward tokens, the number sent is about 2 tokens. Second, the other
two explanatory variables, Maxf0;xi¡xjg and Maxf0;xj¡xig suggest that the
larger the absolute di®erence between the e®ort levels of subjects i and j, the
less likely subject i is to send rewards and also the fewer reward tokens sent, if
any. The negative coe±cient on Maxf0;xi¡xjg may be consistent with subjects
refusing to send reward tokens to subjects acting less cooperatively than they
do. However, probably the only reason why one is less willing to send rewards
to someone acting more cooperatively than one does oneself is that one does
not expect rewards to receive in return. We summarize our ¯ndings below.
Result 9 Subjects are less prone to sending reward tokens to subjects acting
more cooperatively than they do, the larger the di®erence in cooperation
levels. This is inconsistent with subjects rewarding their peers for their
cooperative behavior in the social dilemma.
Next, we extend our analysis in Table 3.7 by adding information on (po-
tential) signaling behavior; see columns (v)-(viii). The key variable here is
I(Signal seen). This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the e®ort level66 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
of subject j in period t is an e®ort level that has been invested in period t ¡ 1,
and 0 otherwise. We use this dummy as a control variable, but we also interact
it with xj (to create I(Signal seen) £ xj) to check whether the strength of the
signal is inversely related to the level chosen: Sending a signal is more costly
the lower the signal chosen, and hence the more trustworthy subject j may be.
In addition, we also add p2
ji;t to take into account the e®ects of stage 3 rewards
due to having received reward tokens in stage 2.
The consequences of adding these variables for the level of signi¯cance of
the coe±cients of the social dilemma stage variables are quite substantial. In
terms of economic relevance, the signaling variables are much more important
than the social dilemma ones. The magnitude of the variable I(Signal seen) is
around ¯fty percent in stage 2. Together with the interaction term (evaluated
at the average e®ort level of seven) the probability of attracting rewards using
a signal of six or lower, is around six times greater in magnitude than the ¯rst
four variables of Table 3.7. In the second reward stage these e®ects are slightly
less strong, especially because part of the signi¯cance of being in a bilateral
exchange relationship is accounted for by the variable p2
ji.15 We summarize our
¯ndings in result 10 below.
Result 10 Subjects are more likely to send reward tokens to a subject if that
subject chose the same e®ort level as in the previous period. Because a
large share of subjects hardly ever change their e®ort levels and because
the subjects' identi¯ers are reshu²ed between periods, subjects view un-
changed e®ort levels as a signal of the decision maker's identity.
3.5 Discussion
In the real world behavior of individual agents is embedded in a system of in-
terpersonal relations, where individual welfare depends on actions taken in ac-
tivities that require multi-agent cooperation, and also on actions taken in alter-
native economic activities that only require bilateral cooperation (Granovetter
(1985), Bowles and Gintis (2002)). The latter can take the form of the exchange
of goods or services, for which marginal utilities may di®er between individuals.
Examples include assisting fellow community members with activities such as
crop harvesting or child minding, where the recipients time constraint becomes
15Note that this is remarkable because we did not exclude the 36 percent subjects `choosing
e®ort levels of 11 or higher as a signal'; these agents most likely just play best response to
the relatively low and highly stable e®ort levels chosen by the signalers in their group, which
negatively a®ects the economic and statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cients on the signaling
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less binding, and the recipients marginal value of time may well be above that
of the donor. Refusing to provide these rewards is costly to the agent no longer
receiving them, and hence having the opportunity to selectively engage in a
mutually pro¯table exchange of rewards (and hence have the option to cease
providing these rewards) may be viewed as a natural instrument to induce co-
operation in the multi-agent social dilemma. If a community member does not
act cooperatively in the social dilemma, the other members of the community
may decide to selectively exclude that member from these alternative activities
that positively contribute to welfare.
The results of our laboratory experiments suggest that having the option to
selectively increase one's fellow group members' welfare does not result in an
increase in e±ciency in the multi-agent social dilemma, as is evident from Figure
3.1(a). However, Figure 3.1(b) shows that this is not due to subjects to increase
their peers' welfare by providing a reward, as long as the other group members
reciprocate such that mutually pro¯table exchanges of rewards are established.
These claims are supported by the fact that play in the PR sessions di®ers
substantially from that in the PF sessions. If agents would decide to provide
rewards selectively based on their peers' behavior in the social stage, behavior in
the two sessions should be identical. Even though subject labels are randomly
reshu²ed between periods in the PR sessions, group composition itself remains
¯xed. Therefore, subjects are equally well able to base their decisions to send
reward tokens to some of their peers on their behavior in the social dilemma
stage, and reap the fruits of these selective rewarding decisions in the subsequent
periods as in the PF sessions. However, in the analysis of play in the PF sessions
we ¯nd evidence that subjects base their decision to directly increase their peers'
welfare more on whether they received rewards from their peers in the previous
reward stage, than on their peers' behavior in the social dilemma stage. And
from the analysis of play in the PR sessions we ¯nd that subjects attach more
weight to establishing bilateral cooperation in the reward stages than to a®ecting
their peers' behavior in the social dilemma stage. The reason is because they
are willing to incur costs to signal their identity between periods by choosing a
speci¯c e®ort level in the social dilemma stage. Rather than trying to maximize
their pro¯ts in the social dilemma activity by choosing a privately optimal e®ort
level, they pick an e®ort level that serves as a subject label in the periods to
come; see Figure 3.4.
So we ¯nd that subjects are not willing to provide the `second-order public
good' of (not) using the option to selectively a®ect their peers' welfare to induce
cooperation in the social dilemma, but they are willing to cooperate bilaterally.68 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
When subjects are able to select their partners in an activity that requires
cooperation, e±ciency tends to be much higher than if group composition is
imposed (see for example Sutter et al. (2010)). Our results are consistent
with that. The possibility for subjects to choose their partners in the `reward
activity' results in the exchange of reward tokens being very close to the socially
optimal level (as the average number of reward tokens sent is above 10 (from
an endowment of 12) in both reward stages in periods 23-29 in 2SR in the
PF sessions. Hence, we cannot attribute our results to subjects' not being
cooperative, all the evidence suggests that they are conditionally cooperative.
The pattern of play in the social dilemma stage in 0SR in all three matching
designs (as shown in Figure 3.3(a)) is consistent with subjects reciprocating to
their peers' e®ort decisions in the previous period. This gives rise to a jagged
pattern of e®ort levels in all groups (group-level data are available upon request).
And from the pattern of rewarding in 2SR (especially in the PF and PR sessions)
we ¯nd that subjects reciprocate in rewarding.
3.6 Conclusion
Previous literature shows that e±ciency in a social dilemma situation can be in-
creased considerably if subjects are allowed to either punish or reward their peers
for non-cooperative (cooperative) behavior in the social dilemma. This e®ect
vanishes, however, when the experimental design allows for counter-punishment
(or retaliation). In this chapter, we demonstrate that the option to counter-
reward also negatively a®ects the cooperation-enforcing e®ect if rewards are
used as an instrument.
We study experimentally a non-linear public game (also known as the Com-
mon Pool Resource game) with two stages of reward. Rewards in such a setup
can be either used in an `enforcing' manner, linked to the decisions observed in
the group-level social dilemma game, or in a `bilateral' manner, fully indepen-
dent of the observations made in the group-level social dilemma game. We set
up three matching protocols a®ecting the length of subjects interaction across
periods and compare the use of rewards in them. We implement our standard
non-linear public bads game (with zero reward options; 0SR) and the same game
with two reward stages (2SR) using three di®erent matching protocols: sessions
with Partner matching and ¯xed identity labels (PF), sessions with Partner
treatment and randomized identity labels (PR), and sessions with (imperfect)
Stranger matching (S).
We ¯nd that in the PF sessions, o®ering subjects two options to send re-3.6. Conclusion 69
wards to their peers does not improve e±ciency in the non-linear Common Pool
Resource game as compared to the case with zero reward options. While ef-
¯ciency in the social dilemma stage remains low throughout the experiment,
the propensity to send reward tokens increases over time. We ¯nd that this
increased propensity to send rewards is due to subjects positively reciprocat-
ing to the number of reward tokens received from fellow group members in the
previous reward stage. Here, decisions in the social dilemma stage are found to
play a role in the ¯rst period only, and even then we still ¯nd that more than
one-third of the subjects just equally divide whatever number of reward tokens
they give over all four other members of their group.
We delve deeper into the underlying mechanism by analyzing play in the PR
and S sessions. With respect to the latter, we ¯nd subjects in the S sessions
to also be prone to just equally divide whatever number of reward tokens they
give over all four other members of their group, as more than 40 percent of the
subjects display such behavior. Even though subjects are rematched into new
groups at the beginning of every new period, subjects still try to earn extra
money by sending reward tokens to fellow group members in the ¯rst reward
stage in the hope of receiving back some in the second.
The results of comparing play in the PF and PR sessions are most telling,
however. Because group composition remains ¯xed throughout the experiment,
one would expect play in the social dilemma stage to be identical in the PF
and PR sessions if rewards are used to enforce cooperation. All what is needed
for such behavior to emerge is (i) being ensured of future payo®s if the reward
recipients are sensitive to receiving rewards (that is, one needs to be in the same
group as the recipients in the next period), and (ii) receiving information on the
behavior of one's peers in the social dilemma stage of the current period. Both
conditions are met in PF and PR. Still, we ¯nd marked di®erences between
the two session types. We ¯nd that the within-group variance of e®ort levels
chosen is larger in the PR sessions than in the PF sessions, while the within-
subject variance in e®ort over all periods is smaller in PR matching than in the
latter. The lack of convergence in e®ort levels in the PR sessions suggests that
subjects see bene¯ts to acting consistently during the social dilemma stage (even
though it is costly if one chooses an e®ort level that is (much) below the Nash
equilibrium level), whereas they do not perceive any bene¯ts to such persistence
in the PF sessions. Given that the only di®erence between the two matching
protocols is that subject identi¯ers are reshu²ed between periods in the one
protocol and not in the other, it is natural to think of the persistence of e®ort
levels in terms of a signal: Subjects in the PR sessions manage to overcome the70 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
problem of establishing multi-period, mutually pro¯table exchanges of reward
tokens by choosing a speci¯c `signal' by means of their e®ort decisions in the
social dilemma stage.
Together, we ¯nd strong evidence that subjects do not use reward tokens to
endorse cooperative behavior in the social dilemma, but that they see the bene-
¯ts of engaging in a less risky, more pro¯table exchange of reward opportunities.
Because there are no discrete stages in real world social dilemma situations there
is a continuous opportunity to engage in mutually pro¯table activities requiring
bilateral cooperation, we conjecture that the presence of such opportunities is
insu±cient to support cooperation in the social dilemma itself.3.A. Appendix 71
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Instructions for the two stages of reward treatment
In this appendix, the instructions of the Partner Fixed (PF), Partner Random
(PR), and Stranger (S) treatments are displayed. The experimental instructions
are kept the same where possible. Sentences that di®er are placed in brackets,
and each sentence is preceded by the abbreviation of the treatment.
Introduction:
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision-making. The
experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours. You will be paid after the exper-
iment. No other experiment participant will learn how much you earned. You
will be paid 5 Euros for your participation PLUS any additional earnings you
will make in the experiment. How much you earn crucially depends on your
decisions in the experiment.
During the whole experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other partici-
pants. Disobeying this rule results in your exclusion from the experiment. In
the experiment, you will participate in two Tasks. You will earn points in each
of them. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for all the points you
earned.
The exchange rate is: 100 points = 1 Euro, 1 point = 1 Euro-cent.
Experiment description:
The experiment consists of 15 rounds. In each round, you will be in a group with
four other participants; a group therefore consists of ¯ve participants in total.
Note that you will interact with the same four subjects in all rounds. The other
members of your group will be identi¯ed by means of identity labels, `x', `xx',
`xxx' and `xxxx'. [PF: These labels will remain the same within each round, and
between rounds. To give an example, if another group member is labeled `x' in
some round, he/she is also labeled `x' in the next round. / PR: These labels will
remain the same within each round, but they will change between rounds. To
give an example, if another group member is labeled `x' in some round, he/she
may be labeled `xxxx' in the next round. That means that nobody is able to
make a connection between another participant's decisions in di®erent rounds.
/ S: After each round, all participants are randomly rematched into new groups.72 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
Again, the labels `x', `xx', `xxx' and `xxxx' are randomly assigned to the other
four members of your group. Because groups are rematched, `xx' in some round
is not the same participant as the group member labeled `xx' in some other
round. This means that nobody is able to make a connection between other
participants' decisions in di®erent rounds.]
At the beginning of every round, you receive 13 tokens. You have to decide
how to divide these 13 tokens between two options: option 1 and option 2.
Observe that you have to divide all your 13 tokens. Therefore if you put X
tokens into option 1, you put automatically 13 ¡ X tokens into option 2. In this
task, therefore, you will be asked to make one choice: how many tokens you put
in option 1. It is then automatic that you put 13 ¡ X tokens in option 2.
Now, we will explain how you earn points for the tokens you put in option
1 and option 2.
Earnings for tokens in option 1: The number of points you earn for the tokens
in option 1 depends on how many tokens you put in option 1 and how many
tokens the other four group members put in option 1. You receive 9.5 points for
every token you put in option 1. You also have to pay costs when using option
1. The costs depend on how many tokens in total all group members (including
you) put into option 1: for every token you put into option 1 you have to pay
a cost of 0.15 points MULTIPLIED BY the total number of tokens in option 1.
Earnings for tokens in option 2: The number of points you earn for the
tokens in option 2 depends only on how many tokens you put in option 2. For
every token in option 2 you receive 0.5 points. There are no costs.
Your total earnings in this round are the sum of points you earn in option 1
and 2, that means
9.5*X ¡ 0.15*Y*X + 0.5*(13 ¡ X),
where X is the number of tokens you put into option 1, and Y is the total
number of tokens that are put into option 1 (that is, by you and the four other
group members).
When making your decisions, you can use the above formula, but you can
also make use of the table below. The table contains the number of points you
can earn for di®erent combinations of the number of tokens you put in option
1 and the total number of tokens the other four group members put in option
1. Please, have a look at the table now. In the ¯rst column (in grey print), you
¯nd all possible numbers of tokens you may put in option 1. You can choose any
integer number from 0 to 13, that means numbers 0;1;:::;12;13. In the ¯rst3.A. Appendix 73
Figure 3.5 The payo® table.
row (in grey print), you ¯nd the number of tokens the other four participants
may (together) put in option 1. Your total payo® in one round depends on the
combination of the number of tokens you put in option 1 and the number of
tokens the other four participants (in total) put in option 1.
Example: Suppose you put 4 tokens in option 1. In the grey column, ¯nd
the row that begins with 4 (tokens). And, suppose you think that the other four
group members will put in total 12 tokens in option 1. In the grey row, ¯nd the
column that begins with 12 (tokens). Look in the table for the intersection of
the chosen row (4 tokens) and column (12 tokens). You ¯nd that if you put 4
tokens in option 1 and the other four members put in total 12 tokens in option
1, your total earnings in this round are 32.9 points.
In the table, observe the following. You can always make sure to earn 6.5
points in any round by putting zero tokens in option 1. You can, however,
possibly earn more points if you put some tokens in option 1. How many points
you earn, depends crucially on the choices of the other members of your group.
If, for example, you put all 13 tokens in option 1, you can earn 98.1 points, if
the other group members do not put any tokens in option 1. On the other hand,
you can lose 3.3 points, if the other group members do the same as you, and
put all their tokens in option 1.
Other group members a®ect how many points you earn, and you a®ect how74 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
many points the others earn.
Note that in the experiment, you and the other four members of your group
will decide on the division of the tokens at the same time. Therefore, at the
moment of your decision you do not know how many tokens the other members
of your group will put in option 1. You can only guess.
After all group members made their decisions, you will receive information
on how many tokens each group member has put in option 1 in this round, and
how many points each group member earned.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
Have a look at Figure "Screen 1". Here you decide how many tokens you put
into option 1. Use the keyboard to type in one of the numbers 0;1;:::;12;13
in the active ¯eld, and con¯rm your choice by pressing OK.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot
change your decision after you have pressed OK.
After having pressed OK, you will be asked to wait until all experiment
participants have done the same. The experiment continues only after all ex-
periment participants pressed OK. We therefore kindly ask you not to delay
your decision too much. For every decision, a time indication of one minute
is shown in the header. After this time expires, you are repeatedly asked to
submit your decision, or press the OK button.
After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear. After all experiment par-
ticipants have pressed OK, Screen 2 will appear.3.A. Appendix 75
Figure 3.6 Screen 1
SCREEN 2
In the upper part of this screen you ¯nd a table with information on how many
tokens each group member has put in option 1 in this round, and how many
points he/she earned in this round.
Note that information about you is always given in the column denoted
`me'. Information in the columns denoted `x', `xx', `xxx', and `xxxx' is about
the other four group members. [PF: Remember that the group member labeled
`x' will always be the same individual in all rounds. / PR: In each round,
the labels of these four subjects will change. Therefore, for example, subject
denoted `x' in some period may be denoted `xxx' or `xx' or `xxxx' in the next
period. / S: Remember that all participants are rematched into new groups
between all rounds. Therefore, group member `xxx' in some round is not the
same participant as the group member labeled `xxx' in some other round.]76 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
Figure 3.7 Screen 2
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody
understands how points are earned. Use your tables to answer the following
questions. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly,
the experiment will begin.
TEST QUESTIONS:
Q1. I will be in a group with four other subjects. These will remain the same
four subjects for all 15 rounds. [YES/NO]
Q2. When I choose 5 and the other four group members choose 1, 2, 9 and 0,
then my payo® will be:...(use table to answer)
Q3. When a group member is denoted `xx' in round 5, then it is certain that
this is the same subject as the subject denoted `xx' in round 6. [YES / NO]3.A. Appendix 77
Second part of the experiment:
You will now participate in the second and last part of the experiment. It also
has 15 rounds. [PF: You will be matched with the same four group members as
you were before. Again, these other participants remain member of your group
in all 15 rounds. As before, the same individuals have the same labels. / PR:
You will be matched with the same four group members as you were before.
Again, these other participants remain member of your group in all 15 rounds.
As before, the identity labels will remain the same within each round, but they
will change between rounds. / R: As in the previous task, the participants of
your group will not be the same between rounds. Again, the other four members
of your group will be randomly assigned out of all the participants who take
part in this experiment.] In this part of the experiment, however, every round
consists of three stages, Stage I, Stage II and Stage III. Stage I of every round
is the same as before. That means that you will receive 13 tokens and have to
divide them between option 1 and option 2. The payo® table and payments are
the same as before. Let us explain Stage II and Stage III.
Stage II:
In Stage II of a round (following immediately Stage I in each round), you will
again receive a number of tokens | this time it is 12 tokens. Every token is
worth 1 point to you. That means that you basically receive 12 points. You can
now choose how many of these tokens to send to each of the other four members
of your group. For every token you send to another subject in your group, your
earnings will be reduced by 1 point. Every token you send to another subject
in your group is worth 3 points to that subject. So, for every token you send to
another subject in your group, the earnings of that subject will be increased by
3 points. You can decide to send any number of tokens (from 0;1;2;:::;11;12)
to any number of other group members (that is, 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 other group
members). The sum of the tokens you send must not exceed 12. Also, you are
not allowed to send any tokens to yourself. All ¯ve group members make this
decision at the same time.
Earning points in Stage II:
The number of points you earn in Stage II of every round is calculated as follows.78 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
It is equal to:
² 12 points (for 12 tokens you received at the beginning of the round),
² MINUS as many points as the number of tokens you sent to the other four
members of your group,
² PLUS three times the total number of tokens you received from the other
four members in your group.
Stage III:
In Stage III of a round (following immediately Stage II in each round), you will
again receive 12 tokens. Every token is again worth 1 point to you. You can
now choose how many of these tokens to send to each of the other four members
of your group. So, for every token you send to another subject in your group,
his/her earnings increase by 3 points and your earnings will be reduced by 1
point. You can decide to send any number of tokens (from 0;1;2;:::;11;12)
to any number of other group members (that is, 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 other group
members). The sum of the tokens you send must not exceed 12. Also, you are
not allowed to send any tokens to yourself. All ¯ve group members make this
decision at the same time.
Earning points in Stage III:
The number of points you earn in Stage III of every round is calculated in the
same way as in Stage II. It is equal to:
² 12 points (for 12 tokens you received at the beginning of the round),
² MINUS as many points as the number of tokens you sent to the other four
members of your group,
² PLUS three times the total number of tokens you received from the other
four members in your group.
Your total earnings in one round of the experiment are:
² The number of points you earned in Stage I, PLUS
² The number of points you earned in Stage II, PLUS
² The number of points you earned in Stage III.3.A. Appendix 79
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
This is very similar to the decision screen as in the ¯rst part of the experiment:
Figure 3.8 Screen 1
SCREEN 2
In the upper part of this screen you ¯nd a table with information on how many
tokens each group member has put in option 1 in this round, and how many
points he/she earned in Stage I. Your decision is in the column `me'. Decisions of
the other four group members are in the columns `x', `xx', `xxx' and `xxxx'. [PF:
Remember that these labels remain constant within each round, and between
rounds. So `x' is the same subject in all three stages (Stage I, II and III) of the
current round. Furthermore, a subject labeled `x' in this round is also labeled
`x' in the next round. / PR: Remember that these labels remain constant within80 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
each round, but that they change between rounds. So `x' is the same subject in
all three stages (Stage I, II and III) of the current round, but label of subject
labeled `x' in this round may be di®erent in another round. / S: Remember that
these labels remain constant within each round, but that they change between
rounds. So `x' is the same participant in all three stages (Stage I, II and III) of
the current round, but not between rounds.
Figure 3.9 Screen 2
In the lower part of the screen, you are asked to make a decision how many
tokens from your 12 tokens to send to each of the other four members of your
group. For each group member, you have to put in a number; if you do not wish
to send tokens to a particular group member, you type in `0'. The sum of these
four numbers of tokens must not exceed the 12 tokens you received. Press OK,
when you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear. The experiment
continues only after all experiment participants have pressed OK, and therefore
we kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much.3.A. Appendix 81
SCREEN 3
In this screen you ¯nd all information about how many tokens each of the other
group members sent to you in Stage II. In the lower part of the screen, you are
asked to make a decision in Stage III: how many tokens from your 12 tokens in
Stage III you want to send to each of the other four group members. For each
group member, you have to put in a number; if you do not wish to send tokens
to a particular group member, you type in `0'. The sum of these four numbers
of tokens must not exceed the 12 tokens you received. Note that (for example)
subject denoted `x' in Stage I is the same as subject denoted `x' in Stage II and
the same subject in Stage III.
Press OK, when you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear.
The experiment continues only after all experiment participants have pressed
OK, and therefore we kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much.82 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
Figure 3.10 Screen 33.A. Appendix 83
SCREEN 4
In this screen you ¯nd the information about all three stages, and you will also
learn your ¯nal payo® for this round.
Figure 3.11 Screen 4
Please, raise your hand if you have questions at this moment.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody
understands how points are earned. Use your tables to answer the following
questions. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly,
the experiment will begin.84 Chapter 3. Carrots without Bite
TEST QUESTIONS:
Q1. I will be in a group with four other subjects. These are the same subjects
as in the ¯rst part of the experiment. [YES / NO]
Q2. I will be in a group with four other subjects. These subjects will remain
the same four subjects for all 15 rounds. [YES / NO]
Q3. Have a look at screen 3. The subject denoted `xxx' in Stage I and in Stage
II and in Stage III is the same subject. [YES / NO]
Q4. When a subject is labeled `x' in Stage I of round 3, then it is certain that
this is the same subject as the subject labeled `x' in Stage I of round 4. [YES
/ NO]Chapter 4
A Tale of Two Carrots:
The E®ectiveness of
Multiple Reward Stages in
a Common Pool Resource
Game1;2
Forthcoming in J. List and M. Price (eds., 2010) Handbook on Experimental
Economics and the Environment, Edward Elgar.
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I have shown that adding two stages of rewards to a social dilemma
game does not result in an increase in cooperation. This chapter takes a closer
look on one of the matching designs, the partner design with randomized iden-
tity labels between periods. As is shown in the previous chapter, many subjects
use their e®ort levels in the common pool resource as a signal, meant to at-
tract rewards from trustworthy group members. In this chapter, the analysis
of signaling behavior is studied in more detail. Additionally, it turns out that
the partner matching design shows insights into the social orientation of partic-
ipating subjects. This chapter gives a closer look on how this can be established.
1This chapter is co-authored with Daan van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova.
2Special thanks to Charles Noussair, Eline van der Heijden, Mark Brouwers, Chris MÄ uris
and David Vo· nka for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.
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Over the past two decades, many economic experiments have been conducted
to assess the relative e®ectiveness of so-called self-regulatory instruments in sus-
taining cooperation in social dilemma situations, such as public goods games or
common pool resource games. Instruments include ostracism (Masclet (2003)),
peer-to-peer rewards (Sefton et al. (2007), Vyrastekova and van Soest 2008),
and verbal expressions of approval or disapproval (Masclet et al. (2003)). How-
ever, most attention in the literature has been paid to the e®ectiveness of peer-
to-peer punishments.
Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992), and Fehr and GÄ achter (2000) were
the ¯rst to use economic experiments to analyze whether e±ciency in multi-
agent social dilemma situations increases if subjects are given the opportunity
to impose sanctions on their peers. All studies ¯nd that the threat of sanctions
is indeed very e®ective as the resulting level of e±ciency in the social dilemma
situation is very close to the socially optimal level. This is surprising as game
theory predicts that rational self-interested agents would never engage in pun-
ishing their peers. The reason is that these experiments are set up such that
imposing punishments is not only costly to the subject receiving the sanction,
but also to the subject imposing it. That means that punishing is tantamount
to providing a second-order public good. If the punishment is e®ective in chang-
ing the recipient's behavior, the bene¯ts accrue to all group members whereas
the costs are borne by the punisher. And if, on top of that, the game is ¯nitely
repeated, backward induction makes it even less likely that punishments will
be imposed. Punishing non-cooperative behavior in the last period is a costly
investment with zero future payo®s, hence punishing is not rational in any of
the preceding periods either.
So, contrary to these game-theoretic predictions, Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom
et al. (1992), and Fehr and GÄ achter (2000) observe that subjects frequently
impose sanctions on those fellow group members that act non-cooperatively in
the social dilemma situation.3 But in real life there may be yet another reason
not to impose punishments on one's peers, and that is that one makes oneself
vulnerable to counterpunishment (or retaliation). This has been explored by
Nikiforakis (2008), who added a second punishment stage to Fehr and GÄ achter's
(2000) experiment. Those who get punished in the ¯rst punishment stage are
3Note that in these experiments subjects are free to impose sanctions on any of their peers.
Conditional on being willing to impose sanctions it seems most logical to punish those who
free-ride on the cooperative e®orts of the others. That this is not necessarily the case is shown
by Herrmann et al. (2008) who ¯nd that in some countries and cultures not only free-riders
are sanctioned, but also sometimes those who contribute most to the public good.4.1. Introduction 87
given the opportunity to counterpunish in the second. The result is that the
e±ciency gains of punishments vanish: The threat of counterpunishment takes
away the willingness to punish in the ¯rst stage, and hence cooperation unravels
(see also Denant-Boemont et al. (2007)).
Peer-to-peer sanctioning is the most well-studied decentralized enforcement
instrument in social dilemma experiments, but it is not the only one. Peer-
to-peer rewards have been analyzed too; see for example Sefton et al. (2007)
and Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008). These two studies use di®erent impact
ratios of rewards, and come to opposite conclusions regarding the e±ciency
consequences of rewards. Whereas Sefton et al. impose that it costs 1 experi-
mental currency unit (ECU) to increase the payo®s by the reward recipient by
1 ECU (i.e., a 1:1 ratio), Vyrastekova and van Soest use a ratio of costs of 1
unit to increase the recipient's payo®s by 3 (i.e., a 1:3 ratio). The di®erence
between 1:1 and 1:3 is crucial as an exchange of reward tokens between two
subjects makes both better o® in the 1:3 parameterization (as each subject's
net gains are 2 points) whereas their payo®s remain unchanged in case of the
1:1 parameterization.4
Indeed, when using the 1:3 impact ratio, Vyrastekova and van Soest observe
that e±ciency in the social dilemma situation increases if subjects are given
the opportunity to give rewards to their peers (whereas Sefton et al. do not
observe any e±ciency gain).5 But even with a 1:3 impact ratio the improvement
is less substantial than is typically the case with the single stage punishment
mechanism. The natural question is then whether adding a second reward stage
would result in e±ciency being even closer to the social optimum, or not. At
¯rst sight, it seems that e±ciency can only be improved taking as given that
subjects are willing to incur costs to reward their peers, the bene¯ts of acting
cooperatively are increased.
In this chapter we examine whether the opportunity to `counterreward' one's
peers indeed increases e±ciency in the social dilemma situation. We take the
experiment by Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008) as a starting point and add
a second reward stage. We follow the literature by using a Partner treatment
4Note that transfer rewards (1:1) are not necessarily more realistic or common than `net-
positive' rewards (1:3). A ratio greater than 1:1 can be defended by noting that in case of
¯nancial rewards marginal utility of income may di®er between agents. But rewards may
also take the form of helping each other (e.g., helping with the harvest, minding each others'
children, etc.), and the opportunity cost of time may di®er well between agents as well as over
time (cf. Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008)).
5This ¯nding that rewards are e®ective too is not only interesting from a scienti¯c point
of view. In most societies the right of coercion is restricted to the government, and hence
peer-to-peer rewards may well be more relevant in real-world situations than peer-to-peer
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where the subjects' identities are reshu²ed between periods, so that reward
cannot become a game in itself (see, Fehr and GÄ achter (2000), Nikiforakis (2008),
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), and Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008)).
Note that by adding a reward stage to the experiment of Vyrastekova and
van Soest (2008), we actually introduce two changes even though the second
reward stage is identical to the single reward stage in that earlier study. One
change is that adding a second reward stage doubles the maximum number of
rewards that can be given. That means that potential free-riders in the social
dilemma situation face a larger carrot to act cooperatively. And from earlier
work by van Soest and Vyrastekova (2004) we know that larger rewards tend
to improve cooperation. But there is also a second change, which is relevant if
subjects seek to establish mutually pro¯table bilateral exchange relationships.
In treatments with just one reward stage, the only way in which subjects can
signal their intention to cooperate is by behaving cooperatively in the social
dilemma situation. With two reward stages, the ¯rst reward stage can be also
used to signal one's willingness to engage in a bilateral exchange of reward to-
kens. That means that the relationship between behavior in the social dilemma
and the reward activity becomes less important, or is even severed.
This chapter's contribution is twofold. The ¯rst is of direct relevance from
an environmental policy point of view. Whereas Vyrastekova and van Soest
(2008) ¯nd that e±ciency in the social dilemma situation is greater than Nash
with a single stage of rewards, we ¯nd that adding a second reward stage results
in e±ciency falling back to its Nash level. This is in spite of the fact that we
also ¯nd that the opportunity for reciprocity in reward increases the subjects'
propensity to exchange rewards. Taking into account the two changes adding a
second reward stage gives rise to, the second dominates the ¯rst.
The second contribution is methodological in nature. We ¯nd that adding a
second reward stage substantially increases insight into the social orientation of
our subjects, allowing the experimenter to classify subjects into individuals hold-
ing pro-social preferences, strategic money maximizers, and `homo economicus'.
Identifying behavioral patterns is important if the literature takes experimental
play seriously, and tries to come up with utility functions that better capture
actual behavior in the lab. Several methods are available, including Fischbacher
et al. (2001)'s strategy method and the decomposed games approach as devel-
oped by social scientists (Liebrand (1984)). Problems with these approaches
are that (i) they do not capture reciprocal preferences in an interactive setting,
(ii) play in these games may contaminate play in the actual experiment, and
(iii) their predictive power is not always very strong. For example, van Soest4.2. The game and its experimental design 89
and Vyrastekova (2006) use the decomposed game approach to analyze subjects'
behavior in two treatments, one with 1:3 sanctions and one with 1:1 rewards.
Whereas they ¯nd that the observed di®erences in behavior of the various be-
havioral types are in concordance with the theoretical predictions, they are in
many instances not signi¯cantly di®erent.
Indeed, we ¯nd that adding a second reward stage induces pro-social in-
dividuals reveal to themselves by behaving very di®erently from the subjects
whose behavior is best described as strategic money maximizers or purely self-
interested individuals. Indeed, we ¯nd that the extra reward stage induces
subjects to behave much more consistently than in Vyrastekova and van Soest
(2008). It is an interesting avenue for future research to consider whether adding
extra stages to other games also allows researchers to classify their subject pool
into the various behavioral types, thus enabling theorists to come up with mod-
els that better capture actual behavior.
The set-up of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the game, the
game theoretical predictions, and the experimental design. The impact of the
second reward stage is analyzed in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we take a closer
look at the impact of having a second reward stage on individual behavior, on
the basis of which we can classify our subject pool into cooperative individuals,
strategic money maximizers and `homo economicus'. Finally, a conclusion is
provided in Section 4.5.
4.2 The game and its experimental design
The social dilemma game that is studied in this chapter is the common pool
resource (CPR) game. In the following subsection we present the game as well
as our game theoretic predictions, and in the second subsection we introduce
our experimental design.
4.2.1 The game
In the CPR game, each of the N agents is endowed with a ¯xed amount of e®ort
e which she can allocate to common pool resource extraction, or to an alternative
economic activity. The amount of e®ort agent i allocates to extraction is denoted
by xi, and hence e ¡ xi is the amount of e®ort she allocates to the alternative
activity. The game is ¯nitely repeated over T periods. Using s1 to denote stage
1, agent i's total payo®s in period t are given by the following equation:
¼s1
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where Xt denotes the aggregate amount of e®ort put in by the N agents (Xt =
PN
i=1 xi;t). The marginal returns from the alternative activity are constant
and equal to w, and hence, the pro¯ts generated by that activity are equal to
w(e ¡ xi). The returns from the extraction activity depend on the amount of
e®ort subject i allocates to this activity (xi;t), but also on the total amount of
e®ort put in by the N ¡ 1 other agents (X¡i;t =
P
j6=i xj;t). The total yield of
the resource is equal to AXt¡BX2
t , and agent i receives a share of the resource's
yield equal to her share in aggregate extraction e®ort (xi;t=Xt). The symmetric
individual Nash equilibrium extraction e®ort level is xNE
i;t = (A¡w)=B(N +1),




i;t if N > 1, there is a social dilemma. Given that
this game is ¯nitely repeated, the standard game-theoretic prediction is that
all agents choose the Nash equilibrium extraction e®ort, because of backward
induction.
The above game is the baseline treatment, and will be referred to as game
0SR (i.e., the zero reward stage treatment). We implement two additional treat-
ments, the one stage reward treatment (1SR) and the two stage reward treat-
ment (2SR). The ¯rst stage (s1) in these two treatments is identical to the (¯rst)
stage of 0SR, but is then followed by either one or two reward stages (in 1SR
and 2SR, respectively). Each reward stage is set up as follows. Each of the
N agents receive z reward tokens which she can keep herself, or give to one or
more of the other agents. Every token that the agent keeps, is worth 1 point.
Every token that is sent to a fellow group member is worth 3 points to that
group member. Agent i's payo®s in stage s = fs2;s3g in period t are therefore
given by:
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ij;t is the number of reward tokens that agent i sends to agent j (j 6= i)
in stage s = fs2;s3g in period t. The total individual payo®s in one period of











Assuming that subjects only care about their own payo®s and are able to
apply backward induction, the game theoretic predictions regarding play in the
1SR and 2SR treatments are straightforward. Given that the game is played
for a ¯nite number of periods, giving a reward in the (last) reward stage of
period T does not a®ect future behavior anymore. That means that rational,
self-interested agents do not send reward tokens in the last reward stage (s2 in
1SR, and s3 in 2SR). That means that in 2SR there is also no reason to send4.2. The game and its experimental design 91
any reward tokens in the ¯rst reward stage (s2) because the recipients have no
incentives to reciprocate in the second reward stage (s3). And given that no
rewards will be given in the last period, agents choose the Nash equilibrium
amount of e®ort in the CPR stage (s1) in both 1SR or 2SR. In turn this implies
that a positive use of rewards in the (last) reward stage of period T ¡ 1 (i.e.,
s2 in 1SR, and s3 in 2SR) does not in°uence behavior in stage 1 of period T.
Continuing reasoning backward we deduce that no rewards are given in any of
the T periods in either 1SR or 2SR, and cooperation unravels. So, in our ¯nitely
repeated game the standard game theoretic prediction is that no rewards are
being sent in any period, and also that the amount of e®ort allocated to CPR
extraction is always equal to the Nash equilibrium level.
The game theoretic predictions change when the standard assumptions of
rational, self-interested agents are relaxed. In case other-regarding preferences
play a role, reward tokens may be used. For example, individuals with reciprocal
preferences may be present in the subject pool. And these reciprocal individuals
are willing to incur costs to reward some group members for their cooperative
behavior in s1 and s2, and to punish others for their noncooperative behavior by
refusing to send them reward tokens. The e®ectiveness of rewards in improving
e±ciency in the CPR stage is likely to be greater in the 2SR treatment than in
the 1SR treatment, as the bene¯ts of cooperation are unambiguously larger in
the latter treatment.
4.2.2 Experimental design
The experiments were conducted at Tilburg University. The sessions for the
one reward stage institution (1SR) were held during the Spring semester of
2005. Here 40 subjects participated, forming 8 groups of 5 participants, that
is, N = 5. The sessions for the two reward stages (2SR) took place during the
Spring and Fall semester of 2007. In total 55 subjects participated, resulting
in 11 groups. Each session lasted about two hours. All 95 participants were
students at Tilburg University with di®erent nationalities and di®erent academic
backgrounds (economics, law, management, social sciences), and were recruited
via e-mail. Interaction between subjects was mediated via computers, and the
games were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). In each session, 15 or
20 subjects participated who were randomly assigned to computer terminals.
The experimental parameterization is shown in Table 4.1, and the resulting
Nash equilibrium and socially optimal levels of extraction e®ort and reward are
shown in Table 4.2.
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tions of the 0SR treatment (and students were invited to read along), next there
were test questions, and then the 0SR treatment was implemented.6 To facil-
itate the calculations of the pro¯ts in the common pool resource activity, all
subjects were given a payo® table. No information was given about either the
socially optimal or Nash equilibrium extraction e®ort levels.
Variable Description Value
N number of individuals per group 5
T number of periods of the stage game 15
w return on investments in the alternative activity 0.5
A parameter of the CPR's revenue function 11.5
B parameter of the CPR's revenue function 0.15
e individual endowment of e®ort 13
z individual endowment of `reward' tokens 12
r value of reward tokens received 3
Table 4.1 Experiment parameterization.
Variable Description Value
x¤ symmetric individual socially optimal e®ort level 6
X¤ aggregate socially optimal e®ort level 30
xNE individual Nash equilibrium extraction e®ort 10
XNE aggregate Nash equilibrium extraction e®ort 50
p
NE;s
ij Nash equilibrium number of reward tokens given in stage s 0
Table 4.2 Socially optimal and Nash equilibrium levels of all variables of the
stage game.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly matched into
groups of 5 participants. The group composition remained constant for the rest
of the experiment. At the beginning of every new period an identity label was
assigned to each group member, and this label remained constant throughout
the three stages of that period. To prevent reward becoming a game in itself,
we follow the literature (Fehr and GÄ achter (2000), Nikiforakis (2008), Denant-
Boemont et al. (2007), and Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008)) by randomly
reshu²ing identity labels between periods.
Upon completion of 0SR, the instructions for the session's second (and last)
treatment were distributed and read out. This second treatment was either 1SR
or 2SR. In the 1SR treatment each subject received information about the stage
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1 extraction e®ort decisions of all other group members (and their payo®s), the
number of reward tokens he/she received from each other group member, and
the number of reward tokens that group members did not distribute. Because
of screen size limitations, the subjects in 2SR received the same information
except for the information on how many tokens each group member kept for
him or herself.
In the sessions implementing the one reward stage institution participants
earned on average e15.90 (including a showup fee of e5.{), whereas the subjects
in the two reward stage sessions earned, on average, e18.11.
4.3 The e±ciency consequences of allowing for
reciprocity in rewards
Let us ¯rst have a look at the aggregate amount of e®ort put into CPR extrac-
tion, averaged over all groups; see Figure 4.1. The average aggregate extraction
e®ort levels in the 0SR treatments of all sessions are shown in periods 1 to
15, whereas the average aggregate extraction e®ort levels in the two reward
treatments are shown in periods 16-30.
Figure 4.1 Average aggregate extraction e®ort levels in the ¯rst stage.
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starts on average at a level in between the socially optimal level (30) and the
Nash equilibrium level (50), but increases rapidly in the early periods. There is
no di®erence between the two subject pools with respect to their play in 0SR
as the relevant two-sided Mann-Whitney U test (with 8 and 11 groups in the
1SR and 2SR treatments) yields a p-value of 0.395.
The impact of introducing either one or two reward stages are markedly
di®erent, though; see periods 16-30. Whereas the instantaneous reduction in
average aggregate extraction e®ort levels in the CPR stage is identical in 1SR
and 2SR, play evolves very di®erently in the two treatments. Indeed, the single
reward stage reduces average aggregate extraction e®ort levels signi¯cantly as
compared to the 0SR treatment (as the two-sided Wilcoxon matched pairs test
with 8 groups yields a p-value of 0.01), but the two stage reward treatment does
not (11 groups, p = 0.21).
Result 1 Compared with 0SR, adding one reward stage signi¯cantly reduces
the aggregate amount of e®ort put into CPR extraction, but adding two
reward stages does not.
Next, we turn to analyzing reward behavior. The average individual reward
e®ort is presented in Figure 4.2.
The ¯rst observation is that, on average, the number of reward tokens sent
(and received) is lower in the 1SR treatment than in either of the two stages
in 2SR. Whereas this di®erence is not signi¯cant for the last stage of the two
treatments (s2 in 1SR and s3 in 2SR; p = 0.35), it is signi¯cantly higher in s2
in 2SR than in either s3 in 2SR or s2 in 1SR (with p-values of 0.01 and 0.02,
respectively).
Result 2 On average, the total number of reward tokens sent is greater in 2SR
than in 1SR.
As stated in the introduction, adding a second reward stage implies that
the 2SR treatment di®ers from the 1SR treatment in two respects. In the ¯rst
place the maximum number of reward tokens that can be exchanged is twice as
high in 2SR, and hence subjects can o®er their peers a larger carrot to sustain
cooperative behavior in the CPR stage. A payo®-equivalent treatment would
be one with a single reward stage, but with an impact ratio of 2:6. And from
earlier work by van Soest and Vyrastekova (2004) we know that increasing the
net pro¯tability of rewards results in behavior in the social dilemma situation
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Figure 4.2 Average individual number of reward tokens sent in stage 2 and stage
3 in 1SR and 2SR.
The second change is that the presence of a second reward stage allows
subjects to signal their trustworthiness not only in their behavior in the CPR
stage, but also in the ¯rst reward stage. In both the 1SR and 2SR there are
two motivations for choosing lower extraction e®ort levels in the ¯rst stage. By
putting relatively little e®ort into extraction one is more eligible for receiving
rewards, but one also signals one's willingness to act cooperatively. Hence the
odds for other subjects sending a reward to receive reward tokens in return,
are also larger. Clearly in the 1SR treatment the only way one can signal
one's willingness to engage in a bilateral exchange of reward tokens is by acting
cooperatively in the extraction stage (s1). But in the 2SR treatment one can
signal one's trustworthiness in the CPR stage, but also by one's behavior in the
¯rst reward stage. That means that the link between acting cooperatively and
the reward activity is weaker in 2SR than in 1SR.
Given that we ¯nd that e±ciency in the social dilemma situation is at the
Nash level in the 2SR treatment, clearly the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst.
This is evidenced by the fact that the number of rewards exchanged is identical
in the last reward stage in both treatments (s3 in 2SR and in s2 in 1SR), whereas
it is much greater in the 2SR's ¯rst reward stage (s2). Hence, the link between
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cooperation in the social dilemma unravels.
Comparing the e®ectiveness of rewards and sanctions in one or two stage set-
tings, the verdict on the e®ectiveness of sanctions versus rewards in sustaining
cooperation seems to lean towards sanctions. The two instruments are com-
pletely symmetric in the sense that just having one decentralized enforcement
stage (sanctions, or rewards) proves to be e±ciency increasing, but adding a
second enforcement stage makes this e±ciency gain disappear.
As argued in the introduction, in principle rewards are likely to occur more
often in real life situations than sanctions, if only because the right of coercion
usually lies with the government. Rewards can always be given,7 but that
also means that reciprocity in rewards cannot be ruled out either. There is
no natural mechanism that prevents people from engaging in `rewarding' and
`counterrewarding'. It may be less likely that an individual will seek out another
individual who acts non-cooperatively in social dilemma situations to establish
a mutually bene¯cial exchange of good and services with, but if the other makes
the ¯rst gesture, the exchange relationship is established after all.
Whereas peer-to-peer sanctions may not occur very frequently in the real
world (although there are quite a few case studies showing that they are being
used in practice, see for example Taylor (1987) and Cordell and McKean (1992)),
they may prove to be e®ective if they do. Individuals who are punished in a
community may sometimes have the opportunity to retaliate, but clearly there
are many situations in which this is not really possible, if only because it is
natural for punishers to form a collective to prevent retaliation in these matters.
It is less likely that the punished, at least if the punishment was justi¯ed, are
able to do so too.
Peer-to-peer sanctions may occur in the real world in the form of `one-stage'
and `two-stage' situations, but peer-to-peer rewards are likely appear in the form
of `two-stage' rewards only. As such, the prospects for peer-to-peer rewards
being an e®ective decentralized enforcement mechanism are bleak.
4.4 Measuring social preferences
One of the most important challenges economists are nowadays confronted with
is to improve the predictive power of their models. The assumption of humans
being exclusively interested in maximizing their own material welfare predicts
well when analyzing behavior in the market place, but not in situations where
7Keeping in mind the crucial di®erences between rewards and bribes, as the latter always
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cooperation is called for, as is the case in social dilemma situations. Experi-
mental economics can help create data about human behavior from which better
speci¯cations of utility functions for various behavioral types (conditional co-
operators, inequity averse individuals, strategic money maximizers, etc) can be
derived. Various methods have been developed including the strategy method
of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and the decomposed game technique developed by
social psychologists (Liebrand (1984), see also O®erman et al. (1996)).
The attempt by van Soest and Vyrastekova (2006) to predict behavior in a
social dilemma situation using the Decomposed Game approach is of particular
interest here, as the actual experiment used is the 1SR treatment (albeit with
impact factor 1:1; i.e., where rewards are e®ectively transfers). The Decomposed
Game approach consists of 24 independent decision situations, which have actual
¯nancial consequences for the subject who makes the decision, as well as for one
other (anonymous) participant the subject is matched with in the experimental
session. The decision situations present dilemmas because they consist of choices
between a payo® combination with large bene¯ts for the decision maker and
small bene¯ts to the other participant, and a payo® combination where the sum
of bene¯ts is larger but with smaller private bene¯ts to the decision maker.
By choosing between the two payo® allocations in each decision situation, the
decision maker has to weigh his/her own payo® gains/losses against those of the
other, anonymous, participant. This approach allows the experimenter to label
subjects individualistic (if they maximize their own ¯nal payo®), competitive (if
they end up with a positive number of points for themselves and a negative one
for the other participant), or cooperative (if they end up with both a positive
number of points for themselves as well as for the other participant).
The predictive power of this test turned out to be very low in the experiment
under consideration. When using the classi¯cations thus derived to explain be-
havior in the CPR stage, van Soest and Vyrastekova ¯nd that the di®erences
in behavior have the expected signs, but are generally not signi¯cant. Clearly,
behavior in the 1SR treatment is too complex to be captured by a simple classi-
¯cation obtained via a game like the Decomposed Game approach. One of the
main reasons is of course that the approach does not allow for reciprocity as all
subjects make their decisions simultaneously, and, to avoid contamination, only
learn the payo® consequences after the main experiment has been implemented.
The strategy method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) is less susceptible to this
criticism, but the fact that subjects have to answer multiple `what if' questions
tends to make them act more strategic then they would do in a situation with
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Interestingly enough, we ¯nd that our 2SR treatment may provide an alter-
native method for eliciting social preferences. When comparing behavior in 2SR
with that in 1SR, we ¯nd that whereas it is really di±cult to classify our sub-
ject pool into various behavioral types (cf. van Soest and Vyrastekova (2006)),
behavior in the 2SR treatments allows for a very simple and straightforward
classi¯cation of subjects. Let us ¯rst take a look at the aggregate CPR data.
When comparing CPR extraction behavior in 1SR and 2SR in Figure 4.1,
the ¯rst thing to note is that behavior is much more variable in the former
than in the latter. On average, the standard deviation in a group in the 1SR
treatment is 1.35. The average standard deviation in the 2SR treatment is
0.64. This observation is supported by the relevant two-sided Mann-Whitney
U test on di®erences in the standard deviations between the two treatments
(N1 = 8;N2 = 11), which yields a p-value of less than 0.01.
Result 3 The variance in extraction behavior is signi¯cantly higher in treat-
ment 1SR than in treatment 2SR.
One hypothesis explaining why behavior is much more constant in 2SR than
in 1SR is that subjects try to overcome the fact that reshu²ing identities be-
tween periods prevents them building a reputation as being trustworthy in ex-
changing reward tokens. By choosing the same extraction e®ort levels in a series
of periods, subjects signal their identity to their fellow group members.
Let us check whether indeed subjects behave in such a way. We do so in
two steps. First we check subjects' persistency in the amount of e®ort put into
CPR extraction in the three treatments (0SR, 1SR, and 2SR). And then we
check whether the di®erence in persistency between 1SR and 2SR give rise to
di®erences in reward behavior.
Figure 4.3 presents the share of subjects who choose a speci¯c level of ex-
traction e®ort for eight periods, or more. The ¯gure shows a striking di®erence
between the three treatments. In the 0SR treatment, about 27% of the sub-
jects put in the same amount of e®ort into CPR extraction in eight periods
or more, whereas these percentages are 55% in the 1SR treatment and 64% in
the 2SR treatment. The di®erences between the treatments become even more
transparent when the cut-o® point is set at twelve periods or more. In the
0SR treatment, 7% of the subjects choose a speci¯c level of extraction e®ort
for twelve periods or more. In the 1SR treatment, the percentage of subjects is
13% but it is 49% in the 2SR treatment.
Result 4 restates these ¯ndings:
Result 4 Almost 50% of the subjects in the 2SR treatment extract the same4.4. Measuring social preferences 99
Figure 4.3 Share of subjects who keep their stage 1 extraction e®ort levels
constant in the three treatments for 8-15 periods.
number of stage 1 tokens for twelve periods or more. In contrast, less
than 15% display such persistency in extraction e®ort in the 0SR or 1SR
treatment.
So, we ¯nd that subjects are more persistent in their choice of the amount
of extraction e®ort chosen in stage 1 in the 2SR treatment than in the 1SR
treatment. Let us now have a look at whether this di®erence in persistency
gives rise to di®erences in reward behavior.
Here we have to distinguish between the two motivations for sending reward
tokens. The ¯rst is that subjects use rewards as `intended', that is to induce
fellow group members to choose lower levels of extraction e®ort in the social
dilemma situation. The second is that subjects try to establish a mutually
bene¯cial exchange of reward tokens with fellow group members.
In Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) we plot the number of reward tokens given by
sender i to recipient j as a function of the di®erence in extraction e®ort put in
by sender i and recipient j (xi ¡ xj). If rewards would be used predominantly
to mitigate payo® inequalities resulting from di®erences in stage 1 behavior, one
would expect the lines both panels of Figure 4.4 to be upward-sloping. If the
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would expect the number of tokens exchanged to be an increasing function of
xi ¡ xj in the range where xi < xj, and a decreasing function of xi ¡ xj for all
levels where xi > xj.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4 Average number of reward tokens sent by subject i to subject j, as a
function of the di®erence in extraction e®ort (xi¡xj), for (a) the 1SR treatment,
and (b) the 2SR treatment.
Clearly, straightforward rewarding cooperative extraction behavior is not the
most important motivation behind sending reward tokens in either 1SR or 2SR.
Subjects tend to send more reward tokens to those subjects who choose the same
extraction e®ort level in the ¯rst stage as they do themselves. Although both
treatments show peaks at di®erences other than zero too, these are the result of
just a few decisions in case of 1SR but are much more persistent in case of 2SR.
For example, the peak at ¡13 in 1SR is the result of one subject's decision to
choose e®ort level 0 and send 3 reward tokens to a fellow group member who
chose e®ort level 13. Obviously, this was just a one-time decision. But in 2SR
it happens fairly frequently that subjects choosing di®erent levels of extraction
e®ort establish an exchange relationship. For instance, the peaks at +8 and ¡8
are the result of two subjects, one choosing e®ort level 13 and the other choosing
level 5, sending reward tokens to each other for 12 periods. Obviously, this is
one reason why e±ciency in 2SR is essentially at the Nash equilibrium. The
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by the desire to establish mutually pro¯table bilateral exchange relationships
than to in°uence CPR extraction behavior itself.
So we ¯nd that a substantial share of our subjects choose the same level of
extraction e®ort in 12 periods, or more, and also that there is some evidence
that the persistence in extraction behavior facilitates the exchange of rewards.
Having established that a substantial share of our subjects tries to signal
their identity, the next question is to whether these `signalers' behave more
cooperatively than `non-signalers', or not. In the current setting cooperative
behavior consists of three actions: (i) choosing lower levels of extraction e®ort
than average, (ii) being willing to forego pro¯table exchange relationships with
subjects that free-ride in the CPR stage (even though it may be privately prof-
itable to do so), and (iii) positively reciprocate to the number of reward tokens
received in stage 2 by sending back rewards in stage 3 (even though identity
labels are re-shu²ed upon completion of stage 3).
To test whether this is the case, let us ¯rst de¯ne `signalers' as follows:
De¯nition 1 A `signaler' is a subject who chooses the same stage 1 extraction
e®ort level for twelve periods or more.8
This de¯nition results in 27 subjects (of the 55 in the subject pool) to be
classi¯ed as a signaler, and hence 28 as being non-signalers. Now let us have
a look at the ¯rst aspect of cooperative behavior: what extraction e®ort levels
signalers and non-signalers tend to choose. We do so in Figure 4.5(a) and 4.5(b)
respectively.
In Figure 4.5(a) we see that of the signalers nine subjects choose extraction
e®ort 13 for twelve periods or more, whereas the other 18 subjects choose levels
of 10 and lower. That means that two-thirds of the signalers tend to behave
cooperatively in the CPR stage, but one-third does not.
Comparing 4.5(a) and 4.5(b), it is evident that signalers, on average, tend to
behave more cooperatively in the social dilemma situation than non-signalers.
On average, the extraction e®ort level chosen by signalers is below Nash (even
when including the nine subjects choosing 13), and hence the average e®ort
level chosen by non-signalers is greater. Support for this claim is given by a
Student t-test, taking the average extraction of an individual over all periods
as an independent observation. The test compares whether the extractions are
di®erent from ten tokens, the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Taking all signalers
into account, the average extraction level is 9.03, which is statistically di®erent
8The cut-o® point of twelve periods is arbitrary. However, the results that follow are more
or less the same as when a cut-o® point of eleven or thirteen periods is chosen.102 Chapter 4. A Tale of Two Carrots
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5 (a) The distribution of signalers over the various extraction e®ort
levels. (b) Frequency with which the extraction e®ort levels are chosen by the
non-signalers.
from ten tokens (N = 27;p = 0:096). When the signalers with an extraction
level of 13 are taken out, the average extraction level is 7.22, and is statistically
di®erent from 10 (N = 18;p < 0:01). The average extraction level of non-
signalers is 10.11. A Student t-test shows no statistical di®erence with the
symmetric Nash equilibrium (N = 28;p = 0:778).
Result 5 On average, the extraction e®ort level chosen by signalers is below
Nash, and the average e®ort level chosen by non-signalers is greater.
Next, let us have a look at the second aspect of `cooperative behavior', and
that is whether subjects are willing to forego a pro¯table exchange of reward
tokens with subjects who free-ride in the social dilemma stage. We make a
distinction between the number of reward tokens sent by signalers and non-
signalers; see Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
These four panels are revealing. First, there is a clear downward sloping
pattern in the number of reward tokens signalers send to other signalers and
non-signalers in stage 2 as well as in stage 3, with the number of tokens falling
the more e®ort the recipient puts into CPR extraction. Non-signalers, however,
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.6 Rewards sent by signalers in: (a) stage 2 (b) stage 3.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7 Rewards sent by non-signalers in: (a) stage 2 (b) stage 3.
less so when sending rewards to non-signalers (remember that the bulk of the
extraction e®ort chosen by non-signalers is 10 or higher). And in stage 3 there
is hardly any detectable pattern. Therefore, signalers tend to be more willing
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¯cial exchange of reward tokens with free-riders in the CPR stage. And these
conclusions are largely con¯rmed when calculating the Spearman correlation
coe±cients between rewards and stage 1 extraction e®ort of the receiver; see
Table 4.3.9
Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 3
Signalers to: Non-Signalers to:
Signalers ¡0:46 ¡0:37 ¡0:47 ¡0:21
Non-Signalers ¡0:48 ¡0:31 ¡0:20 ¡0:10
Table 4.3 Spearman's correlation coe±cient of relation between sending rewards
and stage 1 extraction e®ort levels of the receiver. All coe±cients are signi¯cant
at the 1% level.
Finally, let us have a look at the third element of cooperation, and that is how
`trustworthy' signalers and non-signalers are in positively reciprocating in stage
3 to the number of rewards received in stage 2. Figure 4.8 shows information
on trustworthiness.
Again, these panels are revealing. Figure 4.8(a) shows the average number
of reward tokens sent by signalers and non-signalers, distinguishing between the
recipients being signalers and non-signalers, in the two stages. Both signalers
and non-signalers send more tokens to signalers than to non-signalers, albeit
that signalers tend to send more. More interesting though is the drop in the
number of tokens sent from stage 3 as compared to stage 2. Whereas the
number sent in stage 3 is about half of the number sent in stage 2 in case of
non-signalers, the drop is much less pronounced in the case of signalers. Here it
is important to remember too that our de¯nition of signalers includes not only
those subjects that persistently chose a relatively low extraction e®ort level (18
of the 27 signalers), but also those subjects that chose e®ort level 13 for twelve
periods or more (the other 9 signalers). We ¯nd a crucial di®erence between the
two types as the majority of the non-cooperative signalers send, on average, no
tokens. When taking out these 9 subjects, the ¯rst four columns of Figure 4.8(a)
change dramatically; see Figure 4.8(b).10 If we only focus on those signalers that
put in 10 tokens or less, we ¯nd that they act very cooperatively in the reward
stage too. They tend to send an equal number of reward tokens to both signalers
and non-signalers in stage 2 and stage 3.
9To compute the correlation coe±cients, each reward decision is taken as independent,
yielding 3,300 observations in total.
10From the non-cooperative signalers, one signaler does exchange reward tokens with an-
other signaler (a ¯nding we have already reported in Figure 4.4(b)). This subject is omitted
from Figure 4.8(b).4.4. Measuring social preferences 105
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8 (a) The average amount of stage 2 and stage 3 tokens that are sent
between subjects of the two types, averaged over all subjects and all periods.
(b) The average amount of stage 2 and stage 3 tokens that are sent by cooper-
ative signalers (with xi · 10) and non-cooperative signalers (with xi = 13) to
cooperative signalers and non-signalers.
Combined, Figures 4.5-4.8 suggest that indeed just adding the second reward
stage allows for a full classi¯cation of our subject pool into pro-social individ-
uals, strategic money maximizers, and individuals who behave in line with the
assumption of `homo economicus'.
The 18 subjects (= 1/3 of the pool) who are signalers and put in maximally
10 units of e®ort into CPR extraction are pro-social individuals. They put in
less extraction e®ort than the average subject, they tend to send fewer reward
tokens to fellow group members who put more e®ort into extraction, and they
tend to give about the same number of tokens in stage 3 as they did in stage 2.
The 28 subjects (= 1/2 of the pool) who were labeled as non-signalers are
strategic money maximizers. They adjust their extraction e®ort level in stage
1 to maximize their pro¯ts, they tend to send their reward tokens to the more
cooperative signalers (that is, the ones with the lower extraction e®ort levels)
because they bank on receiving reward tokens in stage 3, while they themselves
tend not to send any reward tokens in stage 3.
And the remaining 9 signalers consistently choosing extraction e®ort level 13
(= 1/6 of our subject pool) are best labeled as `homo economicus'. Given the106 Chapter 4. A Tale of Two Carrots
lower extraction e®ort levels chosen by the other signalers level 13 is often the
best-response level, and they do not really engage in exchanging reward tokens
at all.
Having seen the evidence that some subjects try act pro-socially, the question
arises what signals their trustworthiness best; is it their behavior in stage 1, stage
2, or stage 3? For the remainder of the analysis, the following de¯nition of a
successful bilateral relationship is used:
De¯nition 2 A `connection' is a bilateral relationship between two subjects,
such that both subjects reward each other in both stage 2 and stage 3 for
eleven periods or more.11
It is expected that mainly signalers form connections with other signalers.
Moreover, it is not clear that subjects who have a connection with a non-signaler
are aware of this, since they have no way of distinguishing non-signalers. Ta-
ble 4.4 shows the ratio of actual connections compared to the total number of
connections that are possible between the subject types.
Possible Connections Actual Connections Ratio
signaler with signaler 26 13 0.50
signaler with Non-signaler 56 6 0.11
Non-signaler with Non-signaler 28 2 0.07
Table 4.4 Existence of connections between the subject types.
The table reveals that half of the signalers are active in a connection with
other signalers. Furthermore, the results show that a small fraction of non-
signalers is active in a connection.
To ¯nd out what determines the creation of a connection, a natural candidate
seems to be extraction and reward e®ort in the ¯rst period. Table 4.5 gives the
average number of reward tokens that a subject has sent and received in period
16 and period 17 to 30. The table divides subjects who are in a connection and
subjects who are not. The table shows that subjects who are in a connection
give and receive substantially more reward tokens than subjects who are not in
a connection. This ¯nding is not very surprising, since the purpose of establish
a connection is to exchange reward tokens. What is more surprising is that the
di®erences in the number of reward tokens exchanged within connections and
outside connections are already visible in the ¯rst period. This ¯nding suggests
that the ¯rst period is crucial for the development of connections.
11Again, the cut-o® point of eleven periods seems rather arbitrary. However, robustness
checks are performed which have indicated that the main results do not change much.4.4. Measuring social preferences 107










Connection 8.4 7.7 8.1 7.4 10.0 8.5 9.8 7.7
Non-Connection 3.9 2.3 4.1 2.6 3.9 1.4 4.1 2.0
Table 4.5 Average rewards sent and received for subjects in a connection and
for subjects not in a connection.
So what is the key signal on the basis of which subjects decide that they
are trustworthy, so that they decide to form a connection? Is it extraction
e®ort, is it stage 2 reward behavior or stage 3 reward behavior? We test this by
estimating the following Probit model:
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In the model, yij is a dummy variable indicating whether a connection starts
in period 2, or not. That means, it has a value of 1 when the connection is
established in period 2 and zero otherwise (with the two subjects giving each
other tokens in both stage 2 and stage 3 for ten periods or more). The variable
I(i and j are signalers) is a dummy variable which has value 1 if the subjects
in the connection are signalers, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are
self-explanatory except for the variable 0.5(xi;t=16 + xj;t=16). It is expected
that the initial choice of stage 1 extraction e®ort levels heavily in°uences the
reward e®ort in stage 2 and 3 of period 16, and hence a®ects the dependent
variable directly, or indirectly by a®ecting stage 2 and stage 3 rewards. An
indirect e®ect of stage 1 on the dependent variable is however not a problem.
This will become a problem when stage 1 simultaneously has a direct e®ect
on the dependent variable. In order to test for this, a measure of the level of
stage 1 extraction e®ort levels is included in the model. The average stage 1
extraction e®ort level of subject i and j is taken as a proxy.12 Table 4.6 gives
the estimation results of the model.
The regression results show that when two subjects are signalers in period
12In addition, a number of other measures for the impact of stage 1 are tested as robustness
checks (results are not reported). For example, including the maximum and minimum of stage
1 of i and j, or adding the extraction e®ort levels of both subjects. More or less all the results
are qualitatively the same.108 Chapter 4. A Tale of Two Carrots
Dependent variable:
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Table 4.6 Probit regression results for the existence of a connection between
subject i and subject j. In total, there are 11 £ 10 = 110 possible connections.
16 to 30, they have a bigger probability of forming a connection. This result
is intuitive, and supports the idea that subjects signal in order to bilaterally
exchange reward tokens. Furthermore, the results indicate that the number of
rewards sent in stage 2 of period 16 has no direct signi¯cant impact on the
development of a connection in future periods. The e®ects of stage 3 rewards in
period 1 are however signi¯cantly positive. The more reward tokens a subject
sends to another subject in this stage, the bigger the probability that the two
subjects will give each other tokens in future periods.
These ¯ndings can be interpreted as supporting the following mechanism.
Two subjects, who reward each other heavily in stage 3 of the ¯rst period, have
shown each other that they are trustworthy. Both subjects have an interest in
maintaining each other's mutual trust, since receiving reward tokens is lucrative.
The only way to recognize the group member with whom it is relatively safe to
exchange reward tokens is by his or her stage 1 extraction e®ort levels, but the
true test of trustworthiness is whether she defaults in stage 3, yes or no.
4.5 Conclusion
In the experimental economics literature, a substantial amount of research has
been dedicated to exploring the e®ectiveness of `decentralized' regulation mech-
anisms in sustaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Decentralized4.5. Conclusion 109
mechanisms are those mechanisms where the agents involved try to solve the
social dilemma situation themselves rather than by relying on some sort of
centralized intervention from, say, a governmental regulatory body. Many sit-
uations where there are positive or negative externalities qualify as a social
dilemma, and hence this literature is very relevant to the environmental eco-
nomics profession. And if self-regulatory instruments are found to be e®ective
in sustaining cooperation, their presence obviates the need for (expensive and
sometimes cumbersome) government intervention.
In this chapter we address the issue whether peer-to-peer rewards can re-
duce aggregate extraction e®ort in a common pool resource game towards the
socially optimal level. Past research has shown that peer-to-peer rewards can
indeed improve e±ciency in the social dilemma situation if the bene¯ts of re-
ceiving a reward are larger than the costs of giving it; see Vyrastekova and van
Soest (2008). However, the experiment in their paper was set up such that re-
ward cannot become a game in itself; subject identi¯ers were reshu²ed between
periods, and there was just one opportunity to simultaneously exchange reward
tokens in every period.
While the reshu²ing of identities can well be defended on the basis of exper-
imental practice, there are not many instances in the real world in which there
is no opportunity for direct reciprocity in rewards. This can be remedied in the
laboratory by adding a second reward stage to the experiment by Vyrastekova
and van Soest (2008). This chapter reports the e±ciency consequences of adding
such a second reward stage, and the results are not very encouraging. Despite
the fact that more rewards are being exchanged in the two-stage setup than
in the one-stage setup, e±ciency in the social dilemma situation is lower (and
about equal to Nash).
That means that rewards may not be e®ective in sustaining cooperation in
social dilemma situations after all. Unless the institutional setting is such that
agents cannot positively reciprocate to rewards received from their peers, the
possibility to engaging in a privately bene¯cial exchange of reward activities
severs the link between the social dilemma situation and the reward activity,
and cooperation in the social dilemma situation unravels.
However, the prospect for rewards may not be as bleak as the above analysis
suggests. In this chapter we also tried to see to what extent adding this second
reward stage facilitates classi¯cation of our subject pool into the various be-
havioral types, such as pro-social individuals, `homo economicus', and strategic
money maximizers. Whereas behavior in the one-stage reward setup is very
noisy, there is much more consistency in our subjects' behavior in the two-stage110 Chapter 4. A Tale of Two Carrots
reward setup. Indeed, we ¯nd that we can classify one-third of our subjects
as pro-social, one half as strategic money maximizers, and one sixth as `homo
economicus'. From an experimental economics point of view this is interesting
because it suggests that adding a stage that allows for direct reciprocity helps
identify the participants' social orientation, thus facilitating the use of this ex-
perimental data in the development of new models that better capture behavior
in social dilemma situations than those based on the assumption of all agents
being rational and interested exclusively in their own material payo®.
But it also suggests that the extent to which rewards can sustain cooperation
in the social dilemma situation crucially depends on the behavioral composition
of the group. If a large share of the agents involved in the social dilemma
situation have pro-social preferences, and if the amount of e®ort the non-pro-
social agents can put into the social dilemma situation is limited, as is the case
in our experiment, e±ciency in the social dilemma situation can be greater
than Nash. Indeed, the group that achieved the greatest e±ciency level in the
common pool resource stage consisted of 4 subjects that were labeled as pro-
social, 1 as strategic money maximizer and 0 were labeled as homo economicus.
Whereas the Nash e±ciency level is at 66% of the social optimum, the e±ciency
level achieved by this group was equal to 98% of the social optimum. In contrast,
a group with one of the lowest levels of e±ciency (42% of the social optimum)
consisted of 0 subjects that were labeled as pro-social, 3 as strategic money
maximizers and 2 were labeled as homo economicus.
That means that rewards may be able to sustain cooperation in a social
dilemma situation after all, but only if the share of pro-social individuals is
su±ciently high indeed.Intermezzo: Visserslatijn1
This short intermezzo serves as a recollection of some memorable quotes
that I have heard at the ¯shing pond, while conducting the ¯eld expe-
riments that are described in the following chapters. Part of the fun of
those quotes is that they are spoken in a Dutch dialect, `Tilburgs'. For
that reason, I have chosen to write this intermezzo in Dutch. This in-
termezzo is meant to have entertainment value only, and not to provide
any scienti¯c insights.
Naast experimenten in het traditionele laboratorium, heb ik gedurende mijn tijd
als promovendus ook experimenten uitgevoerd `in het veld'. De komende drie
hoofdstukken gaan in op de resultaten van die onderzoeken. Voor het zo ver
is, wil ik graag in het kort enkele leuke situaties beschrijven die symbool staan
voor de omgeving waar ik ongeveer twee jaar lang zo leuk heb kunnen werken.
Deze omgeving is een recreatieve visvijver genaamd `de Biestse Oevers' in het
plaatsje Biest-Houtakker (`dun Biest'). Biest-Houtakker ligt dicht bij de stad
Tilburg, vandaar dat er over het algemeen in het Tilburgs met elkaar wordt
gecommuniceerd. Omdat het Tilburgse dialect mij niet vreemd is, lukt het me
vrij aardig om de doorgaans vele conversaties die de vissers met elkaar hebben,
te volgen.
Mijn Tilburgse communicatieve vaardigheden zijn vooral van nut gebleken tij-
dens de vooronderzoeken die ik uitgevoerd heb met Stef van Kessel, Mike Groels
en Paul Lude~ na Delgado. In die vooronderzoeken heb ik namelijk veel geleerd
1Mijn dank gaat uit naar Jan van Steensel en Gerard Steijns voor hun hulp bij het correct
schrijven van de Tilburgse citaten.
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over de kunst van het vissen. Deels leer je de kunst door te kijken naar hoe
anderen vissen. Echter, de beste inzichten verkrijg je door gewoonweg te vragen
hoe het moet. Dan blijkt dat het altijd lastig is om te voorspellen waar de
meeste vis gevangen kan worden. Vaak gehoorde antwoorden op de vraag waar
de vis zich in de vijver bevindt, zijn:
"De miste vis zit tussen de kµ op en de stµ ert."
en
"Witte wµ et is? Meer waoter as vis."
Het aanleggen van het aas is een factor van cruciaal belang. De meeste vissers
zeggen dat het vooral belangrijk is dat het aas "droait as ene tierelier". Maar
natuurlijk zijn ook de weersomstandigheden van invloed. Vooral de windrichting
zou verklaren waarom er veel of weinig gevangen wordt, getuige de verklaring
van een sportvisser:
"Tis Ostewµ end vandaog, dµ es niks wµ erd. De wµ end moet op et zuije staon, dan
aoze ze. ^ Ooh!"
Als het dan allemaal mee zit, en een visser heeft veel vissen gevangen, dan gaat
zoiets niet onopgemerkt voorbij. Zo antwoordde een visser toen hem gevraagd
werd naar zijn visvangst:
"Zette gij mar en pµ enneke klaor, meej heel veul booter!"
Mijn vele bezoeken aan de Biestse Oevers zijn niet onopgemerkt gebleven. Ik
vertel geÄ ³nteresseerden slechts dat wij van de Universiteit van Tilburg komen,
maar zo weinig mogelijk over hetgeen we daar doen. Sommigen zijn nieuwsgierig
genoeg om te vragen naar wat wij allemaal van plan zijn met het onderzoek.
Bang om het gedrag van de vissers in toekomstige onderzoeken te sturen, is
mijn antwoord steevast dat ik niet in kan gaan op vragen over de aard van ons
onderzoek. Dit houdt enig gespeculeer van de vissers natuurlijk niet tegen:
"Ik weet waor ze vur zµ eµ en, des gehµ eµ em. Woarschijnlik ist vur Balkenende!"
"
^ Ooh jµ e, ik kµ en oe wel. GÄ ollie zµ eµ et van die studentenvereeneging, ist nie?"
"GÄ ollie zult onderhaand al wel dirrekteur zµ eµ en van die univµ ersietµ eµ et."
Een van mijn leukste herinneringen bewaar ik aan de ochtenden waarin we
het restaurant van de Biestse Oevers veranderde in een laboratorium. Voor de
vissers was het waarschijnlijk de eerste keer dat ze aan soortgelijk onderzoekIntermezzo: Visserslatijn 113
meededen. Bij aanvang kwamen de vissers ietwat onwennig het lab binnen. E¶ en
visser rondde nog snel een telefoongesprek af:
"Eej, ik goa hange. Sebiet aanderhalf uur teejorieles."
Na a°oop bleek dat niet alleen wij het onderzoek geslaagd vonden, ook de vissers
vonden het leuk om mee te doen. Sommigen vroegen zich af of er nog een
herhaling in het verschiet zou liggen:
"Wanneer is de reeunie?"
Tot slot nog een opmerking over het landschap rondom de Biestse Oevers. De
Biestse Oevers is omringd door prachtige natuur, met bomen, beekjes en wei-
landen waar koeien, paarden en schapen grazen. Vooral laatstgenoemde dieren
hebben moeite met het vangen van vissen...Tenminste, als we een visser mogen
geloven die een conversatie opving tussen twee schapen:
"Zeet diejen eene schoap tegen diejen aandere:
`Hµ edde gij nµ og we gevonge?'
`Nµ eµ eh-µ eh-µ eh-µ eh'"Chapter 5




A large literature in experimental economics has focused on the extent to which
individuals cooperate in social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are group inter-
actions, in which an individual maximizes his own payo® when he does not
cooperate, but where attaining the social optimum requires cooperation. One
experimental paradigm commonly employed to study social dilemmas is the Vol-
untary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). In a canonical version of this game,
each member of a group receives an endowment of money. The members of the
group then simultaneously choose to contribute any portion of their endowment
to a group account. Contributions to the group account bene¯t all members
of the group. The tradeo®s are speci¯ed so that each individual has a dom-
inant strategy to place his entire endowment in his private account, but the
social optimum is attained only if all individuals contribute their entire endow-
ment to the group account. Thus, classical economic theory, which maintains
1This chapter is co-authored with Charles Noussair and Daan van Soest.
2We would like to thank Ad and Thea van Oirschot for use of their ¯shing facility, and Stef
van Kessel, Mike Groels, and Paul Lude~ na Delgado for excellent research assistance. We are
grateful to Niels van den Broek, Machiel Driesser, Patrick Hullegie, Sander Tuit, Alexandra
van Geen and Peter van Oudheusden for their help in conducting the ¯eld sessions. We also
thank Wieland MÄ uller, Jan Potters, Ernan Haruvy, Amrita Ray Chaudury, Eline van der
Heijden, David Vo· nka, Cees Withagen and especially Amos Zemel for their comments and
suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter.
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the assumptions of exclusively self-interested motivation and rational decision
making, predicts that all individuals allocate their entire endowments to their
private accounts.3 The percentage of endowment placed in the group account
can be readily interpreted as a measure of cooperation.
The behavior of individuals who repeatedly play the VCM has been shown
to exhibit two robust patterns (for a survey, see Ledyard (1995)). The ¯rst
pattern is that individuals' initial average contributions to the group account
are signi¯cantly di®erent from both zero and 100 percent of their endowment.
This reveals positive, but less than full, cooperation on the part of the average
individual entering a new social dilemma. The second pattern is that a decline
in the level of cooperation occurs as the game is repeated (see, for example
Isaac et al. (1985), Andreoni (1988), and Isaac and Walker (1988b)). The
two patterns found in the laboratory are interpreted as evidence that behav-
ior of individuals is systematically di®erent from that of self-interested rational
agents. Explaining these patterns has been a focus of a number of models. The
positive level of cooperation at the outset of interaction is one of the stylized
facts motivating the modeling of other-regarding preferences (see for example
Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and An-
dreoni and Samuelson (2006)). The decline in cooperation with repetition of
the game has been interpreted as a reduction of errors over time (Palfrey and
Prisbey (1996), Andreoni (1995), and Houser and Kurzban (2002)), as repu-
tation building (Andreoni (1988), Sonnemans et al. (1999), and Brandts and
Schram (2001)), and as a result of a self-serving bias accompanying conditional
cooperation (see for example Neugebauer et al. (2007)).
In this chapter, we consider whether these two patterns appear in a framed
¯eld experimental environment. The setting of our ¯eld experiment is a privately
owned ¯shing pond where recreational ¯shermen can catch rainbow trout. We
create a social dilemma similar in structure to the VCM. The ¯shermen are
assigned to anonymous groups of four persons, who interact for six forty-minute
periods. In each period, each ¯sherman is allowed to catch a maximum of
two ¯sh, which are his to keep. However, for each ¯sh an individual foregoes
catching, each of the three other members of the group receives a cash payment.
Thus, a social dilemma is created in that each individual has a dominant strategy
to catch two ¯sh in each period, while the social optimum requires all individuals
to forego their catches. Cooperation measures are derived from the actual catch
3If the game is repeated a ¯nite number of times, the only subgame perfect equilibrium
is for each individual to place his entire endowment in his private account in every period,
regardless of the history of play. The social optimum requires all individuals to place their
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of ¯sh, and from the e®ort made to catch ¯sh, relative to a control treatment
in which no collective incentives exist to reduce the catch of ¯sh.4
As described in section 5.2, we ¯nd strong support for classical economic
theory in our ¯eld experiment. There is no evidence of cooperation, even in
the initial periods. Beginning in the ¯rst period, and continuing throughout the
sessions, ¯shermen in the treatment with group-level gains from cooperation ¯sh
with the same e®ort and catch the same average number of ¯sh as those in the
treatment without such potential gains. To explore the source of the di®erence
between our setting and received results from the laboratory, we conduct four
additional treatments. Three of these treatments are implemented in the lab-
oratory, and the fourth one is an additional ¯eld treatment. These treatments
are described and reported in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
These four treatments establish that the discrepancy in cooperation is not
due to the fact that: (i) the framing is contextualized in the ¯eld experiment, (ii)
the subject pool di®ers, (iii) the ¯eld experiment is conducted in a natural rather
than in a structured laboratory setting, or (iv) the group bene¯ts and private
costs of cooperation are denominated in terms of di®erent units (money and ¯sh)
in the ¯eld experiment. Rather, the data from these treatments suggest that
the key di®erence between the laboratory and our ¯eld setting is the decision
variable, the activity that must be undertaken in order to cooperate. When
cooperation requires a reduction of ¯shing, individual behavior conforms to
classical economic theory, and there is no cooperation. This is independent of
whether the reduction in catch results in more money, as is the case in the ¯eld
experiment described above, or into more ¯shing opportunities for the group.
The treatment developed to test the last claim (iv), FieldDyna, is of particu-
lar interest for two reasons. The ¯rst reason is that the assumption that a social
4Our work bears a relation to a number of other ¯eld experiments that focus on coop-
eration. An active literature is investigating in°uences on charitable giving (see for example
List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Frey and Meier (2004), Martiny and Randal (2005), Alpizar
et al. (2008) and Croson and Shang (2008)). Another strand of research uses artefactual ¯eld
methods to study behavior of non-student subject pools in the VCM game (see for example
Barr (2001) and Ru²e and Sosis (2007)), and a closely related paradigm, the common pool
resource game (see for example Cardenas (2003), Cardenas (2004), Cardenas and Ostrom
(2004), and Rodriguez-Sickert et al. (2008)Rodriguez-Sickert, C.). These studies all ¯nd pos-
itive cooperation in the VCM game among the subject pools studied. The available evidence
from framed and natural ¯eld experiments is mixed. Erev et al. (1993) ¯nd considerable
evidence of free-riding when students pick oranges under team incentives. When groups act
individually, subjects pick thirty percent fewer oranges than when a bonus is given to the
group with the highest output. In a one-shot social dilemma setting in a restaurant, Gneezy
et al. (2004) ¯nd that students choose more expensive meals when the costs are split with
¯ve other students, than when each pays for her own meal, and thus exhibit a considerable
tendency toward free-riding. Bandiera et al. (2005) report a substantial degree of cooperation
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dilemma exists depends on no assumptions other than that individuals prefer
to catch more ¯sh to less ¯sh (as described in section 2, the initial ¯eld experi-
ment described above constitutes a social dilemma only under certain, albeit in
our view weak, assumptions on the relative value of ¯shing and monetary pay-
ments). The second reason is that FieldDyna constitutes the ¯rst experimental
test of the canonical renewable resource model (see for example Brown (2000))
with human participants.
Our framed ¯eld experiment can be viewed a controlled test of the external
validity of an artefactual ¯eld experiment. This is the case because we observe
members of the same non-student pool of subjects in the laboratory, as well
as in the ¯eld, performing a similar task. Several other ¯eld experiments have
documented a positive relationship between individuals' cooperativeness in an
experimental VCM game and pro-social behavior in another activity (see for
example Carpenter and Seki (2005), Laury and Taylor (2005), Benz and Meier
(2008), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008), Cardenas (2004), Henrich et al. (2004), and
Ru²e and Sosis (2007)). However, there are other studies that do not ¯nd such a
relationship. For example, List (2006b) and Karlan (2005) ¯nd that subjects act
more cooperatively in laboratory settings than they do outside the laboratory.
These latter papers suggest that the laboratory may not always be well-suited
to test the e®ectiveness of policy interventions to promote cooperation. Here,
we also ¯nd that cooperative behavior in an artefactual ¯eld experiment does
not carry over to a similar ¯eld setting, in this case a framed ¯eld experiment.
Levitt and List (2007, 2008) have taken the view that social preferences
appear with di®erent prominence in the laboratory and in ¯eld settings. Our
results are consistent with this view. Furthermore, for the particular game we
study, we are able to identify several distinct sources of di®erences in cooper-
ativeness between the laboratory and the ¯eld. Our ¯shermen exhibit more
cooperation than student subjects when making decisions in a laboratory envi-
ronment, ¯shermen display more cooperation when making decisions in a natu-
ral environment than in a laboratory setting, and making the ¯shing task real
rather than virtual reduces cooperation. Nevertheless, the absence of coop-
eration in our framed ¯eld experiment can only be attributed to the ¯shing
task being real rather than virtual, since the e®ects of subject pool and of the
structured laboratory setting operate in the opposite direction.
We make no claims that our ¯eld experiment is any more generic than the
traditional experiment conducted in the laboratory, or that commercial ¯sher-
men would necessarily behave in a similar manner to recreational ¯shermen.
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tern observed in a common laboratory implementation of a social dilemma is
not universal, and that the behavior of non-student subjects in a contextualized
laboratory experiment is not necessarily predictive of their behavior in the ¯eld.
5.2 The FieldVCM treatment
The ¯rst pair of treatments we describe consist of a ¯eld implementation of the
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, and a control treatment. The treatments,
which constitute a framed ¯eld experiment in the sense of Harrison and List
(2004), are described in section 5.2.1. In sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 we consider
methodological issues that arise under our design. We present the analysis of
the data in section 5.2.4.
5.2.1 The setting, game, and experimental design
The sessions were conducted at a commercial trout ¯shing facility called `De
Biestse Oevers', located in the village of Biest-Houtakker.5 This village lies
in close proximity to Tilburg, in Noord-Brabant province, in the south of the
Netherlands. De Biestse Oevers is privately owned, and comprises three separate
¯shing ponds with surface areas of about 12,000 square feet each. One of these
ponds served as the venue for our experiment. On a typical day, when no
experiment is taking place, a customer can ¯sh for four hours for e12.50. The
pond has space for twenty ¯shermen at a time. For each paying customer, four
rainbow trout are put into the pond (for an extra fee, salmon trout, a larger
variety of trout, can also be thrown in). There are strict rules regarding the
¯shing gear and type of bait that may be used, but a customer is allowed to
catch as many ¯sh as possible. Also, because of sanitary considerations with
respect to the remaining ¯sh, any trout caught cannot be thrown back into the
pond and must be taken away from the site (presumably home). Customers
therefore have experience with negative externalities, since when an individual
catches a ¯sh he reduces the number of ¯sh available for others. The typical
customer (and our typical participant) is Dutch, male, and over ¯fty years old.
Participants were recruited for our experiment two weeks in advance by
distributing °yers on site which informed customers of the opportunity to take
part in a study conducted by Tilburg University. A maximum of sixteen people
was allowed to participate in each session.
Two treatments, FieldVCM and FieldPI, were conducted under the follow-
ing conditions. A session consisted of six consecutive periods of forty minutes
5See www.biestse-oevers.nl for pictures of the site.120 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
each, and therefore took four hours to complete. Within a session, each period
proceeded under identical rules. Participants were assigned to groups of four,
and group membership remained ¯xed throughout the session. Subjects were
not informed at any time of the identity of the other members of their group.
At the end of each period, each participant was informed privately of the total
number of ¯sh caught by his group.
Before a session began, two rainbow trout per participant were put into
the pond, plus an additional six trout. For a session with 16 participants, we
thus threw in 38 rainbow trout. The number of ¯sh we put into the pond was
common knowledge. Before the ¯rst period, the participants were randomly
assigned a spot at the pond by picking a numbered spot tag out of a bag. This
random assignment procedure was repeated before periods three and ¯ve. The
rotation of positions was intended to create a degree of procedural fairness, since
many ¯shermen believe that their physical position at the pond in°uences their
probability of catching a ¯sh.6
Each participant was allowed to catch a maximum of two ¯sh per period
(rainbow trout or salmon trout, because the latter could still be present because
of previous use of the pond). Any ¯sh caught was his to keep, as the standard
rules and regulations of De Biestse Oevers prohibit throwing trout back into
the pond. At the beginning of each session, we released 38 trout (instead of
32), in an attempt to ensure that, at least in principle, all individuals would be
able to catch their quota of two ¯sh each. Once a participant had caught his
maximum quota, he was required to wait until the next period began to resume
¯shing. At the beginning of the next period, a number of trout equal to the
total catch of the previous period was put into the water. Therefore, the total
number of ¯sh in the pond was the same at the beginning of each period within a
given session, and this information was explained explicitly to the participants.
Communication among subjects was strictly prohibited.
The above is a complete description of the FieldPI treatment; the FieldVCM
treatment di®ered only in that a social dilemma was created by introducing
group incentives for reducing the number of ¯sh caught within each group.7
Each ¯sh that a participant did not catch below his maximum quota of two
6Our data show no actual signi¯cant relationship between location and the number of ¯sh
caught, suggesting that this belief may be incorrect or exaggerated; see appendix 5.A.1 for
more details.
7Informing subjects that they are matched into groups is awkward in a setting in which
individual outcomes are completely independent of others' actions. Nevertheless, we wanted to
check whether framing the FieldPI treatment as a group exercise has an impact on behavior.
Therefore, we conducted one of the FieldPI sessions without informing subjects about any
matching procedures. We did not detect any di®erences in behavior resulting from the di®erent
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per period resulted in a cash payment of e2 to each of the other three group
members. Therefore, a participant faced a tradeo® in the FieldVCM treatment
between catching a ¯sh for himself, or providing a surplus of e6, to be divided
equally among the three other members of his group. Note that this game di®ers
from the standard VCM game in that cooperation yields a pure externality; the
decision maker does not get any private return to the investments he makes. We
imposed this simpli¯cation in order to make the social dilemma more obvious
to subjects. At the end of each period, participants in the FieldVCM treatment
were informed of the group catch in that period, the amount of money they had
earned in that period, and their cumulative earnings. The average earnings of
a participant in the FieldVCM treatment over a session equalled e49.60.
One round of sessions of the FieldPI and FieldVCM treatments was carried
out in June 2008, and a second round was conducted in September and October
2008. The season in°uences the number of ¯sh caught. In June the water
temperature is too high for trout to bite in large numbers, while this is typically
not the case in September and October. Therefore, the data from each of the
two seasons are analyzed separately. The data from June will be described as
having been conducted in the Low season and will be designated as FieldVCML
and FieldPIL. Those data acquired in September and October will be said to
have been gathered in the High season and will be referred to as FieldVCMH
and FieldPIH. All sessions of the ¯eld treatments were conducted between 8
AM and noon (with the instructions starting at about 7.40 AM).
5.2.2 Establishing the existence of a social dilemma
In the FieldVCM treatment, a social dilemma exists if the private bene¯t of the
right to catch an extra ¯sh is smaller than the amount of money received by the
other three members if that ¯sh is not caught. In other words, a social dilemma
exists if participants value the right to catch one additional ¯sh at less than e6.
There is market evidence that the marginal valuation of the act of catching a
rainbow trout is less than or equal to e3. We identi¯ed ¯ve recreational ¯shing
ponds within a 90 minute drive from our site, where ¯shermen are charged only
for the number of ¯sh caught. Thus the fee per ¯sh can be viewed as the price
for the right to catch an additional ¯sh. The fees that are charged for each ¯sh
caught in these ¯ve facilities range from e1.95 to e3; the one that is closest to
Biest-Houtakker, just 40 minutes away, charges e2.40 per ¯sh. The fact that
our participants are regular customers of the Biestse Oevers and not of these
other facilities is the ¯rst piece of evidence that their marginal valuation of the
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The second piece of evidence is obtained by calculating the upper bound for
the value of non-cooperation as follows. First, note that the private value of the
right to catch a ¯sh has two components: the value of the ¯sh itself and the
utility of ¯shing. The price of rainbow trout in local ¯shmongers' shops varies
from e4.85 to e10 per kilo, and the average rainbow trout weighs around 400
grams. This translates into a price range from e1.95 to e4 per ¯sh. Because an
equivalent ¯sh can be purchased nearby for at most e4, it is an upper bound
for the value of a ¯sh itself.
To place a value on the utility of ¯shing, recall that our subjects are regular
customers at the ¯shing pond, so that the value of the marginal half-day of
¯shing is close to the market price of e12.50. This is an upper bound of the
utility of the act of ¯shing itself, since individuals typically are able to take home
some ¯sh after four hours of ¯shing. Thus, a generous upper-bound for the total
value of acting non-cooperatively in our experiment is then e4/¯sh £ 12 ¯sh +
e12.50 = e60.50, though the actual private value is likely to be much lower. If
we suppose that the usual fee of e12.50 is paid with an expectation of catch-
ing four ¯sh on average, the amount typically thrown into the pond per paying
customer, the experiment gives participants an opportunity to catch eight ad-
ditional ¯sh. Under this assumption, the value of acting non-cooperatively for
an entire session (again assuming that the value of each ¯sh is the highest price
available in the area) is e4/¯sh £ 8 ¯sh + e12.50 = e44.50.
Regarding the bene¯ts of cooperation, all subjects would each go home with
e72 if they cooperate fully and catch zero ¯sh during all six periods, which is
substantially more money than the private value of ¯shing as calculated above.8
Indeed, it would be enough to go ¯shing ¯ve times at `De Biestse Oevers', and
have e9.50 remaining, or alternatively to buy twelve ¯sh in a ¯shmonger's shop
and have e24 remaining.9
8We are aware of only one study that estimates the total surplus of recreational ¯shing
(rather than the marginal value of a ¯shing trip), and that is the paper by Toivonen et al.
(2004). They estimate the total surplus recreational ¯shermen in ¯ve Nordic countries obtain
from all ¯shing trips they make per year. The estimates are fairly consistent across these ¯ve
countries in that they range between 1.30 and 1.54 times actual ¯shing expenses. If we apply
the maximum ratio (1.54, measured in Norway), to our case, the amount of compensation
needed for not being allowed to ¯sh equals e19.25 (= 1.54 times the entrance fee) plus e32
(as an upper bound for the consumption value of the eight extra ¯sh one can catch in our
experiment). The calculation indicates that, even when using total surplus of ¯shing rather
than the marginal value, the total estimate of the private value of a half-day of ¯shing of
e51.25, is well below the monetary returns to cooperating of e72.
9In addition, there are various ways to decrease the opportunity cost of acting coopera-
tively. For example, ¯shermen can decide to cooperate at least partially by ¯shing leisurely
rather than at full force, and thus enjoying the act of ¯shing while reducing the chances of
actually catching two ¯sh per forty-minute time period. Alternatively, they can decide to just
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A third test of whether our game is correctly parameterized is a survey of
members of our subject pool. On a day when no experiments were conducted
24 ¯shermen were surveyed. Using the strategy method, we asked the ¯shermen
their maximum willingness to pay for the right to catch ¯sh. We asked a ¯sher-
man how much ¯sh he would like to catch, given that he would be charged e0.50
for each ¯sh caught. If a ¯sherman allocated a non-zero value to this price, we
asked how much he would like to catch if he would be charged e1 for each ¯sh
caught. This procedure was repeated in increments of e0.50 until a ¯sherman
indicated that the fee exceeded his willingness to pay. The survey shows the
monetary value a ¯sherman assigns to the act of ¯shing and the value of a ¯sh
combined. The data does not permit us to disentangle the two values, but that
is not necessary to assess whether a social dilemma exists in FieldVCM.
The results of the survey are the following. Four ¯shermen indicated that
they would not participate in a scheme where a fee was charged per ¯sh caught.
Therefore, we are not able to derive a maximum willingness to pay for these
four ¯shermen. The remaining twenty ¯shermen had an average maximum
willingness to pay for the ¯rst ¯sh they catch of e3.50. One ¯sherman indicated
that he was willing to pay e15 to catch one ¯sh, while another indicated he
would pay e6, and the rest indicated a willingness to pay smaller than e6.
This means that ninety percent of the ¯shermen had a value of less than e6
for the act of ¯shing and the ¯rst ¯sh they catch. For all of the ¯shermen, the
marginal value of each ¯sh beyond the ¯rst was always non-increasing. Thus,
we are con¯dent that our the parametrization used in our experiment indeed
poses a social dilemma.
5.2.3 Measuring cooperation
The measurement of cooperation in this setting raises methodological issues that
do not usually appear in laboratory experiments. The number of ¯sh caught
depends on exogenous factors, such as weather conditions, as well as on the level
of cooperativeness. Here, results obtained in the FieldPI treatment serve as the
non-cooperative benchmark, as FieldPI provides the same incentives to catch
the quota of two ¯sh as FieldVCM does if agents are acting non-cooperatively.
Comparing catch in FieldPI and FieldVCM during a given season (High
or Low) provides one measure of cooperation. Cooperation corresponds to a
smaller catch of ¯sh in FieldVCM than in FieldPI in the same season. We call
the magnitude of this di®erence the Catch measure of cooperation. The level
to just one ¯sh per period. We deliberately speci¯ed the strategy space as zero, one or two
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of cooperation in the FieldVCM treatment in the Low season, according to the



















it =n is the average catch of 4 of the n total number
of individuals in the FieldPIL treatment. An analogous measure is de¯ned for
the High season. A value of C equal to 0 would indicate zero cooperation, and
a positive level would indicate the presence of cooperation.
A second measure of cooperation is the number of times an average ¯sh-
erman casts his ¯shing rod per minute. There are several advantages of this
`input' measure of cooperation. First, casting a rod is a conscious decision of
a ¯sherman. A ¯sherman can deliberately `work harder' to catch more ¯sh.
In appendix 5.A.1, we show that there is a signi¯cantly positive e®ect of e®ort
on the number of ¯sh caught. Second, the measure yields a clear measure of
cooperation. Whereas catching zero ¯sh might be a consequence of bad luck,
not casting a rod cannot be reasonably interpreted in a manner other than as
indicating cooperation. To measure cooperation, we take the average number
of casts per minute registered by members of the group in FieldVCM, and com-
pare it to FieldPI in the same season. If the average is lower in FieldVCM than
in FieldPI, we interpret the di®erence as an indication that cooperation is ob-
served. We refer to the magnitude of the di®erence between treatments as the
E®ort measure of cooperation. The data on casts per minute were gathered by
two experimenters continuously scoring the number of casts of the 16 ¯shermen
at the pond, with each experimenter monitoring eight individuals. This moni-
toring serves to increase the level of experimenter scrutiny in both FieldVCM
and FieldPI | a factor that Levitt and List (2007) have identi¯ed as one that
fosters pro-social behavior.
5.2.4 Results from the FieldVCM treatment
Table 5.1 illustrates the structure of the Field treatments and indicates the
amount of data available. Unless noted otherwise, in the analysis of the data,
we treat the activity of each group of four subjects over an entire session as one
observation. This gives us a minimum of four observations per treatment.
Figure 5.1(a) presents the average aggregate number of ¯sh caught in a
group, while Figure 5.1(b) displays the level of cooperation as calculated ac-
cording to equation (5.1). The average in each of the two seasons is indicated as5.2. The FieldVCM treatment 125
Treatment Groups Main feature Average Earnings
FieldPIH 4 Determine maximum ¯shing activity in the high season {
FieldPIL 4 Determine maximum ¯shing activity in the low season {
FieldVCMH 4 Di®. from FieldPIH measures cooperation in the high season e26.63
FieldVCML 7 Di®. from FieldPIL measures cooperation in the low season e62.71
Table 5.1 Number of groups, main feature, and average earnings in the Field
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism treatment (FieldVCM) and Field Private In-
centive treatment (FieldPI) in the Low and High season.
a separate series. In Figure 5.1(a), higher catch re°ects less cooperation. Two
patterns are obvious in Figure 5.1(a). The ¯rst is that, in a given season, the
average number of ¯sh a group catches in FieldVCM is at least as great as in
FieldPI. Second, whereas the number of ¯sh caught falls over time, the decrease
is not more pronounced in FieldVCM than in FieldPI. This is shown by the
relatively stable level of cooperation, as calculated according to equation (5.1),
in all periods in Figure 5.1(b) (with the exception of the last period in the high
season).
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1 (a) Average group catch by period for FieldVCM and FieldPI, in the
High and Low season. (b) Average level of cooperation by period, in the High
and Low season.
Our second measure of cooperation, e®ort as captured in the number of casts
per minute, is shown in Figure 5.2. The ¯gure shows that the four treatments
yield similar behavior. On average, the ¯shermen cast their rod 0.59 times
per minute in FieldPI, compared to 0.63 in FieldVCM. The E®ort measure is
not appreciably di®erent between the Low and the High season. This ¯nding126 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
Figure 5.2 Average individual casts per minute by period, FieldVCM and
FieldPI, High and Low season.
is important in interpreting the catch data presented in Figure 5.1(a), which
shows that not all ¯sh are caught in the VCM treatments. The ¯nding that
not all ¯sh are caught in the VCM treatments suggests cooperative play by the
¯shermen. However, the e®ort levels show that the lack of catch must be due to
exogenous factors, rather than to a conscious decision of the ¯shermen to stop
catching: Fishermen in the VCM treatments try as hard as the ¯shermen in the
PI treatments to catch ¯sh. Thus, by both the Catch and the E®ort measures,
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show no evidence of cooperation. The support for result 1
below provides the statistical basis for this claim.
Result 1 In our social dilemma experiment conducted in the ¯eld, FieldVCM,
no cooperation is observed.
Support for result 1: We ¯rst consider cooperation measured in terms
of catch. On average, the catch of ¯sh is actually higher in the FieldVCML
and FieldVCMH treatments than in the corresponding FieldPIL and FieldPIH
treatments. A Mann-Whitney test, taking each group's activity over a session as
one observation, and comparing the catch of ¯sh in the Low season, fails to reject
the hypothesis of equal catch in the two treatments (N1 = 4;N2 = 7;p = 0:164).
In the High season, the Mann-Whitney test indicates that more ¯sh are caught
in the FieldVCMH treatment than in FieldPIH (N1 = 4;N2 = 4;p = 0:057).5.2. The FieldVCM treatment 127
Consider now the E®ort measure. Here, the appropriate Mann-Whitney test
indicates no signi¯cant di®erences in casts per minute between FieldVCM and
FieldPI, neither in the Low season (N1 = 4;N2 = 7;p = 0:412) nor in the High
season (N1 = 4;N2 = 4;p = 0:886). There is no evidence of cooperation by
either of our two measures.
Another place to look for evidence of cooperation, is to consider the e®ort
levels associated with attempting to catch a second ¯sh, conditional on hav-
ing caught one ¯sh already in the current period. The quota of catching two
¯sh gives the ¯shermen the opportunity to cooperate partially, by catching one
¯sh | thus enjoying ¯shing while still earning money for the other members
of one's group. Such cooperation would be revealed in lower e®ort in trying to
catch a second ¯sh in FieldVCM than in FieldPI. However, we ¯nd no evidence
of a di®erence in e®ort to catch a second ¯sh between FieldPI and FieldVCM
(Mann-Whitney test, N1 = 19;N2 = 33;p = 0:50, taking the average e®ort
levels of each subject over the course of the entire session as an independent
observation).10 ¥
Thus, we ¯nd no evidence of cooperation in the FieldVCM treatment. We
now consider whether there is a trend in cooperation over time. A downward
trend in the number of ¯sh caught is evident in Figure 5.1(a), which could
indicate an increase in cooperation. However, the decrease is similar in the two
treatments, although it is more pronounced in FieldPI than in FieldVCM in late
periods of the High season. This shows that cooperation becomes even more
negative over time in FieldVCMH, as can be seen from the level of cooperation
depicted in Figure 5.1(b). The visual impression gained from Figure 5.2 is that
there is no discernible trend in e®ort levels. For both Catch and E®ort we test
whether the measure of cooperation is di®erent between early and late periods,
and the weight of the evidence favors result 2.
Result 2 There is no change in the level of cooperation over time.
Support for result 2: For purpose of this analysis, the early periods of
a session consist of periods 1 and 2, while periods 5 and 6 are considered the
10We also test for di®erences in the variance of the number of casts between FieldPI and
FieldVCM. A Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the hypothesis of an equal variance across
the two treatments (N1 = 8;N2 = 11;p = 0:60). There is no evidence of a diminishing
variance over time in either treatment. Comparing the variance in period 1 and 2 with the
variance in period 5 and 6, a Wilcoxon test yields a p-value of 0.58 in the FieldPI treatment
(N1 = N2 = 8) and a p-value of 0.18 in the FieldVCM treatment (N1 = N2 = 11). The
similarity between the two treatments is further evidence that the incentive to cooperate does
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late periods. The average group catch and e®ort over all groups in the ¯rst
two periods of the FieldPI treatment in a given season are taken as the zero
cooperation baselines for early periods. Similar baselines are constructed for
the late periods. Using k = fL;Hg to denote the season, the early baseline
is subtracted from group catch in the ¯rst two periods for each group in the
FieldVCMk treatment separately, and the late baseline from group catch in
periods 5 and 6 for each group in FieldVCMk. Thus, the di®erence between each
group's catch (e®ort) in FieldVCMk and the average catch (e®ort) in FieldPIk
is an observation. If the catch (e®ort) in an observation of FieldVCMk exceeds
the average in FieldPIk, we assign the observation a cooperation level of zero.
We then test whether cooperation is the same in the early and late periods in
either season, treating each group's catch as a matched pair.
The number of ¯sh caught in both early and late periods on FieldVCMk
exceeds the average in the same periods of FieldPIk in every session, so the
Catch measure indicates zero cooperation in both early and late periods. For
the E®ort measure, we ¯nd that the di®erence in cooperation between early and
late periods is insigni¯cant in the Low season (Wilcoxon test, N1 = N2 = 7;p =
0:11), as well as in the High season (N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:85). ¥
5.3 Bridging the gap between the laboratory and
the ¯eld
Section 5.2 shows that the pattern of cooperation in FieldVCM is very di®erent
from the pattern of behavior observed in traditional VCM experiments con-
ducted in the laboratory. However, the two conditions di®er in several major
aspects, and hence there are a number of candidate causes for the di®erences
in results. These include the subject pool participating, whether the experi-
ment is conducted within or outside the laboratory, and characteristics of the
game itself, such as the decision variable (¯sh or money), and the framing of
the task. To isolate the e®ect of the subject pool and the laboratory setting, we
conduct three treatments, called StuLab, FisherLab and FisherPond. We will
refer to these collectively as the Lab treatments because of their relatively close
adherence to traditional laboratory experimental procedures.
In section 5.3.1 we describe the procedures that are common to the three
treatments. Section 5.3.2 describes di®erences between the three treatments.
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5.3.1 The laboratory version of our social dilemma game
As in the FieldVCM treatment, participants in the three lab treatments were
assigned to groups of four subjects. Each group's composition remained constant
throughout the six-period sessions. Sessions were conducted by hand using
pen and paper. Participants were asked to decide how many virtual ¯sh to
catch in each period, with a maximum of two ¯sh per period. Each ¯sh that a
participant decided to catch, yielded her a real cash payment of e1; each ¯sh
that the participant did not catch yielded e0.50 to each of the other three group
members. The earnings of an individual are given by the following:
¼it = e1 £ xit + e0:50
X
j6=i
(2 ¡ xjt); (5.2)
where ¼it are the earnings in Euros of subject i in period t, and xit 2 f0;1;2g
is the catch of subject i in period t. There is a dominant strategy to catch two
virtual ¯sh, yielding individual payo®s of e2 per period. The social optimum,
with each group member receiving e3 per period, can be reached only if all
players choose to catch zero ¯sh. The duration of a session of the lab treat-
ments takes about one fourth of the duration of a session of the ¯eld treatment.
Therefore, earnings in the lab treatments are scaled down by a factor 4 to make
the earnings comparable to the ¯eld treatments.
In contrast to the traditional laboratory experiment, the language of the
instructions was contextualized to approximate a virtual implementation of the
FieldVCM treatment. For example, the terms `¯sh', `catch' and `pond' were
used, rather than terms such as `tokens', `account', and `project'. After the
instructions were read out loud, the participants had to answer some test ques-
tions, which they answered without much di±culty.
After each period the experimenter informed all participants about the de-
cisions of all subjects in the session by writing down all individuals' catch de-
cisions, next to their identi¯cation numbers. This meant that each subject was
able to monitor and track every other individual subject's decisions over time.
However, none of the subjects were informed about which of the other session
participants were in his own group, and there were either twelve or sixteen
subjects in each session. This approximated the content and precision of the
information available to participants in the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments,
in which individuals could observe others, but did not know who was in their
group. After each period, subjects were informed, in private, of their earnings
in that period as well as of the sum of the total group catch. Communication
between participants was strictly forbidden, which was respected in all sessions.130 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
5.3.2 Constructing the bridge from the laboratory to the
¯eld
The ¯rst treatment, StuLab, was a conventional lab treatment conducted with
student participants in the CentER laboratory at Tilburg University. We specif-
ically and exclusively invited students with a Dutch nationality to participate.
This restriction was intended to control for cultural factors, which could po-
tentially in°uence the results (see for example, Brandts et al. (2004), and Her-
rmann et al. (2008)). In total, 32 students participated in the StuLab treatment,
yielding eight groups of four subjects. All of the students were economics, law
or psychology majors. On average, the participants in this treatment earned
e12.98 in the experiment.
The second lab treatment, FisherLab, was identical to the StuLab treatment
except for the subject population, who were customers of `De Biestse Oevers',
the same subject pool sampled for the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments. Thus,
FisherLab can be classi¯ed as an artefactual ¯eld treatment according to the
de¯nitions of Harrison and List (2004). The treatment was conducted in the
restaurant of De Biestse Oevers, which was temporarily transformed into an
experimental lab. We rearranged the restaurant so that it closely resembled a
standard experimental laboratory. We brought folding tables (normally used
as exam tables for students taking large-scale written examinations at Tilburg
University), and placed them in rows well apart from each other. This ensured
that subjects could not read their neighbors' decision sheets. We installed a
blackboard in front of the rows of tables on which decisions could be recorded.
We applied the procedures customary to sessions conducted in our laboratory.
In total, 32 ¯shermen participated in this treatment, comprising eight groups of
four participants, and thus yielding eight independent observations. On average,
the participants in this treatment earned e13.65.
The third lab treatment, FisherPond, was identical to the FisherLab treat-
ment, except that the FisherPond treatment was conducted while participants
were actually ¯shing at the pond. Recruitment took place by approaching ¯sh-
ermen at the pond and asking them if they would be willing to participate in
a research study conducted by Tilburg University. We deliberately approached
¯shermen located at some distance from other participants, in order to exclude
the possibility of participants contacting each other. Once we had recruited all
participants, the rules were explained to all of them simultaneously at a central
location. This was intended to ensure common knowledge and comprehension
of the task among all participants. This was the only time during a session that
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given a typed summary of the instructions, and listened to the experimenter
reading out aloud the full version of the instructions.
After instruction, the ¯shermen returned to their ¯shing spots, and resumed
¯shing. An experimenter circulated among the subjects collecting their deci-
sions and providing information about others' decisions and outcomes, while
the participants continued ¯shing. As in StuLab and FisherLab, participants
were informed in each period about the decisions of all other subjects in the
session, but also (privately) about the decisions of the other members of their
group and their own earnings.
After period six was completed, each participant was paid his earnings and
then continued ¯shing for the remainder of the morning. The average earn-
ings for the participants in this treatment were e14.30. Table 5.2 summarizes
the number of groups, main feature and average individual earnings in each
treatment.
Treatment Groups Main feature Average Earnings
Students in the lab (StuLab) 8 Isolate e®ects of contextualization e12.98
Fishermen in the lab (FisherLab) 8 Isolate e®ects of ¯shermen subject pool e13.65
Fishermen at the pond (FisherPond) 7 Isolate e®ects of physical environment e14.30
Table 5.2 Number of groups, main feature, and average individual earnings in
the lab treatments.
5.3.3 Results in the StuLab, FisherLab and FisherPond
treatments
Figure 5.3 shows the average levels of cooperation over time in the three lab
treatments, StuLab, FisherLab and FisherPond. Cooperation is measured as the
average number of ¯sh not caught per group. That is, the level of cooperation is
the maximum possible group catch in a period, eight, minus the actual (though
virtual) catch. The ¯gure shows that, as in prior controlled laboratory studies,
the level of cooperation is positive in the early periods of the game, and decreases
as the game progresses. Therefore, we obtain the following result:
Result 3 Contribution patterns in the StuLab treatment conform to the usual
patterns observed in the VCM game as typically implemented in the lab-
oratory. The lack of cooperation in FieldVCM is therefore not due to the
contextualization of the decision.
Support for result 3: Figure 5.3 shows that in early periods of the StuLab
treatments, students cooperate in the ¯rst period, but increasingly less so in the132 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
Figure 5.3 Levels of cooperation (maximum possible group catch minus actual
catch) in the lab treatments by period, averaged over all groups.
later periods. A t-test shows that in the StuLab treatment, the cooperation
level is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in period 1 (N = 32;p < 0:01). In this
test, the choice of an individual, rather than a group's average contribution, is
taken as an independent observation (because in the ¯rst period, there are no
intragroup dependencies resulting from the history of play). A Wilcoxon test
comparing `early' and `late' play, taking the group average contribution over pe-
riods 1 and 2 as an observation of early play and the group average over periods
5 and 6 as an observation of late play, yields a p-value of 0.01 (N1 = N2 = 8) for
the StuLab treatment. Hence, cooperation decreases signi¯cantly over time. ¥
Thus, we ¯nd that the lack of cooperation in the ¯rst periods of FieldVCM
is not a result of contextualization itself. Next, we test whether the lack of
cooperation found in the ¯eld treatments is due to di®erences in the subject
pool. It may be the case that ¯shermen are systematically less cooperative
than students, and that such a di®erence accounts for the behavior we observe
in the ¯eld treatments. However, when comparing play in the StuLab and the
FisherLab treatments | which are identical except for the characteristics of the
subjects that participate | we ¯nd that, if anything, recreational ¯shermen are
more cooperative than students. This is reported as result 4.
Result 4 Cooperation is greater in FisherLab than in StuLab. The lack of5.3. Bridging the gap between the laboratory and the ¯eld 133
cooperation in FieldVCM is therefore not due to recreational ¯shermen
being intrinsically less cooperative than students.
Support for result 4: Figure 5.3 shows that students exhibit a lower level
of cooperation than the ¯shermen in the laboratory, especially in the later pe-
riods of the game. This is supported by a Mann-Whitney test (N1 = 8;N2 =
8;p = 0:02), that rejects the hypothesis of equal cooperation in both treat-
ments.11 ¥
Thus, the behavior of recreational ¯shermen in the laboratory experiment
is not predictive of their behavior in the ¯eld. One may argue that this is
not unexpected because recreational ¯shermen are likely to have competitive
instincts: They will try to catch more ¯sh than their peers and hence it is not
surprising that we ¯nd no evidence of cooperation in the ¯eld. On the other
hand, it is striking that ¯shermen act cooperatively, even more so than students,
in a contextualized laboratory experiment. A necessary condition for laboratory
experiments to be reliable tests of policy interventions is that people bring their
true preferences into the laboratory; comparison of the results of FisherLab and
FieldVCM suggests that this is not always the case.12
Furthermore, the above shows that subject pool composition alone does not
account for the lack of cooperation in FieldVCM: both students and ¯shermen
display positive levels of cooperation in the lab. We now consider whether the
laboratory setting itself has an e®ect on the cooperation levels that the ¯shermen
exhibit. We do so by comparing behavior in the FisherLab and FisherPond
treatments. These two treatments are identical except that one is conducted in
a synthetic environment very similar to an experimental laboratory, while the
other is conducted in more natural conditions. From this comparison, we obtain
result 5.
Result 5 Cooperation in the FisherPond treatment is greater than in the Fish-
erLab treatment. Cooperation is reduced by the laboratory setting.
11Initial cooperation is also signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for the FisherLab treatment.
The Student t-test shows that individual cooperation levels are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero
in period 1 in the FisherLab treatment (N = 32;p < 0:01). In this treatment, average group
cooperation decreases over time, but not signi¯cantly. A Wilcoxon test comparing the group
average of period 1 and 2 to that of period 5 and 6, yields a p-value of 0.23 (N1 = N2 = 8).
12There is some evidence that high-sea professional ¯shermen, a distinct group from recre-
ational ¯shermen, are particularly competitive. Two quotes illustrate this point. Analyzing
the catch decisions of Norwegian ¯shermen targeting Blue Whiting, Gezelius (2007) quotes
a skipper stating that \[the choice of technology is not dependent so much on] a question of
cost, but of ¯shing more than your neighbor." Similarly, in his analysis of ¯shing behavior
by Dutch high-sea ¯shermen, van Ginkel (2009) states that \the deep-seated core value of the
¯shing game [is] the ¯sherman's desire to catch more than his neighbors."134 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
Support for result 5: Figure 5.3 shows that the average level of coopera-
tion in the FisherPond treatment is higher than in FisherLab. A Mann-Whitney
test shows that this di®erence is statistically signi¯cant (N1 = 8;N2 = 7;p =
0:04).13 ¥
This result suggests that the formally structured laboratory setting itself
reduces cooperative behavior, at least for our subject pool of recreational ¯sh-
ermen. Therefore, the fact that our experiment is conducted outside of the
laboratory cannot, on its own, account for the lack of cooperation we have
observed in FieldVCM.
5.4 The FieldDyna treatment: A dynamic social
dilemma
The treatments reported in section 5.3 show that the di®erence between our ¯eld
results and traditional laboratory results persist when the e®ects of subject pool
and the laboratory are removed. The source of the discrepancy in results must lie
in di®erences between our ¯eld and the traditional laboratory implementations
of the VCM. While there are several substantive di®erences, we believe that the
most salient is the decision variable that must be modi¯ed in order to cooperate.
In FieldVCM players cooperate by ¯shing less, while in the lab treatments, they
cooperate by giving up money.
There are two separate mechanisms whereby the decision variable could af-
fect the level of cooperation. The ¯rst is the possibility that the decision variable
itself in°uences cooperation. It may be that if a reduction in ¯shing is required
to achieve cooperation, individuals are less cooperative. The second is that
when group bene¯ts and private costs of cooperation are measured in di®erent
units, as in the FieldVCM treatment (money versus ¯sh not caught rather than
the money versus money trade-o® in the lab treatment), individuals are less
cooperative. Di®erent units of account might introduce self-serving biases in
beliefs about the tradeo®s between the two units. For example, individuals may
convince themselves that other players prefer to ¯sh rather than to have money,
and thus that failure to reduce one's own ¯shing is compatible with attaining
13As in the other lab treatments, cooperation in the ¯rst round is also signi¯cantly di®er-
ent from zero for the FisherPond treatment, as indicated by a standard t-test, taking each
individual catch decision as an independent observation (N = 28;p < 0:01). In this treatment
there is also a signi¯cant decrease of cooperation over time. A Wilcoxon test comparing the
group average cooperation of period 1 and 2 to that of period 5 and 6, yields a p-value of 0.03
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the social optimum.
To investigate whether the decision variable is the key factor in°uencing
behavior, and to distinguish between the ¯rst and second possibilities of the
manner in which it in°uences behavior, we construct an additional ¯eld treat-
ment, called FieldDyna. In this treatment, both the private costs and group
bene¯ts of cooperation are measured in terms of ¯shing. If we ¯nd an absence
of cooperation, we would rule out the second explanation, but not the ¯rst.
The FieldDyna treatment is a dynamic game. In the ¯rst period, ¯shermen
are divided into groups of four. Each group has the opportunity to catch a
group maximum of eight ¯sh in the ¯rst period, as was the case in the Field-
VCM treatment. In contrast to the FieldVCM treatment, however, there are
no individual constraints on catching ¯sh in FieldDyna, as long as the group
as a whole does not catch more than eight ¯sh. The total number of ¯sh the
group can catch in the second period, however, depends on the total number of
¯sh the group catches in the ¯rst period. A quadratic (hump-shaped) growth
function relates the increase in the number of ¯sh that the group is allowed to
catch in the next period to the stock remaining at the end of the current period.
Hence, catching too many ¯sh in the current period results in the group being
allowed to catch fewer ¯sh in the next. The social dilemma is entirely in terms
of ¯sh: An individual who catches a ¯sh reduces the number of ¯sh available to
other members of his group in the current period. Typically also the number of
¯sh available for the group in the subsequent periods is reduced, depending on
the actual quantity of allowable catch remaining.
This treatment is interesting for at least three reasons. First, as stated
above, it controls for the impact of the bene¯ts and costs of cooperation being
measured in di®erent units. As such, it isolates potential factors causing the
qualitative di®erences in play between the laboratory and the ¯eld, as captured
in the di®erence between FisherPond and FieldVCM. Second, if there is any
doubt about whether our parametrization in FieldVCM constitutes a social
dilemma, it is obvious that FieldDyna unambiguously does so; ¯sh caught by
one ¯sherman reduces the current number of ¯sh remaining and hence a®ects
the ¯shing opportunities available to the group in both the current and future
periods. Third, the FieldDyna treatment is the ¯rst experimental ¯eld test of
the canonical renewable resource model used in the environmental and resource
economics literature (for an overview, see for example Brown (2000)).
This section is organized as follows. Section 5.4.1 describes the structure of
the game. Section 5.4.2 presents the experimental design and discusses some
methodological issues. Section 5.4.3 presents the main ¯ndings.136 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
5.4.1 Description of the game
Consider the following model, which is the basis of the FieldDyna treatment.
A ¯nite number of agents (n ¸ 2) has access to a renewable resource. Each
agent aims to maximize his net present value of resource harvesting, taking into
account the dynamics of the renewable resource as well as the behavior of his








s.t. 0 · xi(t) · x; (5.4)
_ S(t) = Q(S(t)) ¡ xi(t); (5.5)
Q(S(t)) = G(S(t)) ¡ §j6=ixj(t): (5.6)
Here, T is the number of time periods (t = 1;:::;T) the game lasts, ¹ p
denotes the constant net revenues of selling a unit of the resource, and xi(t)
is the quantity of resource agent i harvests in period t. Next, r is the private
discount rate, possibly the interest rate. S(t) is the stock of the resource in
period t, and _ S(t) denotes the change in the stock of the resource over time.
G(S(t)) is the natural regeneration of the resource, whose rate depends only
on the size of the current stock, and Q(S(t)) is the change in stock resulting
from natural regeneration net of the amount extracted by all agents other than
the decision maker. We assume that there is a maximum number of units of
the resource that an agent can harvest per period (¹ x; see (5.4)). As constraints
(5.5) and (5.6) describe, the change in the stock of the resource in period t,
_ S(t), is equal to the natural regeneration of the resource G(S(t)), minus the
total quantity of resource harvested by the n agents (§j6=ixj(t) + xi(t)).
In the renewable resource literature, the natural regeneration function G(S)








Here, K > 0 is the maximum possible stock of the resource, also referred to
as the carrying capacity. ° > 0 is the maximum rate at which the resource
regenerates, and is usually referred to as the intrinsic growth rate. Note that
G(0) = G(K) = 0, and that the increment in population size is largest at
S = K=2, where dG(S)=dS = 0. This stock level is usually referred to as the
maximum sustainable yield stock (i.e., SMSY = K=2).14 For a su±ciently high
14Note that absent harvesting, equations (5.5) and (5.7) combined would result in the size5.4. The FieldDyna treatment: A dynamic social dilemma 137
¹ x, the total number of ¯sh caught is maximized if aggregate e®ort is chosen
such that the stock is kept at this level in periods t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1, while all
remaining ¯sh are caught in period T.15 This level also maximizes group bene¯ts
in this model if and only if r = 0. Hence, the socially optimal steady state
resource stock, S¤, is equal to SMSY (=K=2) if r = 0. For any non-negative
discount rate, however, the unique Nash equilibrium steady state stock is equal
to zero; absent cooperation, all agents commit maximum e®ort until the stock
is depleted. In appendix 5.A.2, the social optimal and subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium harvesting paths are derived and characterized.
5.4.2 Experimental design and parameters
As in the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments, there were sixteen participants in
a session, assigned to groups of four with ¯xed membership. In each period, the
four ¯shermen in a group faced a group quota which could change from period
to period. The quota for period t | also referred to as the total allowable catch
in that period | is denoted by Zt, and any ¯sherman in the group was allowed
to catch as many ¯sh he or she wanted (or was able to) in that period as long
as Xt ´ §xit · Zt. The total allowable catch remaining for the group at the
end of period t, St ´ Zt¡Xt, determined the number of new ¯sh the group was
permitted to catch, G(St). Therefore, the available quota for period t + 1 was
equal to Zt+1 = St +G(St). Thus, a group's total allowable catch remaining at
the end of period t satis¯ed:
St = St¡1 + G(St¡1) ¡ Xt: (5.8)
In order to facilitate the implementation of the experiment, we modi¯ed the
model of section 5.4.1 as follows. First, the model (5.3)-(5.5) assumes that there
are constant bene¯ts of catching ¯sh (equal to ¹ p). However, in the ¯eld, the
marginal utility of ¯sh may be declining. In the experiment, we ensured that
the bene¯ts of catching ¯sh were always strictly positive, by not only allowing
¯shermen to keep any ¯sh caught, but also by paying them an additional e5
of the resource stock growing over time according to an S-shaped function; the stock develops
logistically. Starting from a very small population size, the stock increases very slowly in
the ¯rst periods (in the case of ¯sh, because the number of mating pairs is small), then
increases and reaches its maximum increment at SMSY = K=2. For stocks larger than this
level, resource growth tapers o® because of increased competition between individuals in the
population for food and basic resources. Eventually, the resource would reach its natural
equilibrium size K, where net growth is zero as the number of o®spring would equal natural
mortality.
15That is, in all periods t < T aggregate catch should be equal to (i) zero, (ii) the maximum
amount (n¹ x), or (iii) G(S)=n, if the current stock is smaller than, larger than, or equal to
SMSY . In period T, §ixi(T) = SMSY138 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
for every ¯sh they caught.16 Second, the rate of time preference, r, was set
equal to zero.17 Third, in the experiment, the continuous growth function (5.7)
of the model was approximated by a discrete function. The values chosen are
represented by the solid line in Figure 5.4; they were such that K = 8 and
SMSY = 4. Fourth, we set the number of periods equal to four (t = 1;:::;4),
and, as in the FieldVCM treatment, we set the total allowable catch for period
1 equal to eight ¯sh for each group (Z1 = 8).18
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Figure 5.4 Theoretical speci¯cation of the regeneration function (with ° = 2
and K = 8) and the discrete experimental parametrization thereof.
For the parameter values we use, the socially optimal harvesting path is
the following. Because r = 0, the group's bene¯ts are largest if the group
harvest is maximized. To do this, a group should catch four ¯sh in the ¯rst
three periods, and it should catch the remaining eight ¯sh in the fourth (that
is, X¤
t = K ¡ S¤ = K=2 in periods t = 1;2;3, and X¤
4 = K). Note that the
discrete parameterization of the logistic growth function as shown in Figure
16Note that because harvesting costs are zero and independent of the size of the stock,
neither the socially optimal nor the Nash equilibrium harvesting paths are a®ected by the
level of ¹ p as long as it is positive.
17In a four hour experiment the natural value of r is zero. Participants may prefer to catch
¯sh sooner than later because of strategic considerations, but for any given number of ¯sh
caught during a session, participants are not likely to prefer to catch them all in the ¯rst
few periods. We could have induced r > 0 by paying interest, but at the cost of (i) longer
instructions, and (ii) a lower probability of subjects being able to infer the correct level of S¤.
18Hence, we implicitly assume that the group's ¯sh stock was initially equal to the carrying
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5.4 is chosen to increase the salience of the maximum sustainable yield stock
as the cooperative solution | the ¯t of the discrete function would have been
better if we had set G(S) = 4 for S = f3;4;5g rather than just for S = f4g.
The subgame perfect equilibrium path is xi;t = ¹ x for all i;t as long as Zt > 0.
That is, the equilibrium outcome is that the entire allowable catch is taken in
the ¯rst period, and there are no ¯sh available to the group afterwards. Since
G(0) = 0, the session would end after the ¯rst period, and the members of the
group would be required to leave the pond area. Because each period is one hour
long, in the social optimum, a group can ¯sh for four hours, catch twenty ¯sh
and receive e100. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium harvesting path, a
group receives eight ¯sh and e40, and can ¯sh for at most one hour.19
In all sessions of FieldDyna, 16 subjects participated, divided into four
groups of four participants. At the beginning of the ¯rst period 38 rainbow
trout were released into the pond (two per participant, plus an additional six,
as was the case in FieldVCM). At the beginning of each subsequent period, a
quantity of ¯sh was released equal to the number caught in the previous period
by all groups in the session that were still active in the current period. Hence,
the actual number of ¯sh in the pond, per ¯sherman still participating, was
the same at the beginning of each period, while the dynamics of the total al-
lowable catch remaining for each of the four groups are described by equation
(5.8). Replacing the ¯sh caught avoids the possibility that one group's harvest-
ing path a®ected the feasibility of other groups in the same session following
their intended path.
In the FieldDyna treatment, participants were aware of which other indi-
viduals were in their group. Fishermen wore colored ribbons identifying their
group. We gave this information because the model presented in section 5.4.1
has a closed-loop solution (see appendix 5.A.2), which requires ¯shermen to be
aware of the size of the remaining quota (Zt) at any moment. We believe that
if this feature of the design a®ects behavior, it would enhance cooperativeness.
If ¯shermen are able to monitor the development of the remaining quota over
time, it may induce them to cease ¯shing when they see that the remaining
quota is getting too small. Hence, if we do not ¯nd any evidence of cooperation,
the results would be even more convincing than in the absence of the group
a±liation information.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed of (i) their total earnings
19The reader may argue that it is no surprise that there is no cooperation in FieldVCM
because `¯shing is fun'. If anything, this argument should result in more cooperation in
FieldDyna because the more cooperative the group's ¯shing behavior, the longer one is allowed
to ¯sh, the larger the number of ¯sh caught, and the larger the amount of money earned.140 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
in the period, (ii) total group catch in the period, Xt, (iii) the total group quota
still remaining, St, (iv) the increase in the group's quota, G(St), and (v) the
size of the resulting allowable catch for the next period, Zt+1 = St + G(St).
As in FieldPI and FieldVCM, the instructions were read out aloud by the
experimenter at a central location, participants were provided with a handout
summarizing the instructions, and communication was strictly forbidden. We
explicitly tested the participants' understanding of the dynamic game by having
them answer test questions before the start of the session. The sessions of the
FieldDyna treatment were conducted in April 2009. Average earnings of the
participants in this experiment were e15.30.
5.4.3 Results of the FieldDyna treatment
There are two patterns that we use to distinguish cooperation from non-cooperation
in this treatment.20 The ¯rst is that, under non-cooperative behavior, there
would be no di®erence in behavior over the four periods. Players would ¯sh
with the same, maximal, e®ort in all periods. Under the social optimum, how-
ever, e®ort would be greater in the last period, relative to the ¯rst three peri-
ods. This would indicate an attempt to reduce catch in periods 1-3 to below
the maximum feasible level. The second pattern is that, under cooperative be-
havior, e®ort would exhibit a dependence on the number of ¯sh remaining in
the group's quota. If individuals ¯sh less intensely when there are fewer ¯sh
in the pond in periods 1-3, it is consistent with cooperation. If they exert less
e®ort when the stock of ¯sh is below the socially optimal level than when it is
above, it is consistent with a targeting of the social optimum. If they ¯sh with
the same intensity regardless of the social cost, we interpret it as evidence of
non-cooperative behavior.
The results of the FieldDyna treatment are presented in Figure 5.5, where
panel (a) shows the stock of ¯sh remaining at the end of each period (St), and
panel (b) shows the associated e®ort, averaged over all active groups, in the
four periods. For comparability we have also included the average e®ort levels
observed in FieldPI and FieldVCM in Figure 5.5(b).
At ¯rst glance, Figure 5.5(a) seems to suggest that participants acted fairly
cooperatively; the size of the remaining stock at the end of each of the ¯rst three
periods is positive. Indeed, of the eight groups participating in this treatment,
20Because it may not be feasible to catch the subgame perfect equilibrium quantity of ¯sh
in a one hour period, comparing the absolute stock of ¯sh remaining with the point predictions
of the two models may give a misleading impression of support for either model. In particular,
if the remaining allowable catch is close to the socially optimal level, it may be a consequence
of a binding feasibility constraint rather than an intention to cooperate.5.4. The FieldDyna treatment: A dynamic social dilemma 141
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Figure 5.5 (a) Amount of allowable catch remaining (ACR) at the end of a
period in the FieldDyna treatment, averaged over all groups. (b) Casts per
minute in the FieldDyna treatment, averaged over all active groups.
only two actually depleted their quota before the ¯nal period, and only one
group caught the total allowable catch in the ¯rst period. However, there is
evidence from the catch data that the stock was not depleted in most sessions
because catching the full quota in a period of one hour was not feasible. The
allowable catch remaining at the end of the fourth period, Z4, is greater than
zero in six of eight groups. Furthermore, the allowable catch remaining (ACR)
at the end of periods 1-3 is on average very close to the ACR at the end of
period 4.
If cooperation is occurring, the average level of e®ort should be at a similar
level in periods 1 to 3, and then increase in period 4. Figure 5.5(b), however,
shows that e®ort starts at a high level in the ¯rst period, decreases slightly in
the second, and remains approximately constant between the second, third and
fourth periods. Furthermore, as the ¯gure illustrates, e®ort in FieldDyna is not
lower than e®ort in the FieldPI treatment, further suggesting that participants
did not voluntarily limit their e®ort.
We also ¯nd that e®ort is independent of the current stock of ¯sh. The model
in section 5.4.1 and appendix 5.A.2 suggests that if players are cooperating,
e®ort in periods 1-3 would be as great as possible if S > S¤ = 4, and zero if
S · S¤ = 4. The relationship between the number of casts and the ACR is142 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
shown in Figure 5.6. The ¯gure shows the average individual number of casts
in the ¯ve minute intervals during which a speci¯c stock level is reached.21
Figure 5.6 Average individual e®ort conditional on the allowable catch remain-
ing (ACR) in period 1-3. Each 5 minute interval is an observation.
The ¯gure reveals that the average e®ort level in a group is independent of
the allowable catch remaining. There is no evidence that e®ort is greater for
S > 4 than for 0 < S · 4. The following result summarizes our ¯ndings with
regard to cooperation in FieldDyna:
Result 6 In the dynamic social dilemma treatment, FieldDyna, no cooperation
is observed. The lack of cooperation in FieldVCM is not speci¯c to that
particular treatment nor to a setting in which private and group gains are
denominated in di®erent units.
Support for result 6: Consider the di®erences in e®ort levels over the four
one-hour periods (see Figure 5.5(b)). A Wilcoxon test indicates no di®erence in
21Data from the ¯rst ten minutes of a period are not included in the ¯gure. During the
¯rst ten minutes of each period ¯shermen have the tendency to put in more e®ort than in
the subsequent time intervals within a period. An explanation for this e®ect could be that
¯shermen are more eager to ¯sh at the start of a new period. Alternatively, given their new
spot at the pond, ¯shermen have to adjust the optimal settings of their rods by trial and
error. Since all groups begin with a stock of eight ¯sh in the ¯rst period, e®ort levels for this
particular stock of ¯sh are higher when the ¯rst ten minutes are included. Inclusion of the
¯rst ten minutes causes the average e®ort at a stock size of eight to equal 0.88 rather than
0.66. Excluding the ¯rst ten minutes of each period does not appreciably change the average
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e®ort between the fourth period and the ¯rst period (N1 = N2 = 6;p = 0:75),
taking the average e®ort levels of each group as an independent observation.
Similar results are found when the fourth period is compared with either the
second period (N1 = N2 = 6;p = 0:67), or the third period (N1 = N2 = 6;p =
0:60). Six observations are used, because two groups caught their allowable
catch in a period before the fourth (one in period 1 and one in period 3).
Now consider the allowable catch remaining at the end of each of the four
periods (see Figure 5.5(a)). A series of Wilcoxon tests indicate that a group's
allowable catch remaining at the end of period 4 does not di®er from that
remaining at the end of each of the ¯rst three periods. The allowable catch
remaining at the end of period 4 does not di®er from that in period 1 (N1 =
N2 = 8;p = 0:60), period 2 (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:89), or period 3 (N1 = N2 =
8;p = 0:40).
The di®erence in e®ort between the range of allowable catches remaining
where it is in a group's interest to catch more ¯sh (if the ACR is 5 or higher),
and where it is socially harmful to catch ¯sh (at four and lower), is investigated
with a ¯xed e®ects panel data regression model. We only use the data for
periods 1-3 because e®ort should be maximal in period 4, independently of
the allowable catch remaining. The Fixed E®ects estimates, which show no
signi¯cant di®erences in e®ort between these two ranges of ACR, are presented
in Table 5.3.
E®ort levels in period 1, 2 and 3 are estimated as a function of ACR. Each
period is divided into twelve ¯ve-minute intervals. We regress the amount of
e®ort exerted by ¯sherman i in time interval s+1 on the ACR in interval s. The
ACR is captured by a series of dummy variables capturing whether it is equal
to 4, 3, 2, or 1. We use an indicator function I(ACR = h);h 2 f1;2;3;4g which
has value 1 if Ss = h, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the baseline against which
each dummy variable should be interpreted is the range at which the ACR is
¯ve or greater. In addition, we insert a within-period time interval variable
(Time) and dummies accounting for the in°uences of between-period e®ects.
The variable Time is included to correct for a trend of e®ort within a period.
All ACR dummy variables are insigni¯cant. Hence, irrespective of the
amount of allowable catch remaining, ¯shermen ¯sh with the same intensity
as they do so when it is both individually and socially desirable to exert full
e®ort. They make no attempt to replenish the resource when ACR levels are
critically low. The only signi¯cant variables in this model are the variable Time
and the dummy variable for the second period. The negative sign of Time indi-
cates that ¯shermen exert less e®ort later in the one hour period, controlling for144 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
Dependent Variable:
E®ort in interval s + 1
I(ACR = 4) ¡0:052
(0:042)
I(ACR = 3) 0:012
(0:089)
I(ACR = 2) ¡0:062
(0:082)




I(Period = 2) ¡0:090¤¤
(0:038)





Table 5.3 Fixed E®ects regression on impact of amount of allowable catch re-
maining (ACR) on individual e®ort. Standard errors, clustered at the group level,
are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level,
¤¤: signi¯cant
at the 5%-level.
the amount of allowable catch remaining. Overall, we ¯nd that our subject pool
of recreational ¯shermen displays a similar lack of cooperation in the FieldDyna
treatment as in the FieldVCM treatment. ¥
5.5 Conclusion
Our data are consistent with the predictions of classical game theory. In Field-
VCM and FieldDyna, behavior conforms to the subgame perfect equilibria of
the games that we created. Accordingly, we ¯nd no evidence of cooperative
behavior in our framed ¯eld social dilemma experiment. We can detect no dif-
ference in behavior between a situation in which refraining from ¯shing yields
a large positive externality to the group (the FieldVCM treatment) and when
it does not (the FieldPI treatment). This conclusion contrasts sharply with re-
sults from studies of the VCM game when it is implemented in the laboratory.
In such laboratory settings, cooperation is typically positive at the outset of a
group's interaction, and declines over time. Therefore, our results shed doubt
on the external validity of behavior observed in this type of laboratory exper-5.5. Conclusion 145
iment. While the behavior of recreational ¯shermen may not be not of special
economic interest in itself, it is striking to see the di®erence in their behavior in
the ¯eld compared to a contextualized laboratory environment.
Additional treatments allow us to explore potential causes of the di®erence
between the results we have observed and those from previous laboratory stud-
ies. The treatments permit us to rule out four would-be explanations: (i) dif-
ferences in contextualization between the game we implemented in the ¯eld and
the standard VCM implemented in the laboratory, (ii) di®erences in the sub-
ject pool (students versus recreational ¯shermen), (iii) di®erences between the
settings in which the experiments are conducted (the laboratory versus a more
natural environment, the recreational ¯shing pond), and (iv) di®erences in the
units in which the bene¯ts and costs of cooperation are measured (money versus
money, or money versus ¯sh).
When implementing our modi¯ed version of the VCM game in the labora-
tory using student subjects, we ¯nd a pattern of behavior very similar to that
typically observed in standard VCM lab experiments. In addition, we ¯nd that
using students as participants lowers cooperation compared to our subject pool
of recreational ¯shermen. Therefore, the use of students alone cannot account
for the greater cooperation observed in received laboratory experiments than in
FieldVCM. Conducting the experiments in the structured and formal setting of
an experimental laboratory decreases cooperation among our subjects. They are
more cooperative when participating in a voluntary contributions game while
they are ¯shing than when they are in the laboratory. Therefore, the fact that
the experiment is conducted outside the laboratory, cannot on its own account
for the lack of cooperation.
The most plausible remaining explanation of the poor external validity of
our laboratory experiments is the nature of the decision variable. Our subjects
are unwilling to forego ¯shing to yield bene¯ts to the group, even when group
bene¯ts are also in terms of ¯shing. Nevertheless, subjects from the same pool
are willing to cooperate if it involves sacri¯cing own monetary earnings for the
bene¯t of the group. Taken together, our data are consistent with the assertion
that cooperativeness depends on the decision variable, the activity that must
be modi¯ed in order to yield a bene¯t to the group. This statement is not to
deny the importance of other factors; for example, whether similar results would
apply to professional high sea ¯shermen remains an open question.
Some readers of this chapter have suggested that a demand e®ect may exist
in the experiment, in that `¯shermen participate in the experiment to ¯sh',
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overwhelms the money that we o®er the group not to ¯sh. However, we note that
a similar e®ect exists with students who participate in traditional laboratory
experiments: Students presumably participate in such experiments with the
primary motivation of earning money for themselves. While ¯shermen might
be disposed to feel that the pond is a place to ¯sh, subjects in the laboratory
presumably are disposed to view it as a place to earn money for themselves.
Furthermore, in the FieldDyna treatment, payo®s are entirely in terms of ¯shing.
Reducing one's own ¯shing increases the overall ¯shing opportunities available
to the group. Thus, the tradeo® is fully in terms of the reward medium that is
typically associated with the venue. As described earlier, we ¯nd no cooperation
in FieldDyna, in agreement with standard economic theory, indicating that a
demand e®ect of the type described above could not account for the lack of
cooperation that we observe.
It has been shown in some ¯eld experiments that decentralized cooperation
can be successful (see for example Erev et al. (1993) and Bandiera et al. (2005)).
Cooperation can be found in naturally-occurring social dilemmas as well (see
for example Ostrom (1990)). However, our results suggest that this successful
cooperation does not spontaneously arise. When there is no contact possible
between agents facing a social dilemma, the mere presence of potential group-
level gains resulting from the sacri¯ce of private payo®s does not guarantee
cooperation | even if the group concerned is small in number. The propensity
to cooperate appears to depend on the nature of the activity that individuals
must undertake, or refrain from, in order to increase group payo®s. It may be
the case that to reliably achieve cooperation in a setting such as ours, some
additional structure is required. This structure might be an e®ective avenue
of communication between individuals (Isaac and Walker (1988a)), a system of
punishment of non-cooperators (Fehr and GÄ achter (2000)), or a mechanism for
increasing and maintaining social cohesion (GÄ achter and Fehr (1999); Masclet
et al. (2003)). All of these factors have been found to increase the level of
cooperation in laboratory social dilemmas. It is thus reasonable to conjecture
that presence of one or more of these instruments may be necessary, or at least
make it more likely, to achieve cooperation in some inhospitable ¯eld settings,
such as the one we have studied here. On the other hand, cooperation may be
so di±cult to achieve in our setting that even these instruments may not be
e®ective.5.A. Appendix 147
5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Statistical analysis of the e®ect of e®ort on catch
This appendix shows that the number of casts per minute, our E®ort measure
of cooperation, is correlated with the number of ¯sh caught, which is used
to calculate our Catch measure of cooperation. Thus, we establish that casts
per minute is a legitimate measure of cooperation: A higher casting frequency
increases expected private payo® and decreases expected group payo®.
An Ordered Probit model is used to estimate the e®ects of ¯shing e®ort on
the number of ¯sh caught, as presented in Table 5.4. The dependent variable
is an individual's catch of ¯sh in a period. Table 5.4 contains estimates of the
pooled data from the FieldVCM and FieldPI treatments.
Dependent variable:





Quadrant Fixed E®ects Yes
N 456
pseudo-R2 0:1928
Table 5.4 Ordered Probit estimation on the relationship between individual
e®ort and individual catch. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are
reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level.
The model shows a clear positive and signi¯cant e®ect of our measure of
e®ort, casts per minute, on the catch of ¯sh. The dummy variable I(High
Season) has a value of 1 when an observation is taken from the high season.
The quadrant ¯xed e®ects are dummy variables that capture the position at
the pond at which a ¯sherman is ¯shing. The quadrant dummy variables are
insigni¯cant, indicating that each position o®ers equal chances to catch ¯sh.148 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
5.A.2 The socially optimum and subgame perfect equilib-
rium extraction paths of the dynamic game
In this appendix we derive the socially optimal and closed-loop Nash equilib-
rium harvesting paths for the theoretical model in section 5.4.1. Assuming
homogenous agents, we have a social dilemma if ¹ X ´ n¹ x > G(SMSY ); that is, if
¹ X > G(S) for all 0 · S · K. This can be shown as follows. Consider ¯rst the
social optimum in case of an in¯nite time horizon problem. The social welfare
function can be derived by inserting (5.6) into (5.5), noting that this implies
that X ´
Pn








G(S) ¡ _ S(t)
´
e¡rtdt: (5.9)










Objective function (5.10) is maximized if dG(S)=dS and r are equated as quickly
as possible. Using (5.7), we ¯nd that the socially optimal steady state stock is
equal to S¤ = max[0;K(° ¡ r)=(2°)] and that the socially optimal harvesting
levels equal X = ¹ X if S > S¤, X = G(S) if S = S¤, and X = 0 if S < S¤.22 In
our dynamic ¯eld experiment r is equal to zero, and hence S¤ = K=2 (= SMSY ).
Also, if the time horizon is limited to T periods and assuming that ¹ X > K, the
socially optimal stock is S¤ = K=2 in periods 1;:::;T ¡1 and 0 in period T; to
maximize group welfare, regeneration should be maximized in all periods apart
from the last one, and the stock should be depleted in that terminal period.
Next we derive the unique Nash equilibrium harvesting path. The solution is
straightforward: All n ¸ 2 agents harvest the resource at maximum e®ort level
(¹ x) until it is depleted, even if ° > r. This can be shown as follows. Consider
e S as a candidate interior equilibrium stock size (i.e., e S 2 h[0;K]), which may
or may not be equal to S¤. For e S to be an interior steady state, all agents
j = 1;:::;n must harvest at xj = G(e S)=n if S = e S, and choose xj = 0 (xj = ¹ x)
if S < e S (S > e S).
That means that the amount of net regeneration agent i faces for any stock
level S, Q(S), equals:
Q(S) = G(S) ¡ (n ¡ 1)¹ x if S > e S;
Q(S) = G(e S)=n if S = e S;
Q(S) = G(S) if S < e S:
22Hence, the socially optimal transition path towards the steady state is a so-called Most
Rapid Approach Path (see for example Hartl and Feichtinger (1987)).5.A. Appendix 149
That means that if agent i decreases the stock in¯nitesimally below e S, she would
increase the regeneration she faces (Q(S)) by almost a factor n (from G(e S)=n to
in¯nitesimally less than G(e S)). Forever harvesting at a rate such that the stock
remains in¯nitesimally below e S would then yield a present value of (almost)
¹ pG(e S)=r for agent i and a zero payo® for all other agents j 6= i in an in¯nite
time horizon model. Clearly, this holds for all agents i = 1;:::;n and for all
e S 2 h0;K], and hence the only steady state equilibrium stock is S = 0 for all
t = 1;:::;1. This means that if one or more of the n ¡ 1 agents are greedy
and harvest at maximum rate, no individual agent is able to keep the resource
stock at the desired level, and hence each agent's best response is to harvest
at maximum rate too (see also Clark (1980), or Dockner et al. (2000, p. 333-
335)). Because G(S) = 0 if S = 0, the game ends in period 1. And if the unique
closed-loop Nash equilibrium path is to deplete the resource in one period in the
in¯nite time horizon model, it is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
path in the ¯nite time horizon model implemented in the ¯eld.150 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
5.A.3 Promotional material
This appendix contains a translation of the °yer, which we used to recruit par-
ticipants in the Field treatments. The original °yer is available upon request
from the authors.
TILBURG UNIVERSITY REQUESTS YOUR PARTICIPATION IN A STUDY
DATE: ...
TIME: PRESENT AT 7.15 A.M., START OF THE STUDY AT 7.45 A.M.
² Duration: 4 hours.
² Participation is free.
² You can earn money during the study.
² Each participant can catch at most twelve ¯sh.
² You can take home all of the ¯sh you catch.
² You should use your own ¯shing equipment and bait.
² We will use pond 3.
² You will ¯sh according to the standard rules of the trout ¯shing facility
plus some modi¯cations.
² You will be allocated more than one spot.
² You are not allowed to talk during the session.5.A. Appendix 151
5.A.4 General rules at the trout ¯shing facility
This appendix gives the rules for ¯shing which apply at the trout ¯shing facility.
They are copied from their website, and translated into English.
Rules and regulations at the trout ¯shing facility
Everyone is cordially invited to ¯sh at our recreational ¯shing facility. You are
obliged to abide by the following rules.
² Entering the site is at your own risk.
² Do not cause unnecessary noise nuisance.
² Each person ¯shes with only one rod at a time.
² Fly-¯shing is only allowed when there is enough space (we decide if this
is so).
² Feeding the ¯sh, in any way or form, is prohibited.
² Fishing is only allowed with natural bait and/or Trout Dough (no ¯sh).
² Fishing with arti¯cial bait, twister, dreg, jigs, shiner, etc., is not allowed.
² Throwing back trout (rainbow trout and salmon trout) into the pond is
not allowed.
² All trout caught (rainbow trout and salmon trout) must be taken home.
² Using a keepnet is not allowed.
² Using a scoopnet to catch ¯sh is not allowed.
² Any grass carp or cat¯sh caught should be thrown back into the pond.
² Fishing at a di®erent pond than the one you have selected upon entering
is not permitted.
² You are allowed to clean ¯sh only at the designated cleaning area.
² Everyone should keep the area clean, including the ¯sh cleaning area.
² Damage to rented material due to incompetent use must be compensated
for.
² We cannot be held accountable for theft, accidents, etc., which take place
on our property.152 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
5.A.5 Instructions for the FieldPI treatment
This appendix contains a translation of the instructions for the FieldPI treat-
ment. Part (a) is the summary of the rules handed out to participants, who
could reread it throughout the session. Part (b) is the text of the instructions
read aloud at the beginning of the session.
a) Summary of the rules
Group formation
² You are placed in groups of 4 persons.
² The groups will remain the same throughout the entire session.
² We do not tell you who belongs to your group and you are not allowed to
exchange information with other participants.
Timing
² The session lasts four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. until noon.
² If we begin later, we will stop later.
² The four hours will be divided into 6 periods of 40 minutes.
Stocking of the pond
² In the ¯rst period, we will put (16 x 2) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the
pond.
² You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch.
² We make sure that an equal number of rainbow trout is in the pond at
the beginning of each period. We do this by putting in a new rainbow
trout at the beginning of a new period for each ¯sh that is caught in the
previous period.
² In each period of 40 minutes, you are allowed to catch at most 2 ¯sh. If
you catch a salmon trout, it also counts as one ¯sh.
In each period
² The number of rainbow trout put into the pond is equal to the number of
¯sh caught in the previous period.5.A. Appendix 153
² You are not allowed to talk with the other participants.
In periods 1, 3 and 5:
² The ¯shing spots are determined by participants picking a numbered spot
tag from a black linen bag.
At the end of the session:
² You will receive 5 euro for your participation.
(b) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter
Introduction
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch.
We ask you to abide strictly by the rules which we impose.
The session
In the next four hours, we ask you to adhere to the following rules. First, all
rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual bait, etc.
You are placed in a group with 3 other participants during the session. A
group therefore consists of 4 persons. Your group remains the same for the
whole session, but we do not inform you about who is in your group, and who154 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
is not. We urgently ask you not to talk to other people during the study. This
is so important to us that we will exclude you from the session if you violate
this rule.
The session takes a total of four hours, from about 8.00 a.m. until noon. If
we start a little later, we will stop a little later. The study consists of 6 periods
of 40 minutes. In the ¯rst period, we will put 2 rainbow trout into the pond for
each participant. In addition, we put another 6 rainbow trout into the pond.
There are 16 participants, and hence we will put (16 x 2) + 6 = 38 rainbow
trout into the pond. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh that you catch. We
make sure that, at the beginning of each period, the number of trout in the
pond is always equal to that at the beginning of all other periods. We do this
by putting in a number of rainbow trout, at the beginning of a new period,
equal to the total number of trout caught in the previous period.
In each 40 minute period you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2 ¯sh. Any
trout caught counts as one ¯sh, whether it is a rainbow trout or a salmon trout.
Whenever you have caught 2 ¯sh and the period is not ¯nished yet, you have
to take your ¯shing line out of the pond. You then have to wait until the next
period begins. You are not allowed to talk with others while you are waiting.
The spot at which you are located may in°uence the number of ¯sh you can
catch. Fishing spots are assigned in periods 1, 3 and 5. That means that you
will be located for two periods of 40 minutes at each of your three spots. Spots
are assigned by having participants pick a numbered spot tag out of a black
linen bag.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about its results.5.A. Appendix 155
5.A.6 Instructions for the FieldVCM treatment
This appendix contains a translation of the instructions for the FieldVCM treat-
ment. Part (a) is the summary of the rules handed out to the participants, who
could reread it throughout the session. Part (b) is the text of the instructions
read aloud at the beginning of the session.
a) Summary of the rules
Group formation
² You are placed in groups of 4 persons.
² The groups will remain the same throughout the entire session.
² We do not tell you who belongs to your group and you are not allowed to
exchange information with other participants.
Timing
² The session lasts four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. until noon.
² If we begin later, we will stop later.
² The four hours will be divided into 6 periods of 40 minutes.
Stocking the pond
² In the ¯rst period, we will put (16 £ 2) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the
pond.
² You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch.
² We make sure that an equal number of rainbow trout is in the pond at
the beginning of each period. We do this by putting in a new rainbow
trout at the beginning of a new period for each ¯sh that is caught in the
previous period.
² In each period of 40 minutes, you are allowed to catch at most 2 ¯sh. If
you catch a salmon trout, it also counts as one ¯sh.
² If you (decide to) catch less than two ¯sh, we give money to the other
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² If you catch fewer ¯sh than the two you can catch maximally, we divide
6 euro equally among the other 3 participants in your group for each ¯sh
you did not catch.
² Hence, for each ¯sh you do not catch (or decide not to catch), each of the
other 3 participants in your group receives 2 euro. This means that:
{ If you catch 2 ¯shes, the other 3 participants in your group do not
receive any money.
{ If you catch 1 ¯sh, each of the other 3 participants in your group
receives 2 euros.
{ If you catch 0 ¯shes, each of the other 3 participants in your group
receives 4 euros.
² This holds for all participants. This means that you will receive 2 euro for
each ¯sh that is left in the pond by the other participants in your group.
In each period
² The number of rainbow trout put into the pond is equal to the number of
¯sh caught in the previous period.
² You are not allowed to talk with the other participants.
In periods 1, 3 and 5:
² The ¯shing spots are determined by participants picking a numbered spot
tag from a black linen bag.
At the end of the session:
² You receive e2 for every ¯sh not caught by the other three members of
your group over the 6 periods.
(b) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter
Introduction
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies5.A. Appendix 157
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The session
In the next four hours, we ask you to adhere to the following rules. First, all
rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net to
set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, and so on.
You are placed in a group with 3 other participants during the session. A
group therefore consists of 4 persons. Your group remains the same for the
whole session, but we do not inform you about who is in your group, and who
is not. We urgently ask you not to talk to other people during the study. This
is so important to us that we will exclude you from the session if you violate
this rule.
The session takes a total of four hours, from about 8.00 a.m. until noon. If
we start a little later, we will stop a little later. The study consists of 6 periods
of 40 minutes. All the money you earn during the study is paid to you at the
end. In the ¯rst period, we will put 2 rainbow trout into the pond for each
participant. In addition, we put another 6 rainbow trout into the pond. There
are 16 participants, and hence we will put (16£2) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into
the pond. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh that you catch. We make sure
that, at the beginning of each period, the number of trout in the pond is always
equal to that at the beginning of all other periods. We do this by putting in a
number of rainbow trout, at the beginning of a new period, equal to the total
number of trout caught in the previous period.
In each 40 minute period you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2 ¯sh. Any
trout caught counts as one ¯sh, whether it is a rainbow trout or a salmon trout.
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members of your group receive money. For each ¯sh you catch fewer than 2,
the other members of your group receive, in total, 6 euros, to be divided equally
among the three of them; they thus receive 2 euros each.
This means that if you catch 2 rainbow trout, the other 3 participants in
your group do not receive any money. If you catch 1 rainbow trout, each of the
other 3 participants in your group receives 2 euro. If you catch 0 rainbow trout,
each of the other 3 participants in your group receives 4 euro. This rule holds
for all participants. Hence, you receive 2 euro for every ¯sh anyone of your three
group members decides to catch fewer than 2 in any period.
The spot at which you are located may in°uence the number of ¯sh you can
catch. Fishing spots are assigned in periods 1, 3 and 5. That means that you
will be located for two periods of 40 minutes at each of your three spots. Spots
are assigned by having participants pick a numbered spot tag out of a black
linen bag.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about its results.5.A. Appendix 159
5.A.7 Instructions for the StuLab, FisherLab and Fisher-
Pond treatments
Part (a) of this appendix presents the translation of the instructions for the
StuLab treatment. Part (b) indicates how the instructions for the FisherLab
and FisherPond treatments di®ered from those of the StuLab treatment.
a) Instructions for the StuLab treatment
Introduction
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. You can earn money during the
study. The amount of money you can earn depends on your decisions during the
session and on the decisions of others. We will read out aloud the instructions
now, and you are invited to read along.
The session
In this session you are placed in a group with 3 other participants during the
session. A group therefore consists of 4 persons. Your group remains the same
for the whole session, but we do not inform you about who is in your group, and
who is not. We urgently ask you not to talk with others during the study. This
is so important to us that we will exclude you from the session if you violate
this rule.
The study consists of 6 periods in which we mimic a scenario at a ¯shing
pond. However, instead of really catching ¯sh, you are requested to decide how
many ¯sh you would like to catch. The rules of the study are as follows. In each
of the 6 periods, you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2 ¯sh. You receive 1
euro for each ¯sh you catch. For each ¯sh you catch fewer than 2, the other
members of your group receive, in total, e1.50, to be divided equally among the
three of them; they thus receive e0.50 each.
That means that if you catch 2 ¯sh, you receive e2 and the other three
members of your group do not receive any money. If you catch 1 ¯sh, you re-
ceive e1 and the other three members of your group receive 1 £ e0.50 = e0.50
each. If you catch 0 ¯sh, you receive e0 and the other three members of your
group receive 2 £ e0.50 = e1 each. This rule holds for all participants. Hence,
you receive e0.50 for every ¯sh anyone of your three group members decides to
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Examples
Suppose that you and all your other group members catch 0 ¯sh. You will earn
e3. This amount consists of the 2 £ e0.50 = e1 as a consequence of the choice
of each of your other group members. Because there are 3 other group members,
you will earn 3 £ e1 = e3. Because you have not caught a ¯sh yourself, you
will earn nothing due to your own ¯shing activities.
If you catch 2 ¯sh while all of your other group members catch 0, you will
earn e5. This amount consists of the 3 £ e1 as a consequence of no catch of
your other group members plus the earnings from your own ¯shing activities, 2
£ e1 = e2.
Suppose that you and all your other group members catch 2 ¯sh. You will
earn e2. This amount consists of the 2 £ e1 of the two ¯sh you have caught.
Because all your other group members have also caught 2 ¯sh, you will earn no
money.
If you catch 0 ¯sh and all of your other group members catch 2 ¯sh, then
you will earn e0. You will earn nothing as a consequence of your own ¯shing
activities. Because no other group member leaves a ¯sh, you will earn nothing.
Filling in the form
You can indicate your choices for each of the 6 periods on the form we handed
out. We will now explain how you can do this. Please look at the form now.
In the upper right corner please ¯ll in your participant number. This number
is the one marked on the sticker on your table. Please make sure to ¯ll in the
correct number; we need this in order to make the payments at the end of the
session.
On the form you ¯nd the choices you can make. Below these options, we
have printed the numbers 0, 1, and 2 next to each period. We ask you simply
to circle your choice for each period.
When you have made your choice for period 1, please put the form, face
down, on your desk, so that we know you are done making your decision for the
period. When all participants have made their choice, we collect all of the forms.
We calculate how much you receive in this period, and ¯ll the information out
on the form. We then return the form to you, so that you know how much you
have earned. On the form, we also write the total number of ¯sh your group
has caught. In addition, we write down the decisions of all participants in the
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provide information on which participant is placed in your group.
After this procedure, period 2 starts. We ask you to make your choice for this
period by circling the appropriate number, and place your form face down on top
of your desk. When everyone has made their choice, we collect the forms, and
calculate how much money each participant receives in period 2. We inform
each participant about the decisions of their group members, and how much
money he/she receives. Also, we again write the decisions of all participants
on the white board. This procedure is repeated until all 6 periods are ¯nished.
Note that you should not make a choice for a period that has not yet begun.
At the end of the session, we give all participants their receipts in private
by inviting them, one by one, to the adjacent room. When you have collected
your earnings, the session is ¯nished. There is no reason for you to return to
this room, so please take all your belongings when your name is called.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but
also during the session. We do not answer questions how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about the results.
Test questions
We now proceed with a short test. Once all participants have answered these
questions correctly, the session will begin.
1. With how many other participants will you be placed in a group?
2. How much money will you earn due to your own ¯shing activity when you
decide to catch 2 ¯sh in a period?
3. How much money will you earn when the following decisions are made in a
period?
² You catch 1 ¯sh,
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² One other member of your group catches 2 ¯sh.
The form
The session consists of 6 periods. In each period, we ask you to choose one of
the following options.
(0) You catch 0 ¯sh. You receive e0 and the other members of your group
receive 2 £ e0.50 = e1 each;
(1) You catch 1 ¯sh. You receive e1 and the other members of your group
receive 1 £ e0.50 each);
(2) You catch 2 ¯sh. You receive e2 and the other members of your group each
receive e0.
Your choice Total group catch Your earnings
Period 1 0 1 2
Period 2 0 1 2
Period 3 0 1 2
Period 4 0 1 2
Period 5 0 1 2
Period 6 0 1 2
b) Instructions for the FisherLab and FisherPond treatments
The instructions for the FisherLab treatment are identical to those for the Stu-
Lab treatment. The instructions for the FisherPond treatment only di®er from
those of StuLab and FisherLab treatments with respect to the mechanics of
the experiment's implementation. In the FisherPond treatment decisions sheets
were to be handed back to the experimenter (rather than put on the participant's
table for the experimenter to collect) and information about the decisions of the
other participants in the session were shown on a paper sheet for the participant
to peruse rather than recorded on a white board.5.A. Appendix 163
5.A.8 Survey about the value of ¯shing
Dear participant,
We are conducting a study on behalf of Tilburg University. We would like you to
answer the following questions. What we ask of you, is to answer the following
questions, which relate to a hypothetical scenario we describe now.
Suppose that you are ¯shing for rainbow trout. However, there is an addi-
tional rule to the usual rules that apply here at the Biestse Oevers: you have
to pay for each rainbow trout that you catch. You are not allowed to put ¯sh
that have been caught back into the pond. What price would be the most you
would pay to catch rainbow trout?
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5.A.9 Instructions for the FieldDyna treatment
This appendix is a translation of the instructions for the FieldDyna treatment.
Part (a) is the summary of the rules handed out to participants, who could
reread it throughout the session. Part (b) is the quiz that participants took
before their session began. Part (c) is the text of the instructions read aloud at
the beginning of the session.
(a) Summary of the rules of the study
Group formation
² You are placed in groups of 4 persons.
² These groups remain the same throughout the entire session.
² The other members of your group wear a ribbon of the same color as you
do.
² You are not allowed to talk to other people during the study.
Timing
² The session lasts four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. until noon.
² If we begin later, we will stop later.
² The four hours are divided into 4 periods of 1 hour each.
Stocking the pond
² In the ¯rst period, we will put (4 £ 8) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the
pond.
² You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch.
² At the beginning of each new period, we put ¯sh into the pond equal to
the total number of ¯sh caught by the present participants in the previous
period.
² The number of ¯sh in the pond per active participant is therefore equal
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Catching ¯sh
² Each ¯sh you catch is yours to take home. For every ¯sh you catch, you
also receive e5. Rainbow trout and salmon trout count both as one ¯sh.
Available ¯sh for your group
² Each period, you and your other group members allowed to catch at most
the number of ¯sh available to your group.
² In the ¯rst period this is 8 ¯sh.
² The number of ¯sh available for your group does NOT depend on the
number of ¯sh caught by other groups.
² The number of available ¯sh for your group in the current period depends
ONLY on the number of ¯sh your group left in the pond at the end of the
previous period. See the table below.
² Whenever a group catches all ¯sh that were available to that group, all
members of that group have to stop ¯shing and are requested to leave the
pond area.
² We pay your earnings at the end of the period in which your session ends.166 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
² Example:
{ In the ¯rst period the total number of ¯sh available to your group
equals 8.
¤ The maximum number of ¯sh that your group is allowed to catch
in the ¯rst period, is 8 ¯sh.
¤ When 8 ¯sh are caught, all members of your group have to take
their ¯shing lines out of the water and have to leave the pond
area.
{ Suppose your group catches 6 ¯sh in the ¯rst period.
¤ At the beginning of the second period, there are 2 ¯sh left from
the ¯rst period and 3 new ¯sh are put into the pond; see the
table.
¤ Your group is then allowed to catch 2 + 3 = 5 ¯sh in the second
period.
¤ If your group catches all 5 ¯sh in the second period, all members
of your group have to take their ¯shing lines out of the water
and have to leave the pond area.
{ If your group catches less than 5 ¯sh, new ¯sh will be placed into the
pond, as indicated in the table.
¤ Suppose your group catches 1 ¯sh in the second period.
¤ Then, at the end of the period there are 5 ¡ 1 = 4 ¯sh left for
your group.
¤ The available number of ¯sh for your group in the next period
is then raised by 4 ¯sh (see the table), and the total number of
available ¯sh in period 3 is 4 + 4 = 8.
Your ¯shing spot
² Each group has four spots, each member of the group ¯shes for one period
at each of these four spots.
² You draw a numbered spot tag out of a black linen bag which indicates
your spot for the ¯rst period.
² You receive a ribbon at the beginning of the session.
² At the end of each period of one hour, we inform you at what spot you
will be ¯shing in the next period.5.A. Appendix 167
Number of ¯sh left at the end Increase in the number Number of ¯sh available
of the previous period of ¯sh available to your group










9 2 ¯sh subtracted 7
² You are not allowed to talk to other people during the session.
(b) Test questions
1. How many other group members are in your group, besides you?
2. Suppose your group catches 6 ¯sh in the ¯rst period.
a. What is the number of ¯sh still available to your group at the end of the ¯rst
period?
b. The number of ¯sh available to your group is then increased by how many
¯sh in period 2?
c. What is the maximum number of ¯sh your group is allowed to catch in period
2?
Suppose next that you and the other participants of your group catch all avail-
able ¯sh in period 2.
d. What is the maximum number of ¯sh your group is allowed to catch in the
third period?
e. What is the maximum number of ¯sh your group is allowed to catch in the
fourth period?
3 a. What is the maximum number of ¯sh your group is allowed to catch in the
¯rst period?
b. How many ¯sh should your group have left at the end of the ¯rst period in
order to have the largest increase in ¯sh available to your group at the start of
period 2?
c. How much is this increase?
d. What is the total number of ¯sh available for your group in the next period?168 Chapter 5. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation Among Fishermen
(c) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter
Introduction
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The session
In the next four hours, we ask you to adhere to the following rules. First, all
rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. That it
is not permitted to throw ¯sh you have caught back into the pond, you are only
allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net to set ¯sh
ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, etc.
You are placed in a group with 3 other participants during the session. A
group therefore consists of 4 persons. The group remains the same throughout
the study. Each participant receives a ribbon. The members of your group have
the same color ribbon as you have. We urgently ask you not to talk to other
people during the study. This is so important to us that we will exclude you
from the session if you violate this rule.
The session consists of four periods of one hour. The session therefore takes
four hours, from 8.00 a.m. until 12.00 a.m. If we start a little later, we will stop
a little later.
In the ¯rst period, we put 8 rainbow trout into the pond for each of the
four groups. In addition, we put another 6 rainbow trout into the pond, and5.A. Appendix 169
hence we put (4 £ 8) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the pond. At the beginning
of period 2, 3, and 4 we put a number of ¯sh into the pond equal to the number
of ¯sh caught in the previous period by all active participants. This means that
the number of ¯sh in the pond for each active ¯sherman is the same at the
beginning of each period.
Each ¯sh you catch is yours to take home. In addition, you receive e5 for
each ¯sh you catch. During the study, rainbow trout and salmon trout both
count for 1 ¯sh.
Although the number of ¯sh per participant remains constant over all peri-
ods, you are not allowed to catch ¯sh without limit. Each period of one hour,
you and your group members are not allowed to catch more than the maximum
number of ¯sh available to your group. In the ¯rst period, this maximum num-
ber of ¯sh available is 8 ¯sh, and you and your group members are not allowed
to catch more than 8 ¯sh in this period. Keep in mind that each ¯sherman is
allowed to catch as many ¯sh he or she can or wants to, as long as the total
number caught by the group in the ¯rst hour is not more than 8 ¯sh.
In the second period, the number of ¯sh available to your group changes.
The number of ¯sh available to your group does not depend on the number of
¯sh caught by participants of other groups. The number of ¯sh available to your
group in the next period depends only on the number of ¯sh still available to
your group at the end of the current period.
The way in which this works is indicated in the table.
Whenever the number of ¯sh caught is such that the number of ¯sh available
to your group at the end of the period equals zero, the number of available ¯sh
is not increased and your group is not allowed to catch any more ¯sh. The
session is over for your group. We pay your earnings at the end of the period
in which your group has caught its maximum available ¯sh.
Whenever the number of ¯sh caught is such that at the end of a period 1
¯sh is left to your group, the number of ¯sh available to your group is raised by
2, and your group is allowed to maximally catch 3 ¯sh in the next period.
Whenever the number of ¯sh caught is such that at the end of a period the
number of ¯sh available to your group equals 4, the number of ¯sh available to
your group is raised by 4, and your group is allowed to maximally catch 8 ¯sh
in the next period.
Whenever the number of ¯sh caught is such that at the end of a period the
number of ¯sh available to your group equals 6, the number of ¯sh available to
your group is raised by 3, and your group is allowed to maximally catch 9 ¯sh
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Let us consider an example. In the ¯rst period, the total number of ¯sh
available to your group equals 8. This means that your group is allowed to
catch at most 8 ¯sh in this period. When the 8th ¯sh is caught, all members of
the group have to take their ¯shing lines out of the water. The session is then
over for your group and you have to leave the pond area.
Suppose your group does not catch 8 ¯sh in the ¯rst period, but rather 6.
In that case there are 8 ¡ 6 = 2 ¯sh still available to your group at the end of
the ¯rst period. The table shows that when 2 ¯sh are left to a group at the end
of a period, the total number of ¯sh this group is allowed to catch is increased
by 3 ¯sh at the beginning of the second period. At the beginning of the second
period there are hence 2 + 3 = 5 ¯sh available for your group. Once again, the
number of ¯sh caught by other groups has no in°uence on the number of ¯sh
your group is allowed to catch.
When your group catches 5 ¯sh in the second period, all members of your
group have to take their ¯shing lines out of the water at the moment the ¯fth
¯sh is caught. If your group catches fewer than ¯ve ¯sh in the second period,
the number of ¯sh available to your group is again increased. The increase in
the number of ¯sh available for your group depends on the number of ¯sh left
at the end of the second period, as indicated in the table. Suppose your group
catches one ¯sh in period 2, then the total number of ¯sh still available to your
group at the end of that period is 5 ¡ 1 = 4 ¯sh. In the table you can see that
in that case, the number of available ¯sh is raised by 4 ¯sh. The number of
available ¯sh for your group is 8 in period 3, in this example.
Each group of ¯shermen is allocated 4 ¯shing spots. You will be located for
one period at each of those group spots. You will draw a number out of a bag
which indicates the spot at which you will be located during the ¯rst period.
You will receive a ribbon before the session starts. At the end of each period
we inform you at which spot you will be located in the next period. We want
to stress again that it is important that you are not allowed to talk during the
session. This is of such importance, that we will exclude you from the session if
you violate this rule.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you5.A. Appendix 171
about its results.
Before the session starts, we ask you to answer some test questions. You can
do this at the spot at which you will be ¯shing in the ¯rst period. Only when




Over the past two decades, scholars have had an increasing interest in human
behavior in social dilemmas. The main work horse for social dilemmas in group
settings is the voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, agents face a
situation in which they can engage in a (sel¯sh) activity that bene¯ts themselves
only, or they can engage in a (pro-social) activity that bene¯ts all members
of the group. The greatest total payo® can be obtained when all members
cooperate, by devoting their e®orts fully to the pro-social activity. The dilemma
is then created as follows: All agents pro¯t equally from the total pro-social
investments, even the ones who have not cooperated. However, for each agent,
the private returns from the sel¯sh activity are greater than the private returns
from the pro-social activity. Assuming that agents are rational and play the
game a ¯nite number of times, the prediction is that no agent will ever contribute
to the pro-social activity, hoping to free ride on the activities of others.
A large body of literature has tested the predictions of the voluntary con-
tribution mechanism using laboratory experiments (see for example Isaac et al.
(1985), Andreoni (1988), and Isaac and Walker (1988b)). Unlike the dire predic-
tion that all agents act purely sel¯shly, the majority of laboratory results shows
two robust patterns (Ledyard (1995)): (i) initially, agents contribute between
1I would like to thank Ben and Shirley Willems for use of their ¯shing facility, and Paul
Lude~ na Delgado, Joris Hoendervangers, Stef van Kessel, and Menusch Khadjavi for excellent
research assistance.
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forty and sixty percent of their e®orts to the pro-social activity, and (ii) as the
game is repeated, more and more e®ort is allocated towards the sel¯sh activity.
In the previous chapter the robustness of these ¯ndings is challenged by con-
ducting a ¯eld experiment, closely related to the voluntary contribution mech-
anism. In this ¯eld experiment, ¯shermen can catch up to two ¯sh in each of
the six periods. Each ¯sh not caught yields a monetary payo® of e2 to each of
the other three group members. Unlike in the lab, no cooperation is observed
in any of the six periods of the game. Fishermen catch as much ¯sh, and exert
as much e®ort in the social dilemma game as in a control treatment where no
incentives are provided to reduce the catch of ¯sh. By conducting a series of
additional laboratory and ¯eld treatments, it is ruled out that the subject pool,
the physical environment, or the fact that the medium of reward (money versus
¯sh) explains the lack of cooperation.
Following the results reported by laboratory experiments on the decline in
cooperation in social dilemmas, the literature has focused on the question how
to promote cooperation. A particular interest is shown in instruments that
are used on a peer-to-peer basis, rather than on instruments used by a formal
institution such as a government. Among the most studied instruments is peer-
to-peer punishment. In laboratory experiments, punishment is implemented as
follows: After each agent has made a decision at what level to cooperate to
the pro-social activity, all agents learn about each other's decisions. Then, they
are given the opportunity to make a costly investment to reduce the earnings
of other group members. The theoretical prediction, assuming rational agents,
is that no use of the instrument is made. Since punishment is costly, those
who punish achieve lower payo®s than those who do not. Agents prefer to
free ride on the punishment activities of others, a phenomenon called second-
order problem of free riding (Henrich and Boyd (2001)). Likewise, if the social
dilemma game is played a ¯nite number of times, backward induction causes
subjects to refrain from using costly punishment or reward. In the last period, no
use of the instrument will be made, because future behavior cannot be changed.
Anticipating that no use of the instrument is made in the last period, free riding
will prevail in the last period. In the next-to-last period, no use of the costly
instrument will be made as well, because agents will not defer from free riding
in the last period. Hence, free riding will occur in this period as well. This logic
can be extended all the way to the ¯rst period. In contrast to the theoretical
predictions, not only is costly punishment used in the laboratory on a large scale,
the instrument succeeds in promoting cooperation. Punishment has been found
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et al. (1992), and Fehr and GÄ achter (2000,2002).2
The e®ects of monetary punishment in a ¯eld setting are tested in this chap-
ter. This is done by adding a punishment stage to the FieldVCM and FieldDyna
treatments presented in Chapter 5. Studying punishment in the ¯eld setting of
Chapter 5 is interesting for two reasons. First of all, there has never been con-
ducted an experiment before that explicitly tests the e®ects of punishment in
a non-laboratory environment. Taking traditional laboratory methods to ¯eld
settings is a relatively new phenomenon, and this chapter extends the ¯eld ex-
perimental literature in a new direction. Secondly, the recreational ¯shing pond
is interesting because it is likely that ¯shermen who catch a lot of ¯sh gain
respect of fellow ¯shermen. It is possible that those who are uncooperative are
seen as `good ¯shermen', because they are able to catch a lot of ¯sh. Conse-
quentially, it could be the case that uncooperative ¯shermen do not attract a lot
of punishment. In a laboratory experiment on the Ultimatum Game, respon-
ders approve of much lower payo®s when the allocator has earned the right to
become an allocator (see Ho®man et al. (1994)). Allocators have proven to be
more skillful in a task conducted in the laboratory (scoring high on a knowledge
quiz), and the respect that they have earned with this translates into a larger
cash in°ow. A similar mechanism can uphold in the ¯eld setting under study.
The main advantage is that levels of respect come naturally, rather than that
this is created in an arti¯cial way.
Compared to the previous chapter, the setup of the FieldVCM and Field-
Dyna experiments is changed slightly. The six periods of which the FieldVCM
treatment exists, are divided into two initial periods of the baseline game, and
then four later periods of the game with punishment. A treatment of the Field-
Dyna experiments consists of three periods of 35 minutes, rather than the four
one-hour periods of the FieldDyna experiment from Chapter 5. The way in
which subjects can punish each other in FieldVCM and FieldDyna is very sim-
ilar to the way it is implemented in traditional laboratory experiments. After
each period, subjects receive information about the catch and earnings of each
fellow group member. Then, all subjects receive an endowment of e3, which
they can use to reduce the monetary earnings of other group members. Each
euro spent reduces the earnings of a group member by three euro. After each
subject has made his or her decision in private, feedback is given on the total
amount of punishment received by the other group members. Subjects are also
informed on the total punishment received by each of the group members.
2Not in all societies is punishment e®ective. Herrmann et al. (2008) show that in some
societies punishment leads to a breakdown of cooperation.176 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
Unlike the ¯ndings of traditional laboratory experiments, we ¯nd no evidence
that monetary punishment promotes cooperation. In the FieldVCM treatment,
¯shermen ¯sh with the same intensity, whether punishment opportunities are
present or not. E®ort levels are greater than those exerted in the FieldPI treat-
ment reported in Chapter 5. Any evidence of partial cooperation is absent as
well; ¯shermen always try to catch their ¯rst ¯sh, and conditional on catching
one ¯sh, they ¯sh with the same intensity to catch the second ¯sh. Likewise,
there is no evidence that monetary punishment promotes cooperation in the
FieldDyna treatment. The ¯shermen provide equal e®ort levels to catch ¯sh,
independent of the stock level remaining.
The setup of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 describes the experimental
design and experimental procedure. The procedure deserves extra attention,
because weather in°uences caused us to change the way in which we gathered
data. During one of our sessions, the weather was too warm for the ¯sh to
bite in large numbers. In another session, a sudden storm prevented us from
completing all periods. The threat of lightning caused us to abort the session
due to safety concerns for the participants. In section 6.3 the data are presented,
and section 6.4 gives some concluding remarks.
6.2 Experimental design and procedure
In this section, the experimental designs of the FieldVCMPun and FieldDyna-
Pun treatments are described.
6.2.1 Experimental design of FieldVCMPun
The experiments were conducted at the privately owned recreational ¯shing site
`de Biestse Oevers'. A detailed description of this ¯eld setting can be found in
Chapter 5. Recruitment of the participants was done two weeks in advance, by
handing out °yers at the Biestse Oevers. A maximum of sixteen participants
was allowed to take part in a session.
The FieldVCMPun session consisted of six periods of 35 minutes each. The
session was divided into two treatments, the baseline and punishment treat-
ment. In the ¯rst two periods, the baseline treatment was conducted while the
remaining four periods consisted of the punishment treatment.
In the baseline treatment, participants were placed in groups of four. Each
¯sherman was allowed to catch up to two ¯sh in each period; each ¯sh caught
had to be taken home. Once a participant caught the second ¯sh, he or she had
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For each ¯sh that a ¯sherman did not catch, the other three group members
received e2. Each participant therefore faced a tradeo®; either take home one
¯sh and experience the utility of catching it, or forego the act of ¯shing and
raise the earnings of the other group members with e6 in total. The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is that all agents catch two ¯sh in each
period. However, the social optimum requires all agents to forego their entire
catch. For a detailed discussion of the establishment of a social dilemma in this
game, see Chapter 5, section 2.2. At the start of the experiment, 16£2+6 = 38
rainbow trout were released into the pond. After each period, a new rainbow
trout was put into the pond for each ¯sh caught. This means that in every
period, the pond was stocked with 38 rainbow trout, plus the stock of ¯sh that
was already present from past days. At the end of each period, all participants
received feedback on the catch and earnings of each of the other group members.
The description of the punishment treatment is similar to the baseline treat-
ment, with the exception that participants were given the opportunity to sanc-
tion fellow group members. Subjects were placed in the same groups as in the
baseline treatment. They were given this information at the start of the pun-
ishment treatment. At the end of each of the four periods, subjects received an
endowment of e3. Subjects then received information on the individual catch
and earnings of each of the other group members. A subject could decide to
spend e1 to reduce the earnings of a fellow group member by e3. No restric-
tions were placed on how punishment could be targeted, as long as no less than
e0 and no more than e3 was spent. Each euro that a subject did not spent, was
added to his or her total earnings. In case a subject's earnings within a period
would be reduced to below e0, then the earnings of previous periods would be
reduced, including those of the baseline treatment. If a subject had negative
earnings, then the total earnings were set to e0. A subject could never have a
`debt'; future earnings were not reduced in case a subject had negative earnings
at the end of any period. For example, if a subject would have negative earnings
at the end of period 3, but earned money in period 4, then the total earnings
of that subject were equal to the earnings made in period 4. Finally, after each
subject made his or her punishment decisions, but before the new period began,
individual feedback was given on the total amount of punishment received. Sub-
jects were also informed on the catch and sum of punishment received by each
of the other group members. This kind of feedback di®ers from usual practice,
where no feedback is given on the sum of punishment received by other group
members. Note that because punishment is costly, backward induction causes
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Nash equilibrium is the same as the one of the baseline treatment.
The instructions of the baseline treatment were explained at a central place.3
All subjects were informed that they would play two periods of the baseline
treatment, after which new instructions for part 2 were explained at the central
location. After the instructions for part 1 were explained, all subjects were
requested to randomly draw a spot tag out of a black linen bag to determine their
¯shing spot for the ¯rst two periods. Before period 1 began, each participant
had to make test questions at their ¯shing spot. Only when all subjects correctly
answered all questions the experiment would continue. Test questions were also
made before the beginning of the second part of the experiment. At the end
of the second period, ¯shermen were told that their new ¯shing spot was six
places to the left of their current one. Similarly, at the end of the fourth period,
subjects were told that their new ¯shing spot was again shifted six places to
their left side.
6.2.2 Experimental design of FieldDynaPun
As an additional way to study the in°uences of monetary punishment on coop-
eration in a social dilemma, the FieldDyna treatment is considered. A complete
description of that experiment and the theoretical predictions can be found in
section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Some changes have been made in the sessions of the
FieldDynaPun treatment, which are described below.
The FieldDynaPun sessions consisted of two parts, each consisting of three
periods of 35 minutes. One part consisted of the baseline treatment, and one
part consisted of the punishment treatment. In the FieldDynaPun session,
subjects were placed in groups of four. In total, sixteen subjects participated in
a session. All participants were told with whom they were grouped by issuing
each player with colored ribbons. In the baseline treatment, a group was allowed
to catch up to eight ¯sh in the ¯rst period. Each ¯sh caught was his to keep and
yielded earnings of e3 to the one who caught it. The logistic growth function
described in section 5.4.2 was used to link catch in one period to the group
quota in the next period. Assuming rational agents, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium predicts that all eight ¯sh are caught in the ¯rst period, and that no
¯sh can be caught in the second and third period. The social optimum can be
reached if group catch is limited to four ¯sh in the ¯rst two periods, so that eight
¯sh can be caught in period 3. A score board was used so that all subjects could
see the available catch for his or her group. This score board was used so that
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subjects were not confused about the remaining stock of ¯sh; in case we ¯nd no
evidence of cooperation, then this information makes it even more convincing
that subjects act out of self interest. At the end of a period, individual feedback
was given on the following: i) the total individual earnings, ii) the total group
catch, iii) the catch and earnings of each other group members, iv) the group
quota left at the end of the previous period, v) the increase of the group quota,
and vi) the size of the resulting allowable catch for the next period. At the
beginning of the new period, a number of rainbow trout was put into the pond
equal to the number of ¯sh caught in the previous period by ¯shermen who are
active in the new period. This makes sure that the intended harvesting path of
one group does not in°uence the intended harvesting path of another group in
the same session.
The description of the punishment treatment is similar as the baseline treat-
ment, with the exception of a punishment opportunity. Punishment was imple-
mented the same way as in the FieldVCMPun treatment: After each period,
subjects received feedback on the catch and earnings of their group members
and had the opportunity to reduce their earnings. Subjects received a budget of
e3, each e1 spent reduced the earnings of a group member with e3. A subject
could never have negative earnings; in case a subject would have negative earn-
ings in a period, past earnings would be reduced. Like in the FieldVCMPun
treatment, future earnings were not reduced in order to recover from negative
earnings from past periods. The procedure in which the subjects made their
punishment decisions was very similar as in the FieldVCMPun treatment: After
each subject had made their punishment decisions, feedback was provided on
the sum of punishment received. Feedback was also provided on the catch and
sum of punishment received by each of the other group members. Since pun-
ishment is costly and the game is ¯nitely repeated, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is not changed; agents would never use punishment and all eight
¯sh are caught in the ¯rst period.
At the start of a session, subjects were requested to randomly draw a spot
tag out of a black linen bag. The spot tag indicated their ¯shing spot for
the ¯rst three periods of the session. The participants were then told that the
instructions would be given in a decentralized way, in groups of four participants
(the decentralized instructions were given to four members of di®erent groups).4
All participants were told that everyone would receive the same instructions.
Instructions for the second part were also provided in a decentralized fashion
in groups of four participants. At the end of the ¯rst part, the subjects were
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informed that their new ¯shing spot was located six ¯shing spots to the left of
their current one. Before each part began, subjects had to answer test questions.
Once all subjects had answered all test questions correctly, the session started.
6.2.3 Experimental procedure
Some extra attention is paid to the experimental procedure. One FieldVCMPun
session is carried out end of March 2010, and three sessions with the FieldDyna
setup are carried out end of March and beginning of April 2010. Due to un-
forseen weather conditions, the way we conducted the experiments deviated
form the way we planned it. In the ¯rst session, two sequences of the base-
line treatments were conducted. The second session was run with the baseline
treatment ¯rst, followed by the punishment treatment. The second treatment
of this session was terminated halfway the second period, because of a sudden
storm. Data is available for only one punishment decision, made at the end of
the ¯rst period. Finally, the third session began with the punishment treat-
ment, but this was followed by what we term the `Unconstrained' treatment.
In this treatment, subjects could ¯sh unconstrained for a period of 35 minutes.
No negative externalities could be imposed on others (except for the fact that
the stock of ¯sh is ¯nite; one ¯sh caught by one ¯sherman cannot be caught by
another within a period). Table 6.1 shows the collection of the data. The table
shows the number of groups, the order in which the treatments were carried
out, the number of periods, and the average individual earnings.
Treatment Groups Order (# Periods) Average Earnings
FieldVCMPun 4 Baseline (2) - Punishment (4) e34.13
FieldDyna 4 Baseline (3) - Baseline (3) e9
FieldDynaPun 4 Baseline (3) - Punishment (1 1
2) e12.31
FieldDynaPun 4 Punishment (3) - Unconstrained (1) e12.88
Table 6.1 Number of groups, order of treatments, and average earnings in the
FieldVCMPun and FieldDynaPun treatments.
6.3 Data analysis
In this section, the data are presented. Section 6.3.1 covers the behavior of the
¯shermen in the social dilemma stage, and the e®ect that punishment has on
cooperation. Section 6.3.2 shows how the subjects use punishment.6.3. Data analysis 181
6.3.1 Cooperation in the social dilemma stages
This section covers the development of cooperation in the two ¯eld experiments.
First, the development of play in the FieldVCMPun treatment is examined after
which the FieldDynaPun treatment is considered.
Cooperation in the FieldVCMPun experiment
As a starting point of the analysis, the catch and e®ort levels in the social
dilemma stage are presented. Figure 6.1(a) shows the sum of ¯sh caught per
group and Figure 6.1(b) shows the average e®ort levels of the four groups.5
For ease of comparison, the average e®ort level of all groups from the FieldPI
treatments (both high and low season) is included in the ¯gure as well. A
detailed description of the FieldPI treatment can be found in section 5.2.1
(a) (b)
Figure 6.1 (a) Sum of ¯sh caught per group in the FieldVCMPun session.
Periods 1-2 form the baseline treatment and periods 3-6 form the punishment
treatment. (b) Average e®ort per group in the FieldVCMPun treatment (average
of all groups from the FieldPI treatment (see Chapter 5) is also included).
Figure 6.1 shows three important things. The ¯rst observation is that the
catch of ¯sh is declining slightly after the ¯rst two periods. This decline in
catch can be interpreted as a tendency for subjects to cooperate more when
punishment is introduced. However, the e®ort levels show whether the ¯shermen
caught fewer ¯sh on purpose, or that a decline in catch is bad luck. Bad luck
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seems to be ruled out from the second observation; unlike the catch of ¯sh,
e®ort levels are relatively stable over the periods. Even when subjects can
punish each other, they try as hard in every period to catch ¯sh as without the
option of being punished.6 The ¯nal observation is that the average e®ort levels
of the FieldPI treatment are lower than those observed in the FieldVCMPun
treatment; punishment does not lead ¯shermen to be more cooperative. All
in all, punishment seems to have no e®ect on promoting cooperation. This
observation is in contrast to the results of many laboratory experiments. In
result 1, we summarize our ¯nding:
Result 1 Monetary punishment does not promote cooperation in the Field-
VCMPun treatment.
Support for result 1: The ¯rst piece of evidence comes from comparing
the e®ort levels in the baseline to those in the punishment treatment. As an
independent observation, we take the average e®ort level of a group in both
treatments. A Wilcoxon matched pairs test shows no di®erence in e®ort levels
(N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:273). The same test is repeated at the subject level, given
the limited amount of observations. We ¯nd a similar result: E®ort levels are
not signi¯cantly di®erent from the baseline and punishment treatment (N1 =
N2 = 16;p = 0:569).
When we apply the same procedure to the catch of ¯sh, we ¯nd that fewer
¯sh are caught in the punishment treatment. This is shown by a Wilcoxon
matched pairs test, taking each group as an independent observation (N1 =
N2 = 4;p = 0:066). At the individual level, this ¯nding is con¯rmed (N1 =
N2 = 16;p = 0:011). However, given that the e®ort levels are very similar in all
periods, it must be the case that the lower catch of ¯sh in later periods is due
to bad luck. For that reason, we conclude that punishment does not promote
cooperation.
Additional support for result 1 is provided by means of a regression analy-
sis, presented in Table 6.2. The dependent variable of the regression analysis
is the change in catch (column (i)) or e®ort (column (ii)) of subject i, between
period t and t+1. The main independent variable is the number of punishment
tokens received,
PN
j6= pji. Also a variable that takes into account regression to
the mean is included xi;t¡x¡i;t, this variable controls for declines in catch that
are not caused by the punishment instrument. This variable is not included for
6Note that, in general, e®ort levels show a declining trend, because ¯shermen become
physically tired of the act of ¯shing. Although this is not clearly visible from the e®ort
levels exerted in the FieldVCMPun treatment shown in Figure 6.1(b), results from Chapter 5
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the regression on e®ort, because subjects are not given feedback on the e®ort
levels of other group members. Table 6.2 shows that the impact of punish-
Dependent variable:




j6=i pji ¡0:768 ¡0:104
(0:429) (0:179)






Table 6.2 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in catch (column
(i), or a change in e®ort (column (ii)). Standard errors, group-level clustered, are
reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level.
ment is insigni¯cant, both for the catch measure and for the e®ort measure.
This provides additional evidence that punishment does not enforce subjects to
become more cooperative, unlike many results from laboratory experiments. ¥
Having shown that punishment does not promote cooperation, we will show
that there are no signs of cooperation at all. Fishermen always try to catch
two ¯sh in each period, just like we have reported in Chapter 5. We summarize
below:
Result 2 In the FieldVCMPun session, there is no evidence of cooperation,
neither in the baseline treatment, nor in the punishment treatment.
Support for result 2: The ¯rst piece of evidence comes from the obser-
vation that ¯shermen have positive levels of e®ort to catch the ¯rst ¯sh, in all
periods. When ¯shermen are exerting e®ort to catch ¯sh, they show a revealed
preference for catching a ¯sh. A series of two-sided Student t-tests, taking a
subject's average e®ort levels in a period as an independent observation, show
that the e®ort levels to catch the ¯rst ¯sh are always greater than zero. For
each of the six periods, the t-test has a p-value smaller than 0.01 (N = 16).
The second piece of evidence comes from comparing the e®ort levels in Field-
VCMPun with those observed in FieldPI. A reduction in e®ort as compared to
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are trying to catch fewer ¯sh, which might be interpreted as evidence of coop-
eration.7 A Mann-Whitney test shows that e®ort levels in the FieldVCMPun
treatment are greater than those in the FieldPI treatment. Taking each group as
an independent observation, average e®ort is greater in the ¯rst two periods of
FieldVCMPun (the baseline treatment) than in the ¯rst two periods of FieldPI
(N1 = 4;N2 = 8;p = 0:048). Similarly, average e®ort levels in periods 3-6 in
the FieldVCMPun treatment are greater than in the same periods in FieldPI
(N1 = 4;N2 = 8;p = 0:016).
The ¯nal piece of evidence is obtained by considering the e®ort levels to
catch the second ¯sh in both treatments of the FieldVCMPun session. If ¯sh-
ermen are acting partially cooperatively, then they could do this by lowering
their e®ort levels for their second ¯sh, conditional on having caught the ¯rst
¯sh. We ¯nd no such e®ect. We test this by means of a Wilcoxon matched
pairs test, taking e®ort levels for ¯shermen who have caught at least one ¯sh
in a period. The matched pair consists of the e®ort level exerted to catch the
¯rst ¯sh, and the e®ort level exerted to catch the second ¯sh. In the baseline
treatment of FieldVCMPun, average e®ort levels for the second ¯sh are even
greater than those for the ¯rst ¯sh (N1 = N2 = 27;p = 0:012). In the punish-
ment treatment, average e®ort levels for the ¯rst and second ¯sh are the same
(N1 = N2 = 48;p = 0:529). ¥
Cooperation in the FieldDynaPun experiment
Additional evidence that monetary punishment does not promote cooperation
is obtained by conducting the FieldDyna experiment. Let us begin by showing
the average stock level and e®ort levels in the FieldDynaPun treatments. Figure
6.2(a) shows the average stock levels at the end of each period in each of the
three sessions, while Figure 6.2(b) shows the corresponding average e®ort levels
in each period.
Our ¯rst aim is to establish the e®ect that punishment has on promoting
cooperation. The Baseline-Punishment session shows that the stock levels in the
baseline treatment are lower than the stock level in the punishment treatment
(note that we only have one full period as an observation in this treatment).
A similar observation can be made for the e®ort levels. The combination of
these two ¯ndings is consistent with the conclusion that punishment has a pos-
7Note that we do not compare the catch levels, since the two experiments have been
conducted over a year from each other. For this reason, we do not control for the seasonal
e®ects when considering catch. This is not a problem for e®ort, because e®ort is independent
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.2 (a) Average stock of ¯sh at the end of each period in the FieldDy-
naPun sessions. Periods 1-3 form part 1 of each treatment (either the baseline or
the punishment treatment) and periods 4-6 form part 2 of the experiment (either
the baseline, punishment or unconstrained treatment). (b) Average e®ort per
group in the FieldVCMPun treatment.
itive e®ect on promoting cooperation. However, this ¯nding can be explained
by two factors: The results of the previous analysis and those of the FieldPI
treatment of Chapter 5 show that ¯sh are less likely to bite in later periods of
the experiment. Furthermore, ¯shermen experience lower marginal bene¯ts of
the act of ¯shing, or become physically tired of the act of ¯shing, as indicated
by the steady drop in e®ort in all the sessions (including those of Chapter 5).
The Punishment-Unconstrained treatment illustrates this point; although stock
levels of ¯sh are above the social optimum in period 1 and 2, e®ort levels in the
Unconstrained treatment are on average slightly lower (but not signi¯cantly so)
than those in period 3 of the Punishment treatment. We state an intermedi-
ate result below for the Punishment-Unconstrained session, coming back to the
Baseline-Punishment session later.
Result 3 Monetary punishment does not promote cooperation in the Punishment-
Unconstrained session.
Support for result 3: If subjects intend to target catch at the social
optimum, it is to be expected that in the ¯nal period the stock is depleted,186 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
or at least has levels lower than those in periods 1 or 2.8 The ¯rst support
for our claim that monetary punishment does not promote cooperation, comes
from observing that the stock levels at the end of each period, though seemingly
to be targeted at the social optimum, are equal in all three periods. We ¯nd
no evidence that the stock level at the end of period 3 is lower than those in
periods 1 or 2, as indicated by a Wilcoxon matched pairs test. As an independent
observation, we take the end stock level of a group in period 1 and compare it
to the end stock level in period 3. The test shows that the stock levels are equal
(N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:886). A similar result is obtained when the di®erence in
end stock levels of period 2 and 3 are compared (N1 = N2 = 4;p = 1:000).
Finally, average e®ort levels in the Unconstrained treatment are slightly (but
insigni¯cantly) lower than those in any period of the punishment treatment. In
the Unconstrained treatment, ¯shermen are expected to ¯sh at their maximum
(sel¯sh) optimum. Finding e®ort levels which are slightly lower than in any
period of the Punishment treatment is suggestive that ¯shermen ¯sh at their
(sel¯sh) optimum in the Punishment treatment as well.9 A Wilcoxon matched
pairs test shows that e®ort levels are statistically signi¯cantly lower in period
1-3 as compared to the Unconstrained treatment, taking each group as an in-
dependent observation (for each test, N1 = N2 = 4 and p = 0:068). Due to the
limited number of observations, the test is repeated taking each individual e®ort
level as an independent observation. This results in an insigni¯cant di®erence
between periods 1-3 on the one hand and the unconstrained treatment on the
other (for each test, N1 = N2 = 16 and the lowest p-value is 0.179).
Additional support for result 3 is provided by a regression analysis, pre-
sented in Table 6.3. The regression analysis estimates a subject's change in
catch from one period to the next, xi;t+1 ¡ xi;t (column (i)), or the change in
8Even in the last period, a ¯sherman might fear being punished when, for example, he
catches more than his `fair' share of the ¯sh remaining. Even so, it is expected that more
¯sh are caught in total than in any of the two preceding periods in case ¯shermen are not
hindered by bad luck.
9Note that we do not have evidence that supports the view that ¯shermen ¯sh with
maximum e®orts in the punishment treatment. Data from other ¯shing sessions shows that
¯shermen become physically tired as the periods go by. It might be the case that although
¯shermen exert slightly more e®ort in the punishment treatment than in the Unconstrained
treatment, the ¯shermen could have exerted even more e®ort in the punishment treatment.
This is consistent with the view that ¯shermen are pro-social after all. However, we think
that this is unlikely; given that ¯shermen have all the incentives to catch as much as possible
in the Unconstrained treatment, it is to be expected that they ¯sh with the optimal e®ort
level (which might be at the top of their physical ¯tness). If ¯shermen could ¯sh at a much
faster pace, then it might be the case that their rods `outrun' the rainbow trout. Therefore,
although it might be possible that ¯shermen could have ¯shed with greater e®ort levels in the
punishment treatment, the fact that e®ort in the Unconstrained treatment is so similar to e®ort
in the punishment treatment suggests that they ¯shed with the optimal e®ort levels in both
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e®ort, ei;t+1 ¡ei;t (column (ii)). This analysis is similar to the one presented in
Table 6.2. Variables included are the e®ects of the total number of punishment
tokens received by the other group members,
PN
j6=i pji, and a variable that takes
into account regression to the mean for the catch measure only. In contrast to
the analysis reported in Table 6.2, a dummy variable is included for period 3.
The last period of the FieldDyna treatment is di®erent from the earlier ones,
because it is socially optimal to deplete the resource stock. However, there still
might be some e®ects of punishment received in period 2 that carry over to
period 3. Table 6.3 shows that, like the results reported in Table 6.2, there is
Dependent variable:




j6=i pji ¡0:085 0:037
(0:273) (0:056)
xi;t ¡ x¡i;t ¡0:568¤¤¤
(0:065)






Table 6.3 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in catch (column
(i)), or a change in e®ort (column (ii)). Standard errors, group level-clustered,
are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level.
no e®ect of punishment on cooperation. Fishermen do not catch less ¯sh, nor
provide smaller e®ort levels, when they have received punishment in the previ-
ous period. Like the results of the FieldVCM treatment, the variable that takes
into account regression to the mean is signi¯cantly negative. This shows that
the ¯shermen converge towards some norm of the number of ¯sh that are being
caught. ¥
The data we have for the Baseline-Punishment session are not rich enough to
give an undisputable conclusion about the e®ectiveness of punishment. Due to
a sudden storm, the session was terminated halfway during the second period
of the punishment session, leaving us with complete data on the ¯rst period
only, and some e®ort levels for the second period. However, the data that we do188 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
have for this session, do not show any evidence of punishment being e®ective.
The logic we apply is as follows: If there are no signs of cooperation, then
it must be the case that punishment is ine®ective. Absence of cooperation is
observed when ¯shermen ¯sh with the same intensity when the allowable catch
remaining (ACR) is four or lower, as they do when the ACR is ¯ve or greater.
When ¯shermen intend to cooperate by maximizing group catch, it is to be
expected that they stop ¯shing when the stock level is four. Figure 6.3 shows
that ¯shermen keep ¯shing with the same intensity, irrespective of the size of
the ACR. In the ¯gure, the average e®ort levels are reported conditional on
the stock of ¯sh for all three sessions of the FieldDyna experiments. Only the
¯rst two periods are included, because there is no social dilemma in the ¯nal
period. To be more precise, each period is divided into seven intervals of ¯ve
minutes. The ¯ve minute interval after which a group reaches a certain stock
level is included in the ¯gure.10 As can be seen, e®ort levels when the ACR is
four or lower are always greater than zero.11 As the positive e®ort levels show
when the stock level is three, the fact that a stock level of two and one is not
reached must be due to bad luck, rather than the ¯shermen not trying to reach
that stock level. We summarize our result below.
Result 4 In all FieldDynaPun experiments, we cannot ¯nd any evidence of
cooperation, neither in the baseline treatments, nor in the punishment
treatments.
Support for result 4: The ¯rst piece of evidence of absence of cooperation
is obtained by comparing the e®ort levels in period 1 and 2 of a treatment to
those of period 3 of the same treatment. If ¯shermen are acting cooperatively,
then it is expected that more e®ort is exerted in period 3 than in either period
1 or 2. In total, three baseline treatments are conducted (two in the Baseline-
Baseline session and one in the Baseline-Punishment session). This gives us
twelve observations. However, in one of the sessions a group depleted their stock
in period 2, leaving us with eleven independent observations. The observation
that is lost, provides in itself a clear example that ¯shermen are not acting
10The ¯rst ten minutes of a period are not considered, because at the start of a period,
¯shermen are more eager to ¯sh. Since all ¯shermen start with an ACR of eight, the e®ort
levels associated with this stock level are slightly biased. Including the ¯rst ten minutes of a
period in the baseline treatment causes the e®ort levels to increase from 0.62 to 0.68. In the
punishment treatment, including the ¯rst ten minutes of a period increases e®ort from 0.72
to 0.79.
11An exception contains the ACR of one and two in the punishment treatments of the
Punishment-Unconstrained session and the Baseline-Punishment session. Fishermen in the
two punishment sessions never reached those stock levels, which is why e®ort levels are missing
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Figure 6.3 Average individual e®ort conditional on the allowable catch remain-
ing (ACR) in period 1 and 2. Each 5 minute interval is an observation. The
white bars contain data from the baseline treatments of the Baseline-Baseline
and Baseline-Punishment sessions. The grey bars contain data from the pun-
ishment treatments of the Punishment-Unconstrained and Baseline-Punishment
sessions.
cooperatively. A Wilcoxon matched pairs test shows that e®ort levels in period
1 are greater than those in period 3 (N1 = N2 = 11;p = 0:005). E®ort levels
in period 2 are similar to those in period 3 (N1 = N2 = 11;p = 0:212). The
two tests show that ¯shermen ¯sh with at least the same intensity in the period
without the social dilemma as they do in the periods with a social dilemma. The
same test cannot be performed for the punishment treatment in the Baseline-
Punishment session, because the data is incomplete for the second period and
missing for the third period due to a sudden storm.
The ¯nal piece of evidence in favor of a total absence of cooperation is
obtained by considering the e®ort levels, conditional on the ACR. Table 6.4
shows a ¯xed e®ects regression analysis where the e®ects of the stock level on
e®ort are measured. Each period of 35 minutes is divided into seven intervals
of ¯ve minutes. The independent variable is the individual e®ort level, ¯ve
minutes after a certain stock level is reached. Dummy variables are included to
take account for the stock level; the benchmark is the stock level at which it
is socially optimal to catch an additional ¯sh (a stock level of ¯ve or greater).
Also included is a dummy variable for the second period, to account for between190 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
period e®ects in e®ort. Likewise, the variable Time is included to take account
of trends in e®ort within a period.
Dependent variable:
E®ort in interval s + 1
Baseline Punishment
Treatment Treatment
I(ACR = 4) 0:140¤¤ 0:129
(0:051) (0:102)
I(ACR = 3) 0:175¤ ¡0:075
(0:077) (0:049)
I(ACR = 2) 0:212 NA
(0:118)









Table 6.4 Fixed e®ects regression model to estimate the in°uence of stock level
on e®ort. Standard errors (clustered at the group level) are reported between
parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level,
¤¤: signi¯cant at the 5%-level,
¤:
signi¯cant at the 10%-level.
The regression shows that in the baseline treatment, e®ort levels are even
greater when the stock is coming close to depletion. An exception is the e®ects
of a stock level of only one ¯sh; ¯shermen then reduce their e®ort levels as com-
pared to stock levels of ¯ve or greater. However, the observations from a stock
level of one come from the only group who depleted their stock entirely before
the end. So, although the ¯shermen in that group slightly reduced their e®ort
to catch the last ¯sh remaining, they actually caught it. Therefore, even the
negative sign of e®ort cannot be interpreted as evidence in favor of cooperation.
In the punishment treatment, e®ort is una®ected by remaining stock levels;
¯shermen ¯sh with the same intensity irrespective of the stock level. The threat
of punishment does not cause the ¯shermen to start to cooperate. Unfortunately,
the data are not rich enough to observe what would have happened when the
stock levels were lower than three. ¥6.3. Data analysis 191
6.3.2 The use of punishment
In this section, the mechanism behind punishment is presented. First, the use of
punishment in the FieldVCMPun treatment is presented. Finally, punishment
in the FieldDynaPun sessions is considered.
Punishment in FieldVCMPun
As is shown in results 1 and 2, monetary punishment is not an e®ective instru-
ment to promote cooperation in our ¯eld FieldVCM experiment. To understand
this result in more detail, we analyze how the instrument is used. Figure 6.4
shows the sum of punishment used for each of the four groups. The ¯gure
Figure 6.4 Sum of group punishment used for each of the four groups in the
FieldVCMPun treatment.
shows that with an average of 0.75 tokens per period, monetary punishment
is hardly used. Moreover, the rare use of punishment is stable in any of the
periods, although in the last period only one punishment token is used in total.
The pattern of punishment found in the FieldVCMPun treatment is in sharp
contrast to earlier laboratory results on punishment, where punishment is high
in early periods and declines over time (see for example GÄ urerk et al. (2004),
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), Nikiforakis (2008), Rand et al. (2009)). Group
1 never used the punishment instrument at all, while the sum of punishment
tokens used in the other groups never exceeds three in a given period. A closer192 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
look at the data shows that out of the 4 periods £ 4 subjects £ 4 groups = 64
punishment decisions, only in ¯ve of those cases a subject directed punishment
to one or more group members. Furthermore, out of the 64 £ 3 = 192 punish-
ment tokens that could have been used, only 12 tokens (6.25%) are used. As a
result, we state the following:
Result 5 In the FieldVCMPun treatment, monetary punishment is used rarely
by the subjects. There is no upward or downward trend in the use of
monetary punishment.
Support for result 5: The trend in time is considered by comparing the
sum of punishment in period 1 with period 4 of the punishment treatment. As
an independent observation, we take the sum of punishment used at the group
level. A Wilcoxon matched pairs test shows no signi¯cant di®erence between the
two periods (N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:285). Repeating the analysis at the individual
level, the same result is obtained (N1 = N2 = 16;p = 0:285). ¥
Finally, we present some further insights into how punishment is used in
the FieldVCMPun treatment. One would expect that punishment is mainly
targeted at those who cause the largest negative externalities, the mechanism of
punishment found in many laboratory experiments. In our ¯eld experiment, it
is hard to ¯nd evidence for an unambiguous mechanism, because the instrument
is used so rarely. Out of the ¯ve punishment decisions that are made in total,
four came from di®erent subjects, and only one subject used punishment in two
periods. In three of the instances in which a subject punished, all three tokens
were evenly divided among all group members. These instances of punishment
seem rather arbitrary, given that in two of those instances the targeted group
member did not have an equal catch. Combined with the big catch and e®ort
levels presented in the previous section, it seems that acts of punishment bear no
relation to the observed behavior in the social dilemma stage.12 This conclusion
is reported in result 6:
Result 6 Monetary punishment is not correlated with catch of the recipient in
the FieldVCMPun treatment.
12Punishment received in one period might also have a relation with punishment sent in
the next period. Those who have received a lot of punishment might `retaliate' by using much
punishment in the next period. We ¯nd that the sum of punishment received in period t, and
the sum sent in period t + 1 has no signi¯cant correlation. This is evident from a Pearson
correlation coe±cient, with an insigni¯cant value of ¡0:130, taking the sum each subject's
punishment decisions per period as an observation (N = 48;p = 0:379).6.3. Data analysis 193
Support for result 6: A Hurdle regression or Tobit regression is not fea-
sible, given the low number of punishment decisions. Therefore, we present the
Pearson's correlation coe±cient. A unit of observation consists of the catch of a
subject, summed over the four periods in the punishment treatment. Linked to
the catch measure is a punishment measure; punishment received by the same
subject, summed over the four periods. The Pearson's correlation coe±cient
has a value of 0.274, but is statistically insigni¯cant (N = 16;p = 0:304). ¥
Punishment in FieldDynaPun
Even though monetary punishment is not an e®ective instrument to promote
cooperation in the dynamic ¯eld experiment, it is still interesting to observe
how the instrument is used. Figure 6.5 shows the use of the instruments
over the three periods in the Baseline-Punishment session and the Punishment-
Unconstrained session. Two observations can be made from Figure 6.5. Firstly,
Figure 6.5 Average sum of punishment used per group in the Baseline-
Punishment session and the Punishment-Unconstrained session. Data for period
2 and 3 is missing for the Baseline-Punishment session.
monetary punishment is used more often in the FieldDynaPun treatments than
in the FieldVCMPun treatment. Out of the 32 subjects that participated in
one of the two FieldDynaPun treatments, 12 subjects used punishment, a rate
which is double than that in FieldVCMPun. In total, like in FieldVCMPun, 64
punishment decisions were made in FieldDynaPun, of which 14 times a subject194 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
sent more than zero tokens to a group member. These 14 punishment decisions
yielded a total of 34 punishment tokens to be used, which is almost three times
as much as in FieldVCMPun. Furthermore, punishment seems to be stable over
the three periods in the Punishment-Unconstrained session. Punishment is as
high in period 1 as it is in period 2 or 3. In result 7, we summarize our ¯ndings:
Result 7 In the FieldDynaPun experiments, monetary punishment is rarely
used by the subjects. There is no upward or downward trend in the use
of monetary punishment in the Punishment-Unconstrained session.
Support for result 7: The trend over time is considered by comparing
the sum of punishment in period 1 with period 3, which is only possible for
the Punishment-Unconstrained session. A Wilcoxon matched pairs test, taking
the sum of punishment used at the group level, shows no signi¯cant di®erence
between the two periods (N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:713). Because of the low number
of observations, the analysis is repeated at the individual level, which has the
same result (N1 = N2 = 16;p = 0:713). ¥
As a ¯nal part of the analysis, we consider the mechanism of monetary pun-
ishment in the FieldDynaPun treatment. Also in the FieldDynaPun treatment,
it is expected that those who catch most ¯sh are punished because they cause
the largest negative externalities onto others. However, like in the FieldVCM-
Pun treatment, punishment is used rarely, making it hard to uncover a clear
mechanism of punishment.
In the FieldVCMPun treatment, three out of the ¯ve times that punish-
ment was used, it was divided equally among all group members. The data for
FieldDynaPun show that this is the case in ¯ve out of fourteen cases. Although
this is half of the amounts observed in FieldVCMPun, still a large amount of
punishment in FieldDynaPun seems to be targeted rather arbitrary; ten of the
victims of equal punishment caught zero ¯sh. All in all, we cannot ¯nd evidence
in favor of a correlation between catch and punishment, as is observed in many
laboratory experiments.13 We summarize our last ¯nding below:
Result 8 Monetary punishment is not correlated with catch of the recipient in
the FieldDynaPun treatment.
Support for result 8: The ¯rst piece of evidence is obtained by estimat-
ing the correlation between catch of ¯sh and sum of punishment received. In
13The sum of punishment received in period t, and the sum sent in period t + 1 also bear
no signi¯cant correlation in the FieldDynaPun treatment. This is supported by the Pearson
correlation coe±cient, which has an insigni¯cant value of 0:013, taking the sum each subject's
punishment decisions per period as an observation (N = 32;p = 0:945).6.3. Data analysis 195
the Baseline-Punishment session, we are limited to catch and punishment re-
ceived in one period only. We sum the catch and punishment tokens received
over the three periods in the Punishment-Unconstrained session. The Pearson's
correlation coe±cient has an insigni¯cant value of 0.067 (N = 32;p = 0:716).
The second piece of evidence is obtained by estimating a Hurdle regression
model and a Tobit model. The dependent variable is the number of punishment
tokens sent by subject i to subject j in period t. As independent variables, we
use the absolute di®erence in catch between subject i and j, and the absolute
di®erence in catch between subject j and the group average catch (without
taking subject j into account). Finally, a period variable is added to take
the trend of punishment into account. Data for both punishment sessions are
pooled, and the results are reported in Table 6.5. The Hurdle model is presented
in columns (i) and (ii), while the Tobit model is presented in column (iii).
Dependent variable:




maxf0;ci ¡ cjg 0:020 ¡0:003 0:165
(0:031) (0:017) (0:230)
maxf0;cj ¡ cig 0:068 0:030 0:643
(0:111) (0:055) (0:879)
maxf0;cj ¡ c¡jg ¡0:082 ¡0:016 ¡0:758
(0:125) (0:074) (0:993)
maxf0;c¡j ¡ cjg ¡0:136 ¡0:260¤¤¤ ¡1:382¤
(0:091) (0:072) (0:821)




N 192 29 192
Table 6.5 Hurdle model (columns (i)-(ii)) to estimate the determinants of pun-
ishment. The punishment decision is estimated using a Probit speci¯cation. The
punishment level is estimated using truncated linear regression. Tobit model
(column (iii)) to estimate the determinants of punishment. Marginal e®ects are
reported in the columns for punishment decision. Standard errors (clustered at
the group level) are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-
level,
¤: signi¯cant at the 10%-level.
The regression results show that when subjects decide whether or not to
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ni¯cant. This means that when subjects decide to punish a group member, the
di®erence in catch does not matter. However, conditional on sending punish-
ment tokens, subjects who catch less than the group average receive less punish-
ment tokens (column (ii)). Some intuition behind punishment seems to be used
after all, a result found in the estimates of the Tobit model as well. However,
we still conclude that no widely used mechanism is underlying the punishment
instrument, because the economic signi¯cance of the parameter value is of lit-
tle meaning. The maximum di®erence in catch between the group average and
subject j is found to be 2.67 ¯sh, which translates into withholding less than
three fourths of a token. The estimates of the Tobit model show that slightly
less than half a token is withheld if this would occur. ¥
6.4 Conclusion
The results of this chapter con¯rm the ¯ndings reported in Chapter 5; no evi-
dence of cooperative behavior is found in the FieldVCM treatment or FieldDyna
treatment. In the FieldVCM treatment, subjects show no signs of cooperation.
The main evidence for this claim is provided by looking at the e®ort levels ex-
erted, as measured by the amount of times a ¯sherman casts his ¯shing rod. In
the FieldVCM treatment, subjects try as hard to catch the ¯rst ¯sh, as they
do to catch the second ¯sh. Results of the FieldDyna treatment are similar,
¯shermen try as hard to catch an additional ¯sh, independent of the allowable
catch remaining.
When providing subjects with the opportunity to punish group members,
then no increase in cooperation is observed, neither in the FieldVCM treat-
ment, nor in the FieldDyna treatment. The current chapter shows that when
punishment is in the form of a monetary reduction of earnings, then ¯shermen
do not behave di®erently than when punishment opportunities are absent. Our
results are in contrast to what has been reported in many laboratory exper-
iments on punishment. Experiments conducted in the laboratory show that
punishment often leads to an increase in cooperation. This holds for monetary
punishment, as well as non-monetary punishment (for monetary punishment,
see Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and GÄ achter (2000, 2002), for
non-monetary punishment, see Masclet et al. (2003)).
The use of monetary punishment is rare in the FieldVCMPun treatment.
Moreover, there seems to be no clear correlation between the degree a group
member is anti-social and the degree of punishment assigned to him or her. As
a motive to punish, it seems implausible that subjects believe they can change6.4. Conclusion 197
the behavior of fellow group members. A more plausible motivation seems to be
that subjects simply want to take revenge; it makes them feel good to punish a
free-riding group member. Taking revenge on free-riding group members might
give joy, as is reported on studies that measure brain activity (see de Quervain
et al. (2004) and Fehr and Camerer (2007)). The results reported in the current
chapter are consistent with that view; it might be the case that the rare events
of punishment observed in the FieldVCM treatment are born out of frustration,
and that venting this frustration derives joy for the punisher. Of course, this
argument applies to the FieldDyna treatment as well.
However, given the low frequency of punishment (especially in the Field-
VCM treatment) and the absence of a correlation with the catch of ¯sh (in
both the FieldVCMPun and FieldDynaPun treatments), di®erent explanations
are also possible. One explanation is the following: The fact that so few sub-
jects sanction fellow group members suggests that subject do not derive any
joy of punishment. Rather, the data seem to be more consistent with the view
that subjects are averse to use punishment; they might not like the idea that
someone is able to reduce one's earnings. Alternatively, the subjects might
not like the idea of reducing someone else's monetary earnings. This intuition
seems strange given the observation that no cooperation is observed in the social
dilemma. One would expect that if ¯shermen do not like to reduce earnings of
fellow group members, then much more cooperation should have been observed.
However, there are important di®erences between reducing someone's earnings
due to catching ¯sh or due to punishment. Perhaps the most important dif-
ference between the two is that in the social dilemma stage potential earnings
are reduced, while in the sanctioning stage actual earnings are reduced. The
aversion to reduce someone's actual earnings might be a feature of the speci¯c
subject pool we have. It could be the case that more punishment is used if the
same ¯eld experiment is played with, for example, students.
Another explanation for the low use of the punishment instrument might
be that ¯shermen are averse to punish group members who caught many ¯sh,
because such group members are good ¯shermen. When deciding to punish
someone, it might be considered unfair to punish good ¯shermen, because they
deserve to catch a lot. Results from laboratory experiments on, for example,
the Ultimatum Game show that when the allocator has earned the right to be
an allocator, then the responder approves of much lower rates than would be
the case if this right is not earned (Ho®man et al. (1994)).
The results reported in this chapter suggest that relying on monetary pun-
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harmful. Perhaps an interplay with other factors, such as communication, or a
well established group norm might be necessary in order for punishment to be
e®ective in non-lab settings. In the next chapter, a di®erent kind of punishment
is considered; punishment which reduces someone's ¯shing time.6.A. Appendix 199
6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Statistical analysis of the e®ect of e®ort on catch
In this appendix, we show the statistical relationship between our e®ort measure
and catch of ¯sh. We use an Ordered Probit model to estimate the e®ects of
e®ort on catch, presented in Table 6.6. The dependent variable is the amount
of ¯sh caught by an individual. As an independent variable we use our measure
of e®ort, the ratio of casts per minute. Furthermore, we include quadrant ¯xed
e®ects; dummy variables which take into account the e®ects of the ¯shing spot
at the pond. Table 6.6 contains pooled data for the FieldVCMPun session and
FieldDynaPun sessions.
The model shows that e®ort has a positive and signi¯cant in°uence on the
number of ¯sh caught by an individual. The quadrant ¯xed e®ects are all in-
signi¯cant, indicating that the spot at which an individual ¯shes has no in°uence
on the number of ¯sh caught.
Dependent variable:
Number of ¯sh caught in a period
E®ort 1:076¤¤¤
(0:283)
Quadrant Fixed E®ects Yes
N 332
pseudo-R2 0:0308
Table 6.6 Ordered Probit estimation on the relationship between individual
e®ort and individual catch. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are
reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level.200 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
6.A.2 Instructions for the FieldVCMPun treatment
This appendix contains a translation of the FieldVCMPun treatment. Part (a)
and (b) is the text of the instructions read aloud at of the baseline treatment,
of which part (b) is handed out to the participants. Part (c) is the summary of
the rules of the punishment treatment.
(a) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter
Word of welcome
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The study
In the next four hours, we ask you to ¯sh according to the following rules. First,
all rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, etc.
(b) Summary of the baseline treatment rules
Group formation
² You are placed in groups of 4 persons.
² The groups will remain the same throughout the entire session.6.A. Appendix 201
² We do not tell you who belongs to your group and you are not allowed to
exchange information with other participants.
Timing
² The session lasts ¯ve hours, from around 10.00 a.m. until around 15.00.
² If we begin later, we will stop later.
² The session is divided into two parts, part 1 and part 2.
² Part 1 takes 70 minutes and is divided into two periods of 35 minutes.
² When part 1 is ¯nished, we will give instructions for par 2.
Stocking the pond
² In the ¯rst period, we will put (16 £ 2) + 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the
pond.
² You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch.
² We make sure that an equal number of rainbow trout is in the pond at
the beginning of each period. We do this by putting in a new rainbow
trout at the beginning of a new period for each ¯sh that is caught in the
previous period.
² In each period of 35 minutes, you are allowed to catch at most 2 ¯sh. If
you catch a salmon trout, it also counts as one ¯sh.
² If you (decide to) catch less than two ¯sh, we give money to the other
three participants of your group.
² If you catch fewer ¯sh than the two you can catch maximally, we divide
6 euro equally among the other 3 participants in your group for each ¯sh
you did not catch.
² Hence, for each ¯sh you do not catch (or decide not to catch), each of the
other 3 participants in your group receives 2 euro. This means that:
{ If you catch 2 ¯shes, the other 3 participants in your group do not
receive any money.
{ If you catch 1 ¯sh, each of the other 3 participants in your group
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{ If you catch 0 ¯shes, each of the other 3 participants in your group
receives 4 euros.
² This holds for all participants. This means that you will receive 2 euro for
each ¯sh that is left in the pond by the other participants in your group.
In each period
² The number of rainbow trout put into the pond is equal to the number of
¯sh caught in the previous period.
² You are not allowed to talk with the other participants.
² At the end of each period, you receive information on how much money
you have earned. We also tell you how many ¯sh each of the other group
members has caught, and how much money he or she has earned.
² The information on catch and earnings of other group members is always
presented in a random order. This means that you cannot link the catch
and earnings of one group member in one period to the catch and earnings
of that same group member in another period.
In period 1
² Your ¯shing spot in part 1 is determined by participants picking a num-
bered spot tag from a black linen bag.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about its results.
Test questions
We will now have a short test. When all participants have correctly answered
all questions, the study will begin.
1. With how many other participants are you placed in a group?
2. How many euros do you receive, due to your own activities, when you
catch one ¯sh in a period?6.A. Appendix 203
3. Suppose the following situation has occurred:
² You catch 2 ¯sh
² The other members of your group each catch 1 ¯sh
{ How many euros do you receive?
{ How many euros do each of the other group members receive?
(c) Summary of the punishment treatment rules
Timing
² Part 2 consists of 4 periods of 35 minutes.
Group formation
² You are placed in a group with 4 persons.
² Your group members are the same as those in part 1.
² We do not tell you who belongs to your group and you are not allowed to
exchange information with other participants.
The rules of part 1 are in place in part 2 as well
New rules in part 2
² The main di®erence with part 1 is that in part 2 you can indicate from
which participants you want to reduce earnings.
² You can instruct us to reduce the earnings of one or more other group
members with e3, or more.
² If you instruct us to reduce the earnings of another group member with
e3, then this costs you e1.
² In each period you receive a budget of e3 that you can use to reduce
the earnings of another group member. You can reduce the earnings of
another group member with maximally e9. However, you can also reduce
the earnings of each the other three group members with e3.
² You do not have to instruct us to reduce the earnings of other group
members. If you decide not to reduce the earnings of other group members,
the budget of e3 is added to your total earnings.204 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
² The total amount of money that is reduced from a group member can
never be bigger than the total earnings of that individual up to that period
(including the earnings of part 1).
² At the end of each period we inform you about the number of ¯sh each of
the other three group members have caught, and their individual earnings.
Then we ask you how many of the e3 you would like to spend to reduce
the earnings of one or more group members, and if so, with how much you
want the earnings to be reduced.
² At the beginning of the next period we inform you about all decisions of
your other group members, and we tell you how much money each of the
other group members have earned.
² Note that the information presented to you is always in a random order.
² An example:
{ Suppose that a group member has caught 2 ¯sh and that his earnings
in that period are e10. If you decide to reduce the earnings of that
group member with e6, then this costs you e2 of your budget.
¤ The one whose earnings you have lowered then has earnings equal
to: 2 ¯sh plus e10 { e6 = e4.
¤ You then have e1 left in your budget. If you do not choose to
reduce the earnings of another group member, this euro is added
to your total earnings.
{ Suppose another group member has caught 1 ¯sh and his earnings in
that period are e2. If you decide to spend e1 for this group member,
then his earnings in this period are e2 { e3 = {e1. In that case, the
total earnings of that group member up to that period will be lowered
with e1. In case those earnings are e0, then they will remain e0.
In period 3 and 5 of part 2
² We will tell you where you will ¯sh in period 3. In period 4 you have to
¯sh at the same spot. In period 5 we will tell you at which new spot you
will ¯sh. This is the same spot as period 6.6.A. Appendix 205
6.A.3 Instructions for the FieldDynaPun treatment
This appendix contains a translation of the FieldDynaPun treatment. Part (a)
is the text of the instructions read aloud at the beginning of the session. Part
(b) is the text that is handed out to the participants. Part (c) is the text of the
instructions read aloud at the beginning of part 2. Part (d) is the text that is
handed out to the participants.
(a) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter for part 1
Word of welcome
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The study
In the next four hours, we ask you to ¯sh according to the following rules. First,
all rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, etc.
Group formation
You are placed in a group of 4 participants. The group remains the same during
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in your group have the same color ribbon as you have. You are not allowed to
talk with other participants. This rule is so important that we exclude you of
the study if you do not abide by this rule.
Timing
The study consists of two parts, part 1 and part 2. Part 1 takes about two
hours, until about 12.00 hours.
Earnings from ¯shing
You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch. In addition you earn e3 for
each ¯sh you catch. During the study, rainbow trout and Salmon trout count
both as one ¯sh.
Number of periods in part 1
The ¯rst part consists of three periods of a half hour each.
Stocking the pond
In the ¯rst period we put 38 rainbow trout into the pond.
Total available ¯sh for your group
You are not allowed to catch as much ¯sh as possible. In each period, you and
your group members are not allowed to catch more ¯sh than is available for
your group. In the ¯rst period, there are 8 ¯sh available for your group. Each
participant is allowed to catch as much ¯sh as possible, but the total catch in
your group can not be more than 8 ¯sh in the ¯rst period.
The amount of ¯sh available for your group does not depend on the amount
of ¯sh caught by other participants at the pond. The amount of ¯sh available
for your group in a period only depends on the amount of ¯sh that was present
for your group at the end of the previous period. And this amount depends
on the amounts available in all previous periods. How this exactly works is
presented in the following table:
If, due to catch in the previous period and the periods before that, on a
given moment no ¯sh are available for your group (in other words, if at any6.A. Appendix 207
Number of ¯sh left at the end Increase in the number Number of ¯sh available
of the previous period of ¯sh available to your group










9 2 ¯sh subtracted 7
given time a 0 appears on the score board), then you and your group members
have to stop ¯shing immediately. In the second column of the table you see that
no extra ¯sh are available for your group, and you are required to wait until the
start of the second part of the study.
If at the end of a period 1 ¯sh is available for your group (in other words,
if the score board indicates a 1 at the end of a period), then the amount of ¯sh
that your group is allowed to catch in the next period is raised by 2. Hence,
there are 3 ¯sh available for your group in the next period.
If at the end of the previous period 4 ¯sh are available for your group, then
the amount of ¯sh available for your group in the next period is raised by 4 ¯sh.
This means that your group can catch 8 ¯sh in the next period.
If at the end of a period 6 ¯sh are available for your group, then the amount
of ¯sh available for your group in the next period is raised by 3 ¯sh. This means
that your group can catch 9 ¯sh in the next period.
How to read the table
Suppose that at any given moment there are 8 ¯sh available for your group. If
you and your group members catch 1 ¯sh in total in that period, then the total
available catch in the next period raises with 2. If you and your group members
catch 2 ¯sh in total in that period, then the total available catch in the next
period raises with 3.
Fishing spot
You will draw a spot tag out of a black linen bag. Before the study begins, you
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spot. We want to stress again that it is very important that you do not talk
with other participants. This is so important that we will exclude you from the
study if you do not abide by this rule.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about its results.
We will now have a short test. When all participants have correctly answered
all questions, the study will begin.
(b) Summary of the instructions for part 1
Group formation
² You are placed in groups of 4, recognizable by the colored ribbons.
² You are not allowed to talk during the study.
Timing
² The study takes place from around 8.00 until 12.00 hours.
² The ¯rst part consists of 3 periods of 30 minutes each.
Earnings
² You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch.
² You receive e3 for each ¯sh you catch.
Total available ¯sh for your group
² Each period you and your group members are allowed to catch what is
available for your group (as indicated on the score board).
² In the ¯rst period, there are 8 ¯sh available for your group.
² The available ¯sh for your group ONLY depends on the decisions made
in your group.6.A. Appendix 209
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Test questions
1. What is the maximum amount of ¯sh that your group is allowed to catch
in period 1?
2. If your group catches 3 ¯sh in the ¯rst period, how many ¯sh are available
for your group in the next period?
3. If your group catches 4 ¯sh in the ¯rst period, how many ¯sh are available
for your group in the next period?
4. If your group catches 5 ¯sh in the ¯rst period, how many ¯sh are available
for your group in the next period?
5. If your group catches 8 ¯sh in the ¯rst period, how many ¯sh are available
for your group in the next period?
(c) Instructions read aloud by the experimenter for part 2
Group formation
You are placed in groups of 4 participants. The group remains the same during
part 2 of the study. The group members of part 1 are the same as those in part
2. You keep your colored ribbon. We urge you not to communicate with other
participants. This is so important that we exclude you from the study if you do
not abide by this rule.210 Chapter 6. Monetary Punishment in the Field
Timing
Part 2 takes two hours, until about 14.00 hours.
Earnings
You are allowed to take home each ¯sh you catch. In addition you receive e3
for each ¯sh you catch. During the study, both rainbow trout and Salmon trout
count as one ¯sh.
Number of periods in part 2
The second part consist of three periods of 30 minutes each, like in part 1.
Available ¯sh for your group
Like in part 1, in part 2 you are not allowed to catch more than the total
available ¯sh for your group. This is indicated on the score board. The total
available ¯sh for your group in the next period depends on the total available
¯sh at the end of the previous period, as indicated on the score board. Changes
as compared to part 1:
² The main di®erence with part 1 is that in part 2 you can indicate from
which participants you want to reduce earnings.
² You can instruct us to reduce the earnings of one or more other group
members with e3, or more.
² If you instruct us to reduce the earnings of another group member with
e3, then this costs you e1.
² In each period you receive a budget of e3 that you can use to reduce
the earnings of another group member. You can reduce the earnings of
another group member with maximally e9. However, you can also reduce
the earnings of each the other three group members with e3.
² You do not have to instruct us to reduce the earnings of other group
members. If you decide not to reduce the earnings of other group members,
the budget of e3 is added to your total earnings.6.A. Appendix 211
² The total amount of money that is reduced from a group member can
never be bigger than the total earnings of that individual up to that period
(including the earnings of part 1).
² At the end of each period we inform you about the number of ¯sh each of
the other three group members have caught, and their individual earnings.
Then we ask you how many of the e3 you would like to spend to reduce
the earnings of one or more group members, and if so, with how much you
want the earnings to be reduced.
² At the beginning of the next period we inform you about all decisions of
your other group members, and we tell you how much money each of the
other group members have earned.
² Note that the information presented to you is always in a random order.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding the session, you can ask them now, but also
during the session. We do not answer questions about how to act in this study
| all decisions you take are yours. We also do not answer questions about the
purpose of this study. When we have analyzed the data, we will inform you
about its results.
We will now have a short test. When all participants have correctly answered
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(d) Summary of the instructions for part 2
Timing
² Part 2 consists of 3 periods of 30 minutes.
Group formation
² Your group in part 2 is the same as your group in part 2.
The rules of part 1 are in place in part 2 as well
New rules in part 2
² You can instruct us to reduce the earnings of one or more other group
members with e3, or more.
² If you instruct us to reduce the earnings of another group member with
e3, then this costs you e1.
² In each period you receive a budget of e3 that you can use to reduce
the earnings of another group member. You can reduce the earnings of
another group member with maximally e9. However, you can also reduce
the earnings of each the other three group members with e3.
² You do not have to instruct us to reduce the earnings of other group
members. If you decide not to reduce the earnings of other group members,
the budget of e3 is added to your total earnings.
In period 3 of part 2
² We will tell you where to ¯sh in the next period. You will ¯sh at the same
spot in the remainder of this study.
Test questions
We will now have a short test. When all participants have correctly answered
all questions, the study will begin.
1. How big is your budget that you receive at the end of each period to reduce
the earnings of other group members?
2. Are the following statements correct or false?
² When I spend all of my budget, I can reduce the earnings of each
other group member with e3. C / F6.A. Appendix 213
² When I spend all of my budget, I can reduce the earnings of maxi-
mally 1 other participant with e9. C /F
² I do not need to spend my entire budget; the budget is then added
to my total earnings. C / FChapter 7
Non-Monetary Punishment
and Rewards in the Field1
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, it is shown that monetary punishment does not lead subjects to
become more cooperative as compared to the FieldVCM treatment. Fishermen
catch similar amounts of ¯sh, and ¯sh with similar intensity in the FieldVCM
treatment as they do in FieldPI. Having monetary punishment as a device to
enforce cooperation has no e®ect in that setup. As an additional experiment,
a dynamic social dilemma experiment is conducted, termed FieldDyna. In this
experiment, overharvesting by a group in one period leads to a considerable
loss in the stock of ¯sh in future periods. We ¯nd no evidence of cooperation;
¯shermen ¯sh with maximum intensity, independent of the possibility to punish.
In the search for instruments that promote cooperation, the literature on
laboratory experiments has focussed on rewards as well (for example see Chap-
ters 3 and 4 of this thesis). The success of rewards depends crucially on the
cost-bene¯t ratio. When rewards merely represent a one-to-one transfer of one
agent to the other, it has no e®ect on cooperation (see Sefton et al. (2007),
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), and Sutter et al. (2010)). Matters change
when the costs for the sender are lower than the bene¯ts of the receiver (see
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), Rand et al. (2009), and Sutter et al. (2010)).
Real life examples of such so called net-positive rewards can be found when two
agents help each other in knowledge intensive tasks. It costs little e®ort for an
1I would like to thank Ben and Shirley Willems for use of their ¯shing facility, and Paul
Lude~ na Delgado, Joris Hoendervangers, Stef van Kessel, and Menusch Khadjavi for excellent
research assistance.
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expert to ¯x someone's boat, but the payo® to the recipient are likely be greater
than the e®ort exerted by the expert.
In the current chapter, the e®ects of punishment are reconsidered, taking
the e®ects of rewards into account as well. One important di®erence between
punishment used in the ¯eld setting of Chapter 6 and punishment in the lab,
is the payo® medium. In the lab, punishment is usually monetary in nature
while money is also the payo® medium in the social dilemma stage. In the
¯eld experiments reported in Chapter 5 and 6, money is the medium in which
punishment is used, like in the lab, but the payo® media in the social dilemma
stage are ¯sh and ¯shing time. In the current chapter, both the earnings from the
social dilemma game and the medium of punishment or rewards are the same;
¯shing time. The setup of such a social dilemma game has two advantages.
Firstly, the results of this chapter provide a robustness check on the results of
the voluntary contribution mechanism, presented in Chapter 5. A self-serving
bias which subjects might use to convince themselves that others do not value
money as much, is very unlikely to hold in the setup of this chapter. If an
absence of cooperation is found in a similar way as in the FieldVCM treatment,
than that provides further evidence of a poor external validity of the laboratory
VCM game. Secondly, it might be the case that a di®erence in the payo® media
causes punishment to have no e®ects on cooperation. Perhaps punishment or
rewards might only promote cooperation when the payo® medium is similar to
the payo® medium in the social dilemma stage. Therefore, the results of this
chapter serve as a robustness check on the results of Chapter 6. Note that any
motives of not punishing skillful ¯shermen seems unlikely in the setup of this
chapter, while such motives might have played a role in Chapter 6. Fishermen
might think it is fair that good ¯shermen earn more money. However, it is hard
to see why ¯shermen would approve of any behavior of good ¯shermen that
reduces the ¯shing time of others. Good ¯shermen have nothing to lose by the
presence of less skilled ¯shermen.
The setup of the social dilemma experiment, termed the baseline game, is as
follows. The baseline game is divided into two parts, and ¯shermen are placed
into groups of four. In the second part, ¯shermen can ¯sh unconstrained for
up to 150 minutes and earn a monetary bonus of e2 per ¯sh caught. The
¯rst part is divided into three periods of thirty minutes each in which each
¯sherman is allowed to catch up to two ¯sh. A ¯sherman is allowed to keep
each ¯sh that is caught, but for each ¯sh caught, ten minutes of ¯shing time
in part 2 are subtracted from each of the other three group members. In two
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baseline game. At the end of each period in part 1, ¯shermen receive feedback
on the catch of each of the group members. Then, the ¯shermen have the
opportunity to reduce their own ¯shing time in part 2 by up to three times
¯ve minutes; each interval of ¯ve minutes spent reduces the ¯shing time in part
2 of a group member with ¯fteen minutes in the punishment treatment. In
the reward treatment, a ¯sherman can spend ¯ve minutes of his own time to
increase ¯shing time of a group member by ¯fteen minutes. Based on previous
laboratory experiments, it has been shown that transfer rewards have no e®ects
on cooperation. Therefore, in order to give rewards a fair chance to establish
cooperation, a net-positive nature of the instrument is considered.
In contrast to results reported from laboratory experiments, we do not ¯nd
evidence that punishment or rewards promotes cooperation. Fishermen ¯sh with
the same intensity in the baseline treatment as they do in either the punishment
or the reward treatment. Moreover, in the baseline treatment there are no
signs of partially cooperative behavior in any of the three periods. Unlike in
the lab, the subjects in our ¯eld experiment hardly make use of punishment
opportunities. In the rare cases where punishment is used, it is targeted at
those who catch most ¯sh. Rewards are used more often than punishment, and
in a di®erent way. Rather than sending rewards to the group member with the
lowest catch, in many instances, subjects divide their rewards equally among all
group members.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 7.2, the
setting in which the ¯eld experiment is described, as well as the experimental
design and procedure. Section 7.3 presents the data analysis, and section 7.4
concludes.
7.2 The setting, experimental design and exper-
imental procedure
This section covers the experimental design and procedure of the baseline, pun-
ishment and reward treatments. Special attention is given to the measurement
of cooperation, but ¯rst the setting of the ¯eld experiment is described.
7.2.1 The setting of the ¯eld experiment
The ¯eld experiment is conducted at a privately owned recreational ¯shing fa-
cility `De Biestse Oevers'.2 The ¯shing site consists of three ponds which are all
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roughly ¯fty meters long and thirty meters in width. Each pond has room for
twenty ¯shermen, ten of those spots are located at the east side and ten on the
west side. The fee that is charged at the Biestse Oevers is either e12.50 or e15.
For e12.50, four rainbow trout are put into the pond while for e15, two rainbow
trout and one salmon trout are set out. A ¯sherman is then allowed to catch as
many ¯sh as possible, but no compensation is provided in case a ¯sherman does
not catch the ¯sh that are released on his behalf. There are strict rules when it
comes to catching ¯sh. For example, it is prohibited to use more than one rod
at the same time, no scoop net can be used to catch ¯sh, and each ¯sh caught
has to be taken away from the pond (presumably home). Because ¯shermen
take away the ¯sh they catch, they are all experienced with imposing negative
externalities on other ¯shermen; each ¯sh caught by one ¯sherman cannot be
caught by another. Depending on the season, a ¯sherman can either ¯sh four
hours (from April to October) or ¯ve hours (from November to March).
7.2.2 The design of the Baseline treatment
In the baseline treatment, participants are placed in groups of four. Group
composition is ¯xed throughout the entire experiment, but no participant is
informed about the identity of his or her group members. A session of the
baseline treatment consists of two parts: part 1 and part 2. Part 1 consists
of three periods of thirty minutes, while part 2 is consists of one period which
takes 150 minutes maximally. However, the duration in which a ¯sherman can
¯sh in part 2 depends on what happens in his group in part 1.
Let us begin by explaining the rules of part 2. A ¯sherman can ¯sh uncon-
strained in part 2, and each ¯sh caught is his to keep and additionally yields
a bonus of e2. After each half hour in part 2, the number of ¯sh caught by
¯shermen who are allowed to ¯sh in the next half hour is replenished. This
rule is intended to keep the ratio of ¯sh per ¯sherman constant. The spot at
which a ¯sherman ¯shes in part 1 and part 2 is determined by a lottery; each
participant has to draw a spot tag out of a black bag.
At the beginning of part 1, two ¯sh per participant are put into the pond,
plus an additional six to increase the probability of catching ¯sh. In each of
the three periods of thirty minutes, each ¯sherman is allowed to catch up to
two ¯sh. When the second ¯sh is caught, the ¯sherman has to wait until the
start of the next period. All ¯sh caught can be kept, but no monetary bonus is
attached to catching ¯sh in part 1. At the end of each period, each ¯sherman is
informed on the total number of ¯sh caught by each individual group member.
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a ¯sherman cannot link the catch of one ¯sherman from one period to another.
At the start of each subsequent period, the stock of ¯sh is replenished. This
means that at the start of each period in a given session an equal number of
rainbow trout is present in the pond.
The social dilemma is introduced by the following rule: Each ¯sh that a
¯sherman catches in part 1 reduces the amount of time in part 2 for each of
the other three group members by ten minutes. Assuming that a ¯sherman has
monotonically increasing preferences over ¯shing time and money, ¯shing the
full time in part 2, rather than ¯shing fully in part 1, makes each ¯sherman
better o® for the following reasons: (i) the duration of part 2 is an hour longer
than part 1, (ii) in part 2 each ¯sherman can ¯sh unconstrained in terms of
the number of ¯sh he is allowed to catch, and (iii), in part 2 each ¯sh yields a
monetary bonus of e2 which is absent in part 1.
One important observation is that for a group to fully reap the bene¯ts of
¯shing in part 2, it is required that all group members give up ¯shing in part
1. However, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for each ¯sherman
is not to give up ¯shing, but to ¯sh at full force in each period of part 1; for
each individual ¯sherman there are no negative e®ects associated with catching
¯sh, only other group members are harmed. To make sure that part 2 domi-
nates part 1 even when the costs of waiting are included, we have conducted
a questionnaire. On a day in which no experiment was conducted, we asked
21 ¯shermen which of the following two options they preferred. Option 1 was
to ¯sh for ninety minutes and be allowed to catch six ¯sh. Option 2 was to
wait for ninety minutes and then to ¯sh for 150 minutes unconstrained. In case
a ¯sherman indicated to prefer option 1, we repeated the question, but then
indicating that e0.50 is earned per ¯sh caught in option 2. This procedure was
repeated until a ¯sherman indicated to prefer option 2 over option 1. Out of
21 ¯shermen, 14 indicated that they preferred option 2 over option 1 even if no
money could be earned in option 2. Two ¯shermen indicated that they never
preferred to wait for ninety minutes, they always preferred option 1 over option
2. The remaining ¯ve ¯shermen preferred option 2, but only if compensated
well enough; the ¯sherman with the highest willingness to accept demanded a
price of e1.50 per ¯sh caught in part 2. For nineteen out of 21 ¯shermen this
means that our parametrization indeed causes the social optimum to require all
¯shermen not to ¯sh in part 1. Therefore, we are con¯dent to claim that the
tradeo® in our experiment resembles a social dilemma. In Appendix 7.A.2 we
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7.2.3 The design of the Punishment and Reward treat-
ment
The rules described for the baseline treatment are e®ective in both the punish-
ment and reward treatment. However, in the punishment and reward treatment
subjects are given an opportunity to directly reciprocate the behavior of group
members. At the end of each period in part 1, subjects receive information
about the catch of each of the other group members. The order in which this
information is provided is randomized over the periods, as is the case in the
baseline treatment. Then, subjects can choose to reduce the length of their own
¯shing time in part 2 by up to three intervals of ¯ve minutes. Each interval of
¯ve minutes spent, reduces the ¯shing time in part 2 of a designated group mem-
ber by ¯fteen minutes in the punishment treatment. In the reward treatment,
each interval of ¯ve minutes spent, increases the ¯shing time in part 2 of a group
member by ¯fteen minutes. Subjects can choose how to allocate the intervals of
¯ve minutes, as long as no less than zero and no more than three intervals are
used. If a subject has no time left in part 2, then neither the punishment nor
the reward instrument can be used. After each subject has made his decision,
feedback is given on: (i) the total number of ¯ve minute intervals the other three
group members have directed towards the subject, (ii) the total amount of time
available in part 2 as a result of the decisions of the group members, (iii) the
total number of ¯ve minute intervals directed towards each of the other group
members. No information is provided on the total length of ¯shing time each
of the other group members has left. This is done in order to let reward and
punishment decisions be based on the actions of group members in the previous
period only, and also to prevent retaliation taking place.
For each subject and in all treatments, the total length of part 2 cannot be
smaller than zero minutes or greater than 150 minutes. This poses a problem in
the reward treatment, since it is possible that subjects end up with more than
150 minutes of ¯shing time. For that reason, we have told the subjects in the
reward treatment that they receive coupons in case the 150 minutes are binding.
The coupons can be used at De Biestse Oevers at any date of choice in order to
reduce the entrance fee that is normally charged. Because it is impossible for
us to track when the ¯shermen would use these coupons, we could not pay e2
for every ¯sh they caught. To make up for this loss, we gave a coupon worth of
e3 for every thirty minutes in excess of the 150 minutes of ¯shing time in part
2. This is equivalent to a compensation of two minutes ¯shing time on another
day for every one minute a ¯sherman has in excess of 150 minutes.
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Length of each period 30 minutes
Maximum catch per period 2
Earnings per ¯sh caught e0
Reduction others in part 2 per ¯sh caught 10 minutes
Part 2
Maximum length 150 minutes
Maximum catch no maximum
Earnings per ¯sh caught e2
Punishment/Reward
Costs to punish/reward 5 minutes
Impact of punishment/reward 15 minutes
Maximum amount to punish/reward per period 3 £ 5 minutes
Table 7.1 Experimental parametrization. Part 1 and Part 2 are e®ective for the
baseline, punishment and reward treatment.
7.2.4 Measurement of cooperation
As compared to traditional laboratory experiments, measuring cooperation in
our ¯eld setting comes with some di±culties. Ideally, the number of ¯sh not
caught re°ects the level of cooperation within a group. The problem with this
approach is that catching ¯sh is subject to external in°uences such as weather
conditions and ¯shing skills of the ¯shermen, as well as on the degree of co-
operation. Therefore, interpreting the absolute catch of ¯sh as a measure of
cooperation in the baseline treatment is misleading; it is unclear whether a ¯sh
not caught is due to cooperativeness of the subjects or simply bad luck. The
catch of ¯sh in the punishment or reward treatment compared to the baseline
treatment does provide a direct measure of the e®ectiveness of the instruments.


















it is the total catch in period t of group j in either the
Punishment or Reward treatment, and
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period t of all groups in the baseline treatment. A value of C equal to 0 would
indicate zero cooperation, and a positive level would indicate the presence of
cooperation in the punishment or reward treatments.
Our second measure of cooperativeness is to consider the input process of
catching ¯sh: ¯shing e®ort. Rainbow trout is a predator ¯sh that actively pur-
sues bait. Therefore, a ¯sherman can increase his catch by constantly casting
bait and reeling it back in. The movement of the bait naturally attracts the
¯sh and the more the bait moves, the bigger the probability of catching ¯sh.
Two experimenters continuously gathered information on the e®ort levels of the
sixteen ¯shermen. One experimenter monitored eight ¯shermen at the east side
of the pond while the other experimenter monitored eight ¯shermen at the west
side. Measuring e®ort rather than output has three advantages in our exper-
iment. The ¯rst advantage is that a ¯sherman can consciously `work harder'
by casting his bait at a faster pace. In appendix 7.A.1 we show that there is
a positive correlation between e®ort and catch; the more a ¯sherman casts his
rod, the more ¯sh are caught. The second advantage is that, unlike catching
¯sh, casting bait is independent of weather in°uences, with the exception of
extreme weather conditions such as a heavy storm. Finally, the most important
advantage is that casting bait provides an unambiguous measure of cooperation.
Whereas a ¯sh not caught might be interpreted as cooperation or bad luck, not
casting bait cannot be interpreted di®erently than evidence in favor of coop-
eration. To measure cooperation, we report the number of times a ¯sherman
casts his bait per minute in each of the treatments. In case an absolute level
of casts per minute greater than zero is found in the baseline treatment, this
is interpreted as evidence against cooperation. The comparison of e®ort levels
in the punishment and reward treatment relative to the baseline treatment give
insights in how e®ective the instruments are in promoting cooperation. We will
use the same measure of cooperation presented in equation (7.1) for the e®ort
levels, using average casts per minute rather than catch of ¯sh, and term this
the E®ort measure of cooperation.
7.2.5 Experimental procedure
The experiments have all been conducted in April and May of 2010. Recruitment
was done two weeks in advance by handing out °yers at the site. The °yer
informed interested ¯shermen of the possibility to take part in an experiment
of Tilburg University, and a registration list was available at the canteen of the
Biestse Oevers. A maximum of sixteen participants was allowed to take part in
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Upon arrival of the pond, all sixteen participants in each session were given
a word of welcome after which ¯shing spots were randomly assigned for part 1
of the experiment. The ¯shermen were collectively told that instructions would
be given at the ¯shing spot in groups of four, and that all participants received
the same information. It was stressed that the group in which the instructions
were explained need not be the group members once the experiment began; any
of the other ¯fteen participants are equally likely to be group members. We
have chosen to provide information in a decentralized way in order to prevent
attempts of ¯shermen to communicate strategies in using punishment or reward.
We are con¯dent that we have succeeded in our approach, since all ¯shermen
abided by the rules not to communicate.
The information provided to the ¯shermen was mediated through a lap-
top. After each period, the experiment brie°y stopped and two experimenters
told each ¯shermen the relevant information. In the punishment and reward
treatments the experimenters went by twice, once to gather the punishment or
reward decisions of the ¯shermen and once to give feedback on the decisions
made by the other group members.
In Table 7.2 we provide a summary of the three treatments. The table reports
the number of groups per treatment and the main feature of the treatment. In
the analysis that follows, each group is taken as an independent observation.
Treatment Groups Main feature
Baseline 12 Cooperation in the absence of instruments
Punishment 8 E®ectiveness of punishment on cooperation
Reward 8 E®ectiveness of rewards on cooperation
Table 7.2 Number of groups and main feature for the baseline, punishment and
reward treatments.
7.3 Data analysis
In this section, the data are presented. Section 7.3.1 shows the development of
play in the social dilemma stage, while section 7.3.2 shows how the reward and
punishment instruments are used.
7.3.1 The social dilemma stage
In many laboratory experiments, it is shown that punishment or reward oppor-
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stage. If such e®ects carry over to our ¯eld setting, we would expect a clear
di®erence in catch and e®ort between the baseline treatment on the one hand,
and the reward and punishment treatments on the other. Figure 7.1 shows that
this is not the case, neither for the amount of ¯sh caught (panel a), nor for the
e®ort exerted (panel b).
(a) (b)
Figure 7.1 (a) Average sum of ¯sh caught per period in the baseline, punish-
ment, and reward treatment. (b) Average e®ort per group in the three treat-
ments. E®ort is reported at ¯ve minute intervals within each period.
From Figure 7.1 we can make two important observations. The ¯rst is that
the absolute levels of catch and e®ort in the baseline, punishment and reward
treatments are very similar over the three periods. The second observation is
that there is a decline in the number of ¯sh caught, as well as in the level of
e®ort, as the periods go by. This decline in catch and e®ort is similar in all
treatments, which implies that neither punishment nor reward has any e®ect
on cooperation relative to the baseline treatment. This observation is in stark
contrast to results of many experiments conducted in the lab. We summarize
our ¯nding below:
Result 1 Average catch and e®ort is the same in the ¯rst three periods in
all three treatments. Neither punishment, nor rewards cause an overall
increase in cooperation.
Support for result 1: Support for result 1 is given by a series of Mann-
Whitney tests. As an independent observation, we use the average catch or e®ort
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catch in the baseline treatment (N1 = 12;N2 = 8;p = 0:473). Likewise, there
is no signi¯cant di®erence between catch in the baseline and reward treatment
(N1 = 12;N2 = 8;p = 0:427). As the former tests suggest, we cannot ¯nd a
signi¯cant di®erence in catch between the punishment and reward treatment
either (N1 = 8;N2 = 8;p = 0:195).
With regards to the e®ort levels, there is no signi¯cant di®erence between the
punishment and baseline treatment (N1 = 12;N2 = 8;p = 0:521), nor between
the reward and baseline treatment (N1 = 12;N2 = 8;p = 0:851). Finally,
there is no di®erence in e®ort between the punishment and reward treatment
(N1 = 8;N2 = 8;p = 0:798).
Additional support for result 1 is given by means of a regression analysis,
provided in Table 7.3. The dependent variable is subject i's change in catch
xi;t+1 ¡xi;t (columns (i) and (iii)), or change in e®ort ei;t+1 ¡ei;t (columns (ii)
and (iv)) from period t to period t + 1. The independent variables are the sum
of punishment or rewards received by subject i,
PN
j6=i pji. In case of catch, the
variable xi;t ¡ x¡i;t is included. This variable takes into account the e®ects of
regression to the mean, independent of the punishment or reward instrument.
Note that all subjects are given information on each group member's catch,
but not on each group member's e®ort. Therefore, the regression to the mean
variable is not included for the case of e®ort. Table 7.3 shows that neither
Dependent variable:
xi;t+1 ¡ xi;t ((i) and (iii)), ei;t+1 ¡ ei;t ((ii) and (iv))
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Punishment Reward
PN
j6=i pji 0:358¤¤¤ 0:038 0:128¤¤ 0:024
(0:071) (0:021) (0:061) (0:044)
xi;t ¡ x¡i;t ¡0:67¤¤¤ ¡0:355¤¤¤
(0:157) (0:077)
Constant ¡0:216¤ ¡0:064¤¤¤ ¡0:235¤¤ ¡0:051
(0:108) (0:013) (0:1) (0:051)
N 64 64 64 64
R2 0.3797 0.0396 0.2685 0.0114
Table 7.3 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in catch (columns
(i) and (iii), or a change in e®ort (columns (ii) and (iv))). Standard errors,
clustered at the group level, are reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at
the 1%-level,
¤¤: signi¯cant at the 5%-level.
punishment, nor rewards cause subjects to catch less ¯sh, or exert less e®ort in
the next period. Moreover, the signs of the punishment and reward coe±cients226 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
are opposite of what is expected; the more punishment or rewards a subject
receives, the more ¯sh he catches in the next period. The enforcing in°uence
that punishment or rewards show to have in many laboratory experiments are
not found in our ¯eld setting. Regression to the mean is only found when catch
is considered. This shows that there is some conformity in the number of ¯sh
that group members catch. The variable does not tell whether the conformity
is towards cooperative levels, or uncooperative levels. ¥
We present further insights into the declining trend in catch and e®ort in
the treatments. Visual inspection suggests that the decline in catch and e®ort
is similar over the treatments, although it seems that the decline is more pro-
nounced in the baseline treatment. As we will show below, and summarize in
result 2, the decline of catch and e®ort is indeed smaller in the punishment and
reward treatment than in the baseline treatment. This again con¯rms our ¯nd-
ing that neither punishment nor reward has any positive e®ect on promoting
cooperation.
Result 2 The decline in catch and e®ort levels over the periods in the punish-
ment and reward treatments is not greater than in the baseline treatment.
Support for result 2: Support for result 2 is given by performing a series of
Wilcoxon matched pairs tests with the Catch and E®ort measure of cooperation,
as stated in section 7.2.4. The trend in catch is computed by matching period
1 with period 3 of the same group in the punishment or reward treatment.
As a benchmark of cooperation, we take the average catch in period 1 of all
twelve groups in the baseline treatment and the average catch of those groups
in period 3. This decline in catch provides the trend of cooperation in absence
of the enforcement instruments. A matched pair in the punishment treatment
is created by subtracting group k's catch in period 1 from the average catch
in period 1 of the twelve groups in the baseline treatment. To complete the
matched pair, the catch of group k in period 3 is subtracted from the average
catch in period 3 of the twelve groups in the baseline treatment. A similar
procedure is used for the reward treatment, giving us eight observations in
both treatments. In the punishment treatment, we ¯nd a marginally signi¯cant
di®erence in the decline in catch over time; the decline in catch is slightly less
in the punishment treatment than in the baseline treatment (N1 = N2 = 8;p =
0:092). In the reward treatment we ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence using our catch
measure of e®ort (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:118).
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we do ¯nd a signi¯cant di®erence in trends. Compared to the baseline treat-
ment, the decline in e®ort is less pronounced in both the punishment treatment
(N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:046) and the reward treatment (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:036).
Since the decline in e®ort levels is smaller in the punishment and reward treat-
ment, we conclude that both enforcement instruments do not lead the ¯shermen
to become more cooperative over time, on average. ¥
Let us elaborate some more on the declining trend observed in all treatments.
Two explanations are consistent with the observed decline of e®ort. The ¯rst
explanation is that ¯shermen might experience decreasing marginal bene¯ts of
¯shing, or that they become physically tired from the act of ¯shing. It might
be the case that the ¯shermen always ¯sh at full force in all of the periods,
but that they cannot keep up the levels of e®ort provided in the early stages
of the experiment. Such a view would leave no room for any cooperation in
any period in any of the treatments. In Chapter 5, it is shown that ¯shermen
¯sh with the same intensity in the social dilemma as they do in the Private
Incentives treatment. This is a treatment without a social dilemma, intended
to provide ¯shermen with maximum incentives to catch ¯sh. The reduction
in e®ort reported in that treatment is consistent with ¯shermen experiencing
declining marginal bene¯ts of ¯shing, or becoming physically tired. The second
explanation for a decline in e®ort over the periods is a desire of subjects to
partially cooperate, irrespective of whether or not punishment or reward oppor-
tunities are present. Partial cooperation can occur in a number of ways, two
of which are: i) subjects ¯sh with maximum e®ort in the early periods, and
withhold ¯shing in later periods, ii) subjects ¯sh with maximum e®ort in all
periods to catch the ¯rst ¯sh, but provide no e®ort to catch the second ¯sh.
We focus on e®ort levels only, rather than catch levels, since e®ort provides an
unambiguous measure of cooperation. If at any time a ¯sherman has his rod in
the water, then this cannot be interpreted di®erently than a revealed preference
to catch an additional ¯sh. As stated in the following result, we cannot ¯nd
evidence of partial cooperation in any of the treatments:
Result 3 There is no partial cooperation in any of the periods. This holds for
the baseline, the punishment and the reward treatment.
Support for result 3: Let us start the support for result 3 by considering
the e®ort levels of the subjects to catch the ¯rst ¯sh. A two-sided Student t-test,
taking each individual e®ort level in a period as an observation, shows that the
e®ort levels to catch the ¯rst ¯sh are always greater than zero in all periods. This228 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
holds for the baseline treatment (N = 48;pt=1 = pt=2 = pt=3 < 0:01, where
pt=x is the p-value of the Student t-test in period x 2 f1;2;3g). Similarly, e®ort
levels to catch the ¯rst ¯sh are always greater than zero in the punishment
treatment (N = 32;pt=1 = pt=2 = pt=3 < 0:01) and the reward treatment
(N = 32;pt=1 = pt=2 = pt=3 < 0:01).
The second piece of evidence is obtained by comparing e®ort levels to catch
the ¯rst ¯sh to e®ort levels to catch the second ¯sh. Fishermen might be par-
tially cooperative by taking their rod out of the pond once the ¯rst ¯sh has
been caught. However, a series of Wilcoxon matched pair tests shows that this
is not the case; e®ort levels remain the same. As an independent observation,
we use the e®ort level of a ¯sherman in a period in which he has caught at least
one ¯sh. The matched pair consists of the e®ort level to catch the ¯rst ¯sh,
and the e®ort level to catch the second ¯sh. In the baseline treatment, e®ort
levels for the ¯rst ¯sh are similar to those to catch the second ¯sh in period
1 (N1 = N2 = 24;p = 0:768), in period 2 (N1 = N2 = 15;p = 0:198), and in
period 3 (N1 = N2 = 9;p = 0:401). Likewise, in the punishment treatment
e®ort levels to catch the second ¯sh are equal to those to catch the ¯rst ¯sh in
period 1 (N1 = N2 = 9;p = 0:594), period 2 (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 1:000) and
period 3 (N1 = N2 = 7;p = 0:310). The same holds for the reward treatment
where e®ort levels to catch the second ¯sh are similar to those to catch the ¯rst
¯sh in period 1 (N1 = N2 = 10;p = 0:575), period 2 (N1 = N2 = 4;p = 0:273)
and period 3 (N1 = N2 = 6;p = 0:345). ¥
Finally, we present some evidence in favor of the explanation that ¯shermen
become physically tired of catching ¯sh. We do so by considering the e®ort
levels observed in part 2 of the experiment. It is expected that if ¯shermen
become tired, then they should exert less e®ort over time, even in part 2. Note
that in part 2 of the experiment, ¯shermen are expected to ¯sh at their maxi-
mum ability, because they can ¯sh unconstrained and they earn money for each
¯sh caught. The evidence presented below is also consistent with the ¯sher-
men experiencing a decline in marginal bene¯ts of ¯shing. It is impossible to
disentangle the tiredness explanation from the declining marginal bene¯ts ex-
planation. However, ¯shermen who show to have higher marginal bene¯ts of
¯shing in part 1 by ¯shing at faster pace, show that they have no regard for
others. Note that if ¯shermen exert more e®ort in part 2 than in period 3 of part
1, then the decline in e®ort in part 1 is consistent with an increasing willingness
to cooperate after all. We ¯nd no such e®ect, and summarize our ¯nding in
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Result 4 Fishermen exert less e®ort in part 2 of the experiment than in part
1 of the experiment.
Support for result 4: Support for result 4 is given by a Wilcoxon matched
pairs test, taking as an independent observation the average group e®ort levels
in period 3 of part 1 and the average group e®ort levels in part 2. E®ort levels
in period 3 of part 1 are greater in the baseline treatment (N1 = N2 = 12;p =
0:002), the punishment treatment (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:024), and in the reward
treatment (N1 = N2 = 12;p = 0:018). ¥
7.3.2 The use of the instruments
As we have shown, neither punishment nor rewards have any positive e®ects
on promoting cooperation. This stands in sharp contrast to the e®ects usually
reported in the lab. In order to gain insights into why this might be the case,
it is important to take a look at how punishment and reward is used. Figure
7.2 shows the average number of ¯ve minute intervals used per group over the
three periods in the punishment and reward treatment. The ¯rst observation
Figure 7.2 Average sum of ¯ve minute intervals used per group in the punish-
ment or reward treatment.
that can be made, is that rewards are used more often than punishment. This
¯nding is in line with ¯ndings from laboratory experiments on punishment and
reward. For example, Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008) and Rand et al. (2009)230 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
show that rewards are used more frequently than punishment. We summarize
this ¯nding in result 5:
Result 5 Rewards are used more often than punishment.
Support for result 5: Support for result 5 is given by a Mann-Whitney
test, taking the sum of tokens used per group over the three periods as an in-
dependent observation (N1 = 8;N2 = 8;p = 0:065). ¥
Another observation that follows from Figure 7.2, is that punishment and
reward are relatively constant over the three periods. In the lab, punishment
is typically used in early periods of the game, and decreases over time (see
for example GÄ urerk et al. (2004), Denant-Boemont et al. (2007), Nikiforakis
(2008), Rand et al. (2009)). The threat of punishment usually causes subjects
to behave cooperatively, and therefore its use diminishes over the periods. In
our ¯eld experiment, we do not ¯nd such an e®ect; punishment is used rarely
and subjects remain sel¯sh in all periods. Therefore, the threatening e®ects of
punishment observed in many laboratory experiments do not play a role in our
¯eld setting. When it comes to rewards in the lab, usually the level of reward
is increasing over the periods (see for example Chapter 3, Vyrastekova and van
Soest (2008), and Rand et al. (2009)). Although rewards are used in our ¯eld
experiment as well, the data do not suggest that subjects use more rewards as
the periods go by. There is no evidence of either an increasing or decreasing
trend in the use of the instrument.
Result 6 Punishment and reward assignment does not follow an upward or
downward trend.
Support for result 6: Support for result 6 is given by a Wilcoxon matched
pairs test. The pairs consist of the sum of ¯ve minute intervals in period 1 of
a treatment and the sum of ¯ve minute intervals used in period 3 of the same
treatment. We take each group as an independent observation. In the base-
line treatment, groups use punishment equally often in period 1 as in period 3
(N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:593). Similarly, in the reward treatment, there is no trend
over time (N1 = N2 = 8;p = 0:599). ¥
Many studies of punishment or reward in the laboratory show that the use of
the instruments is based on reciprocity; those who free-ride are punished while
those who cooperate are rewarded. Using a Hurdle regression analysis (columns
i-iv) and a Tobit regression analysis (columns v-vi), we ¯nd moderate support for7.3. Data analysis 231
this mechanism. In the Hurdle model, we ¯rst estimate the decision that subject
i uses the instrument. Then, conditional on using the instrument, the level of
the decision is estimated. Two variables are included that take into account
the individual di®erences in catch between the two subjects. Additionally, two
variables are included that take into account how subject j di®ers from subject
i. Finally, a variable is taken into account that measures the trend of use of the
instruments over the periods. Table 7.4 shows the results.
Dependent variable:
# ¯ve minute intervals subject i sends to j
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Punishment Punishment Reward Reward Punishment Reward
Decision Level Decision Level Treatment Treatment
maxf0;ci ¡ cjg 0:079¤¤ ¡0:542 ¡0:178¤¤¤ 0:001 3:336¤¤¤ ¡0:645¤¤
(0:039) (0:531) (0:065) (0:058) (1:191) (0:326)
maxf0;cj ¡ cig 0:015 0:891¤ 0:213 ¡0:006 0:869 0:768
(0:024) (0:535) (0:204) (0:058) (1:090) (0:778)
maxf0;cj ¡ c¡jg 0:042 ¡1:416¤¤¤ ¡0:172 0:115 1:601 ¡0:555
(0:039) (0:211) (0:198) (0:087) (1:400) (0:737)
maxf0;c¡j ¡ cjg ¡0:157¤¤ 0:105 0:331¤¤ 0:202¤¤¤ ¡7:060¤¤¤ 1:283¤
(0:075) (0:881) (0:140) (0:076) (2:521) (0:661)
Period ¡0:011 0:379¤¤¤ 0:006 ¡0:005 ¡0:372 0:028
(0:008) (0:076) (0:044) (0:038) (0:366) (0:138)
Constant 1:255¤¤¤ 0:961¤¤¤ ¡4:263¤¤¤ ¡0:872¤
(0:378) (0:078) (1:485) (0:486)
N 288 24 288 87 288 288
Table 7.4 Hurdle model (columns i-iv) to estimate the determinants of pun-
ishment and reward. The punishment and reward decision is estimated using a
Probit speci¯cation. The punishment and reward level is estimated using trun-
cated linear regression. Tobit model (columns v-vi) to estimate the determinants
of punishment and reward. Marginal e®ects are reported in the columns for pun-
ishment and reward decision. Standard errors (clustered at the group level) are
reported between parentheses.
¤¤¤: signi¯cant at the 1%-level,
¤¤: signi¯cant at
the 5%-level,
¤: signi¯cant at the 10%-level.
The results show that subjects who catch less than the group average, receive
less punishment tokens and more reward tokens. But, given that a subject who
catches less does receive punishment, those punishment tokens are likely to be
sent by group members who caught much ¯sh. Likewise, given that a subject
who catches less ¯sh than the group average, rewards are not given by those
group members who caught a lot of ¯sh. It should be noted that although
the regression analysis shows that some variables have a statistically signi¯cant
impact, the magnitudes of the coe±cients are such that the economic signi¯cance
is low. For example, when a subject has caught two ¯sh more than the group
average, then there is only a 31.4% chance that he receives punishment.232 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
Another way in which subjects can display reciprocal behavior, is by pro-
viding rewards in the next period, when they are given rewards in the current
period. Similarly, subjects might be inclined to make more use of the punish-
ment instrument once they ¯nd out that they have been punished in the previous
period. A Pearson correlation coe±cient shows evidence of reciprocal behavior
in case of rewards, but not in case of punishment. The Pearson correlation coef-
¯cient has a value of 0.309 in the reward treatment, taking each decision of each
subject as an observation (N = 64;p = 0:013). In the punishment treatment,
this value is 0.019 and insigni¯cant (N = 64;p = 0:879). Note that the use of
rewards suggests a similar mechanism as the one presented in Chapter 3. A
positive correlation between rewards received now, and rewards sent in the next
period, suggests that subjects would like to exchange rewards with other group
members, rather than focussing on the group social dilemma.
Let us elaborate further on the di®erent use of punishment or reward. In
Table 7.5, a breakdown of two interpretations of the mechanism of punishment
and reward is given. In the ¯rst row of the punishment and reward block,
the table shows the fraction of subjects who spend at least one of their ¯ve
minute intervals. The second row presents the fraction of subjects who use the
instrument in a way that resembles reciprocity; by sending most punishment to
those group members who catch most, or by sending most rewards to those group
members who catch least. In the last row of each block, the table shows the
fraction of subjects who divide their tokens equally among their group members,
conditional on making use of reward or punishment.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Punishment
% Subjects who spend more than zero intervals 22 28 16
% Subjects who spend most intervals on those who catch most ¯sh 86 89 100
% Subjects who divide intervals equally, conditional on spending 0 11 0
Reward
% Subjects who spend more than zero intervals 44 41 38
% Subjects who spend most intervals to those who catch fewest ¯sh 36 23 42
% Subjects who divide tokes equally, conditional on spending 36 69 33
Table 7.5 Mechanisms of punishment and reward in more detail.
As the table shows, almost all of the instances of punishment are reciprocally;
punishment is directed to those group members who catch the most ¯sh. This
is in line with the regression results reported in Table 7.4. In only one period,
a ¯sherman decided to punish all three group members equally (while all group
members caught zero ¯sh). Although a considerable amount of rewards are
based on reciprocal motives, many rewards are divided equally. This suggests7.4. Conclusion 233
that subjects use rewards as an investment, hoping that fellow group members
will reward them in return. In Chapters 3 and 4 on rewards it is shown that
some subjects follow such a strategy. However, it is hard how to provide clean
evidence for this claim, because in the total eighteen times a subject divided
rewards equally, in ten of those instances all group members caught zero ¯sh.
It might be the case that the decision to divide the rewards equally is based on
reciprocal motives. A clear distinction between either a reciprocal use, or an
`equal division' use is cumbersome in those cases, because the data are consistent
with both views.
7.4 Conclusion
The results report no evidence at all of cooperation in a social dilemma experi-
ment conducted in a ¯eld setting. Fishermen played a game in which catching
¯sh imposes a negative externality on three other ¯shermen. In a treatment that
allowed subjects to punish, no improvement of cooperation was found as com-
pared to the baseline setting. A similar result holds for a treatment that allows
subjects to reward each other. Our ¯ndings are in line with those of Chapter
6, but in contrast to a vast amount of literature using laboratory experiments
that test those instruments in social dilemmas.
We ¯nd no evidence of partial cooperation; ¯shermen try to as hard as
they can to catch as much ¯sh as they can, in early periods as well as in later
periods. This ¯nding is in line with the results from chapter 5 and 6, but in
contrast to the classical results from the lab, where in early periods cooperation
is positive. The main evidence for this claim is provided by measuring the
e®ort levels of the ¯shermen to catch ¯sh. E®ort is measured as the total
number of times a ¯sherman casts his rod in the water. At no time in part
1 do any of the participants stop ¯shing. Besides the absence of cooperation
in the baseline treatment, we cannot ¯nd any evidence that punishment or
reward has a positive e®ect on cooperation; ¯shermen catch as much ¯sh, and
exert as much e®ort in the punishment or reward treatments as in the baseline
treatment. Additionally, we ¯nd that punishment is rarely used, in contrast
to many laboratory experiments. Rewards on the other hand are used slightly
more, but many subjects refrain from using it in any of the three periods.
The mechanism of both punishment and reward observed in many labora-
tory experiments is mainly characterized by two features. First, punishment is
used by cooperators, directed at free riders, while rewards are used by cooper-
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punishment is targeted to him or her. A similar ¯nding is present in the case
of rewards; the more an agent cooperates, the more reward tokens are received.
The mechanism of punishment that is used in our ¯eld experiment has a similar
mechanism as reported in the lab; those who catch most ¯sh attract the most
punishment. In our ¯eld experiment, rewards are used more often than punish-
ment, but there is no signi¯cant correlation between catch of ¯sh and attraction
of rewards.
The results of this chapter, and the previous one, are important in a num-
ber of ways. The ¯rst is that the vast body of laboratory experiments have
in°uenced theorists to give a theoretical basis for the ¯nding that using pun-
ishment or reward promotes cooperation. Examples of theoretical work show
that punishment strategies can be evolutionarily stable in social dilemmas with
small groups (Boyd and Richerson (1992)), in large groups with inter-group
migration (Henrich and Boyd (2001)), and in social dilemmas with uncertain
futures (Sethi and Somanathan (1996) and Gintis (2000)). In the non-lab set-
ting presented in this and the previous chapter, there is no evidence at all of
cooperation when allowing for punishment or reward. This shows that there
are settings in which the external validity of laboratory results of punishment
or reward is low. Doubting the degree in which laboratory results carry over to
the ¯eld environments makes the grounds on which the theoretical models are
built shaky.
A second way in which the results of this and the previous chapter con-
tribute to the literature is by considering why subjects use punishment or re-
wards. Given that punishment and reward are used, it remains a puzzle why it
is used. By means of theoretical models, two di®erent motivations are distin-
guished, mainly targeted at explaining the use of punishment. The ¯rst reason
why agents might use punishment is to eliminate payo® di®erences between free
riders and cooperators. An aversion against payo® di®erences might stem from
inequality aversion, as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000) and Fowler et al. (2005). Another reason why payo® di®erences
might matter, comes from the notion that if cooperation should have any chance
of surviving as a strategy, then it has to be the case that payo® di®erences with
free riders are completely gone. Punishment is hence performed in order to
achieve greater pro¯ts in future interactions (see for example van Lange (1999),
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Price et al. (2002)). In this line of reasoning,
the outcome of play in a social dilemma is more important than the intentions
to free ride. The second reason why punishment and rewards might be used,
has to do with the intentions of free riding, and is called `strong reciprocity';7.4. Conclusion 235
punishment is used to communicate that one does not approve of the unfair
intentions others have to deviate from the social norm (see for example Gintis
(2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) and Gintis et al. (2003)). With this argu-
ment, the intentions are more important than the ¯nal outcome observed in the
social dilemma.
The underlying assumption why agents punish or reward, is that there are
some `hard wired' preferences to use the instruments (Price et al. (2002)). Us-
ing punishment or reward could give agents some utility. This holds regardless
of the argument that punishment or reward is used to mitigate payo® di®er-
ences, or that it is used to enforce future cooperation. Only recently, evidence
that humans do enjoy the act of punishment has come from neuroeconomics
(for an overview, see for example Fehr and Camerer (2007)). Using a positron
emission tomography camera, the activity in the brain of a human subject can
be analyzed. de Quervain et al. (2004) show that when subjects punish de-
fectors in a trust game, the dorsal striatum is activated, the part of the brain
that processes rewards when goal directed actions are achieved. The authors
¯nd that the greater the punishment given, the more the brain activates the
dorsal striatum. Singer et al. (2006) show that when free riders in a sequential
Prisoner's Dilemma game are punished with electric shocks, male subjects show
activation in the left ventral stratum. This part of the brain is also linked with
reward processing.
The results of this chapter and the previous one add insights into the question
why humans punish, although the results are mixed. The fact that some use
of the instruments is maintained throughout all periods, while cooperation is
absent in both the punishment and reward treatments, suggests that subjects
do not use the instruments to promote cooperation. This is consistent with
the view that humans are inequity averse, but it is also consistent with strong
reciprocity. However, the main underlying motivation of punishment in strong
reciprocity is an unfair intention. The current ¯eld experiment provides a unique
insight in the intentions to free ride, because all subjects could monitor each
other's ¯shing activity. Since at no time a ¯sherman ceased ¯shing, the subjects
were fully aware of the negative intentions of others. Therefore, if intentions are
really driving forces of punishment and reward, then one would expect that
punishment is used more often than reward. This prediction is the opposite
of what is observed in the current ¯eld experiments. One interpretation of the
results of the current chapter, is that subjects use non-monetary punishment
because it gives pleasure to do so. Even though subjects can conjecture that
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take revenge. Revenge is mainly targeted to those who catch ¯sh, rather than
on those who intend to catch ¯sh. In case of rewards, such an interpretation is
less clear because many subjects divide their reward tokens equally among the
other group members. This does not suggest that subjects derive joy from the
act of rewarding, but rather that they use rewards opportunistically, hoping to
attract rewards form others.
Work by, for example, Ostrom (1990) and Casari and Plott (2003) shows that
decentralized punishment does promote cooperation in ¯eld settings. The results
of this chapter, and the previ ous one, suggest that for punishment or reward
opportunities to be e®ective, an interplay with other factors might be necessary.
In ¯eld settings, for example, peers are likely to be able to communicate with
each other, or are likely to meet each other in other facets of life. In case
those opportunities are absent, depending on the mere presence of punishment
or rewards might not give the desirable results that laboratory experiments
predict.7.A. Appendix 237
7.A Appendix
7.A.1 Statistical analysis of the e®ect of e®ort on catch
In this appendix, we show the correlation between catch and e®ort, as measured
by the number of times a ¯sherman casts his rod per minute. We ¯nd a posi-
tive correlation: More e®ort leads to more ¯sh, and therefore we interpret our
measure of e®ort as a legitimate proxy for cooperativeness. An ordered Probit
model is used, taking a ¯sherman's catch and e®ort in each of the four periods
as an independent observation.
As Table 7.6 shows, the coe±cient of E®ort is highly signi¯cant. The quad-
rant dummy variables correct for the spot at which a ¯sherman is ¯shing. Two
of the quadrant variables are signi¯cant, indicating that the probability to catch
¯sh at some spots is greater than at other spots.
Dependent variable:
Number of ¯sh caught in a period
E®ort 0:871¤¤¤
(0:158)
Quadrant Fixed E®ects Yes
N 448
pseudo-R2 0:0411
Table 7.6 Ordered Probit estimation on the relationship between individual
e®ort and individual catch. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are
reported between parentheses.
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7.A.2 Questionnaire results
This appendix presents the questionnaire that we used to determine whether a
social dilemma exists.
Dear Fisherman,
On behalf of Tilburg University we would like your cooperation to ¯ll in a
questionnaire. We ask you to indicate which of the following two options is
your preferred option.
Option 1 Option 2
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 ¯sh Wait for 1.5 hours at your ¯shing spot
and then ¯sh for 2.5 unlimitedly
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 ¯sh Wait for 1.5 hours at your ¯shing spot
and then ¯sh for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e0.50 for each ¯sh caught
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 ¯sh Wait for 1.5 hours at your ¯shing spot
and then ¯sh for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e1 for each ¯sh caught
... ...
... ...
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 ¯sh Wait for 1.5 hours at your ¯shing spot
and then ¯sh for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e15 for each ¯sh caught7.A. Appendix 239
7.A.3 Instructions for the Baseline treatment
Word of welcome
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The study
In the next four hours, we ask you to ¯sh according to the following rules. First,
all rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, etc.
Timing
² The study takes place over four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. till noon.
² In case we start a little later, we will end a little later.
² The morning is divided into two parts, part 1 and part 2.
² Part 1 takes 90 minutes and is divided into three periods of 30 minutes.
² Part 2 consists of 1 period in which you can ¯sh freely.
Group formation
² You are placed in a group with 3 other participants.240 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
² Your group consists of the same 4 participants in part 1 and part 2 of this
study; you and the 3 other participants.
² We do not tell you in which group you are placed, and you are not allowed
to communicate with other participants.
Part 2 of the study
² In part 2 you are allowed to catch as much ¯sh as possible
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch and you receive e2 for each ¯sh
caught.
² After each half hour we put new ¯sh equal to the amount caught in the
previous half hour, by those who are allowed to ¯sh in the next half hour.
² Part 2 takes maximally 2.5 hours.
² The length of time you are allowed to ¯sh in part 2 depends on what
happens in your group in part 1.
Part 1 of the study
² In the ¯rst period, we put (16 £2) +6 = 38 rainbow trout into the pond.
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch, you do not receive money for each
¯sh caught.
² In each period of 30 minutes you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2
¯sh. If you catch salmon trout, this also counts as 1 ¯sh.
² Whenever you have caught your second ¯sh, you have to stop ¯shing; you
are allowed to go on ¯shing when the next period starts.
² After each period, we put in a number of rainbow trout equal to the total
catch in the previous period.
² Each ¯sh you catch reduces the time with 10 minutes of the other members
of your group in part 2 of the study.
² The previous rule holds for all participants. That means that for each ¯sh
another member of your group catches, the time you are allowed to ¯sh
in part 2 is reduced by 10 minutes.7.A. Appendix 241
In each period of part 1
² You are not allowed to communicate with other participants.
² You receive information about how much each of your group members
have caught.
² This information is always presented in random order. You cannot link
the catch of a group member in one period to this group member's catch
in another period.
Other information
² The spot you ¯sh at in part 1 is determined randomly. You draw a spot
number from a bag.
² Your spot at part 2 of the experiment is determined randomly as well.
² When part 2 is ¯nished for you, we pay your earnings and the study stops
for you.
Test questions
We ask you to ¯ll in the test questions. When each participant has correctly
answered all questions, the study will begin.
1. With how many other participants are you in a group?
2. How much money do you receive for each ¯sh caught in part 1?
How much money do you receive for each ¯sh caught in part 2?
3. Suppose that the following situation emerges at the end of part 1 of the
study:
You have caught 3 ¯sh.
The other three members of your group have each caught 2 ¯sh.
How long are you allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
Answer: 2.5 hours minus minutes.
How long are each of your group members allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
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7.A.4 Instructions for the Punishment treatment
Word of welcome
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The study
In the next four hours, we ask you to ¯sh according to the following rules. First,
all rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, etc.
Timing
² The study takes place over four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. until noon.
² In case we start a little later, we will end a little later.
² The morning is divided into two parts, part 1 and part 2.
² Part 1 takes 90 minutes and is divided into three periods of 30 minutes.
² Part 2 consists of 1 period in which you can ¯sh freely.
Group formation
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² Your group consists of the same 4 participants in part 1 and part 2 of this
study; you and the 3 other participants.
² We do not tell you in which group you are placed, and you are not allowed
to communicate with other participants.
Part 2 of the study
² In part 2 you are allowed to catch as much ¯sh as possible
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch and you receive e2 for each ¯sh
caught.
² After each half hour we put new ¯sh equal to the amount caught in the
previous half hour, by those who are allowed to ¯sh in the next half hour.
² Part 2 takes maximally 2.5 hours.
² The length of time you are allowed to ¯sh in part 2 depends on what
happens in your group in part 1.
Part 1 of the study
² In the ¯rst period, we put (16 £ 2)+ 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the pond.
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch, you do not receive money for each
¯sh caught.
² In each period of 30 minutes you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2
¯sh. If you catch salmon trout, this also counts as 1 ¯sh.
² Whenever you have caught your second ¯sh, you have to stop ¯shing; you
are allowed to go on ¯shing when the next period starts.
² After each period, we put in a number of rainbow trout equal to the total
catch in the previous period.
² Each ¯sh you catch reduces the time with 10 minutes of the other members
of your group in part 2 of the study.
² The previous rule holds for all participants. That means that for each ¯sh
another member of your group catches, the time you are allowed to ¯sh
in part 2 is reduced by 10 minutes.244 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
At the end of each period in part 1
² You can give us an order to reduce the ¯shing time of a group member in
part 2 with 15 minutes, or more.
² If you give us such an order, this costs you 5 minutes of your own ¯shing
time in part 2.
² In each period you can spend maximally 3 times 5 minutes of your own
¯shing time in part 2 to reduce the ¯shing time of a group member. If you
spend 15 minutes of your own ¯shing time, then you can reduce the ¯shing
time of one group member with 45 minutes, but you can also reduce the
¯shing time of each group member with 15 minutes.
² You can choose not to give us an order to reduce the ¯shing time of another
group member / other group members.
² If you do not have time left in part 2 then you cannot give us an order to
reduce ¯shing time of a group member.
² At the end of a period we inform you on the number of ¯sh each of the
three other group members have caught and how many minutes you have
in part 2.
² Then we ask you to tell us if you would like to spend 0, 5, 10, or 15 minutes
of your time in part 2 to reduce the time of one or more of your group
members.
² At the beginning of the next period we inform you about all the choices
of your group members, and we tell you the time you can ¯sh in part 2.
² This information is presented in a random order, so you cannot link the
catch or decision of a group member in one period to this group member's
catch or decision in another period.
² It holds for each group member that the ¯shing time in part 2 can not be
lower than 0 minutes or higher than 2,5 hour.
Example
² If you decide to reduce the ¯shing time in part 2 of a group member with
30 minutes, then this costs you 10 minutes of your own ¯shing time in
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Other information
² The spot you ¯sh at in part 1 is determined randomly. You draw a spot
number from a bag.
² Your spot at part 2 of the experiment is determined randomly as well.
² When part 2 is ¯nished for you, we pay your earnings and the study stops
for you.
Test questions
We ask you to ¯ll in the test questions. When each participant has correctly
answered all questions, the study will begin.
1. With how many other participants are you in a group?
2. Suppose that the following situation emerges at the end of part 1 of the
study:
You have caught 4 ¯sh.
The other three members of your group have each caught 1 ¯sh.
How long are you allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
Answer: 2.5 hours minus minutes.
How long are each of your group members allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
Answer: 2.5 hours minus minutes.
3. How many blocks of 5 minutes are you allowed to use to reduce the ¯shing
time in part 2 of another group member?
4. If you spend a block of 5 minutes, with how many minutes do you reduce
the ¯shing time in part 2 of another group member?246 Chapter 7. Non-Monetary Punishment and Rewards in the Field
7.A.5 Instructions for the Reward treatment
Word of welcome
Welcome to this study by Tilburg University. Before we start, we want to point
out two things. Firstly, this study is independent of the owners of the trout
¯shing facility. We are grateful that we are allowed to conduct this study here,
but the owners have nothing to do with this project. All responsibility lies
with Tilburg University. Secondly, we want to make clear that this study has
nothing to do with animal welfare issues or the like. As researchers, we accept
the rules and habits of recreational ¯shing as practiced at the trout ¯shing
facility. We cannot tell you the exact aim of this study. We do want to stress
that your privacy is guaranteed; none of the results we report can be traced
back to individual participants.
As you know, you do not have to pay to take part in this study. The entrance
fees are paid by Tilburg University. You are allowed to take home all ¯sh you
catch. In addition, you can earn money. We ask you to abide strictly by the
rules which we impose.
The study
In the next four hours, we ask you to ¯sh according to the following rules. First,
all rules that normally apply at the trout ¯shing facility remain in place. This
means that it is not permitted to throw ¯sh you catch back into the pond, you
are only allowed to ¯sh with one rod, you are only allowed to use a scoop net
to set ¯sh ashore, you are only allowed to use the usual types of bait, etc.
Timing
² The study takes place over four hours, from around 8.00 a.m. until noon.
² In case we start a little later, we will end a little later.
² The morning is divided into two parts, part 1 and part 2.
² Part 1 takes 90 minutes and is divided into three periods of 30 minutes.
² Part 2 consists of 1 period in which you can ¯sh freely.
Group formation
² You are placed in a group with 3 other participants.7.A. Appendix 247
² Your group consists of the same 4 participants in part 1 and part 2 of this
study; you and the 3 other participants.
² We do not tell you in which group you are placed, and you are not allowed
to communicate with other participants.
Part 2 of the study
² In part 2 you are allowed to catch as much ¯sh as possible
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch and you receive e2 for each ¯sh
caught.
² After each half hour we put new ¯sh equal to the amount caught in the
previous half hour, by those who are allowed to ¯sh in the next half hour.
² Part 2 takes maximally 2.5 hours.
² The length of time you are allowed to ¯sh in part 2 depends on what
happens in your group in part 1.
Part 1 of the study
² In the ¯rst period, we put (16 £ 2)+ 6 = 38 rainbow trout into the pond.
² You can take home each ¯sh you catch, you do not receive money for each
¯sh caught.
² In each period of 30 minutes you are allowed to catch a maximum of 2
¯sh. If you catch salmon trout, this also counts as 1 ¯sh.
² Whenever you have caught your second ¯sh, you have to stop ¯shing; you
are allowed to go on ¯shing when the next period starts.
² After each period, we put in a number of rainbow trout equal to the total
catch in the previous period.
² Each ¯sh you catch reduces the time with 10 minutes of the other members
of your group in part 2 of the study.
² The previous rule holds for all participants. That means that for each ¯sh
another member of your group catches, the time you are allowed to ¯sh
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At the end of each period in part 1
² You can give us an order to increase the ¯shing time of a group member
in part 2 with 15 minutes, or more.
² If you give us such an order, this costs you 5 minutes of your own ¯shing
time in part 2.
² In each period you can spend maximally 3 times 5 minutes of your own
¯shing time in part 2 to increase the ¯shing time of a group member. If
you spend 15 minutes of your own ¯shing time, then you can increase
the ¯shing time of one group member with 45 minutes, but you can also
increase the ¯shing time of each group member with 15 minutes.
² You can choose not to give us an order to increase the ¯shing time of
another group member / other group members.
² If you do not have time left in part 2 then you cannot give us an order to
increase ¯shing time of a group member.
² At the end of a period we inform you on the number of ¯sh each of the
three other group members have caught and how many minutes you have
in part 2.
² Then we ask you to tell us if you would like to spend 0, 5, 10, or 15 minutes
of your time in part 2 to increase the time of one or more of your group
members.
² At the beginning of the next period we inform you about all the choices
of your group members, and we tell you the time you can ¯sh in part 2.
² This information is presented in a random order, so you cannot link the
catch or decision of a group member in one period to this group member's
catch or decision in another period.
² It holds for each group member that the ¯shing time in part 2 can not be
lower than 0 minutes or higher than 2,5 hour.
² In case your ¯shing time exceeds 2,5 hours (due to the decisions of your
group members), you receive a coupon which allows you to make up the
¯shing time at another date.
² For each 30 minutes you are allowed to ¯sh longer than 2,5 hours, you
receive a coupon of e3 (so, for each minute you are allowed to ¯sh longer,
you receive a coupon of e0.10).7.A. Appendix 249
Example
² If you decide to increase the ¯shing time in part 2 of a group member
with 30 minutes, then this costs you 10 minutes of your own ¯shing time
in part 2.
Other information
² The spot you ¯sh at in part 1 is determined randomly. You draw a spot
number from a bag.
² Your spot at part 2 of the experiment is determined randomly as well.
² When part 2 is ¯nished for you, we pay your earnings and the study stops
for you.
Test questions We ask you to ¯ll in the test questions. When each participant
has correctly answered all questions, the study will begin.
1. With how many other participants are you in a group?
2. Suppose that the following situation emerges at the end of part 1 of the
study:
You have caught 4 ¯sh.
The other three members of your group have each caught 1 ¯sh.
How long are you allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
Answer: 2.5 hours minus minutes.
How long are each of your group members allowed to ¯sh in part 2?
Answer: 2.5 hours minus minutes.
3. How many blocks of 5 minutes are you allowed to use to increase the
¯shing time in part 2 of another group member?
4. If you spend a block of 5 minutes, with how many minutes do you increase
the ¯shing time in part 2 of another group member?Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, the e®ects of informal institutions on behavior in social dilemmas
are studied. Chapter 2 shows a review of some of the most in°uential studies
that illustrate how cooperation can be established in a social dilemma, with-
out government intervention. In Chapters 3 and 4, the e®ects of rewards and
counter-rewards on cooperation in a renewable natural resource are examined
by means of a laboratory experiment. Chapter 5 addresses a ¯eld experiment of
the Public Goods game, meant to study the external validity of this in°uential
laboratory experimental game. Using a similar setup, the e®ects of monetary
punishment on cooperation in a ¯eld experiment are studied in Chapter 6. Fi-
nally, Chapter 7 studies the e®ects of non-monetary punishment and reward
on cooperation in a di®erent version of the Public Goods game as presented
in Chapter 5 and 6. In this chapter, the main ¯ndings of the results of this
thesis are brie°y summarized. Furthermore, the results are related to policy
recommendations, and some ideas for future research are presented.
In Chapter 3, the e®ects of rewards are studied in a laboratory Common Pool
Resource experiment. Subjects are placed in groups of ¯ve, and each subject
has to choose how much to extract from a common pool resource. Overhar-
vesting by one leads to smaller payo®s to others in a non-linear way. After the
extraction stage, subjects receive feedback on the extraction decisions of others.
Then, subjects receive an endowment of money which can be spent to reward
other group members. Feedback is provided about the number of rewards that
are received by other group members, although no information is available on
how fellow group members have rewarded others. After this ¯rst reward stage,
a second opportunity to reward is provided which has the same structure as the
¯rst stage. Chapter 3 adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. Be-
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cause subject identities remain ¯xed throughout the periods, subjects are given
the ability to build a reputation. This is a feature that is not implemented
often in laboratory experiments, but it is likely to be a key feature in ¯eld set-
tings. In addition, the possibility to counter-reward is provided. No other study
on rewards has this feature, usually the number of reward stages is arti¯cially
reduced to one (see for example Ostrom et al. (1992), Sefton et al. (2007),
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), and Rand et al. (2009)). Using rewards
in ¯eld settings might be done in order to receive the favor of rewards in the
future. Therefore, having two stages of rewards, rather than one, adds to the
realism of the reward instrument.
The results show that although no cooperation is observed in the social
dilemma game, almost full cooperation occurs in both reward stages when sub-
ject identity labels are kept constant over the periods. Subjects show a will-
ingness to cooperate in the `bilateral' cooperation game, while they massively
free-ride in the `group' cooperation game. In an additional treatment, subjects
are made more anonymous by shu²ing their identity labels between periods.
Behavior in this treatment is qualitatively similar to the one where identity la-
bels are ¯xed. No cooperation is observed in the common pool resource, but a
considerable degree of cooperation is found in the reward stages. By consistently
having the same extraction levels over the periods, many subjects overcome the
barrier of anonymity and engage in a bilateral exchange of reward tokens. A
¯nal treatment considers the e®ects of counterrewards in a stranger treatment
where new groups are formed between each period. No cooperation is observed
at all in this treatment, neither in the social dilemma stage, nor in the reward
stages. In early periods of the game, many subject choose to divide their reward
tokens evenly among their group members. This strategy seems to be used in
order to attract reward tokens in the second reward stage. However, because
of the high levels of defection in that stage, the use of reward tokens in both
stages approaches zero as the end of the experiment comes near.
Based on the results, the policy implications that follow from Chapter 3
are twofold. Firstly, the results suggest that depending solely on a system of
rewards and counter-rewards to overcome free-riding in a social dilemma might
be hazardous. Such a conclusion might seem odd, given that it is hard for a
government to implement a system of rewards and counter-rewards. However, a
di®erent way to look at the experiment, is that the two reward stages represent
an outside economic activity. When resource users have a way to earn money
besides a common pool resource, then the results suggest that the individuals
lean heavily on the outside option, neglecting the long run consequences of theConclusion 253
natural resource. However, because the agents neglected cooperation in absence
of such an economic activity anyway, a government cannot make matters worse
when promoting the use of outside options. Secondly, and put in a di®erent
perspective, the behavior observed Chapter 3 has some positive insights as well.
In the treatments where the same resource users interact with each other, be it
with known identities or changing identities, a lot of cooperation is occurring
when it comes to the use of rewards. The data show that group social dilemmas
cannot be solved, but bilateral social dilemmas can. A government could try
to exploit this feature in a small scale society where resource users frequently
interact on a bilateral basis. For example, a government could try to convince
resource users that free-riding in a natural renewable resource mostly hurts
a neighbor. Shifting the way resource users think about the consequences of
their actions might cause them to be more cooperative. In a situation where
new and unfamiliar resource users frequently meet, such an approach seems
fruitless, given the results of the stranger design. Alternatively, the resource
users have the option to choose their partners in the bilateral social dilemma,
whereas they might have no choice in a group social dilemma. Perhaps if the
government provides opportunities to resource users for them to choose with
whom they interact, this might increase cooperation in the large scale social
dilemma (see for example GÄ urerk et al. (2004) and Sutter et al. (2010)).
One important direction in which future research can shed more light on the
e®ects of counter-rewards is to consider the e®ects of information. In the exper-
iment conducted in Chapter 3, subjects are only told whom they have received
rewards from. No information has been given on how others reward others.
Therefore, subjects might miss out on some crucial information regarding the
mechanism of reward in a group. Knowing that cooperative group members
have attracted a lot of rewards might make others become more cooperative as
well. The e®ects of counter-rewards might be reversed when subjects receive
more information.
Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3. The partner matching design where
identity labels are shu²ed between periods is considered in more detail. Those
results are compared to an identical treatment with only one stage of reward,
taken from Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008). Interestingly, although less re-
wards are used in the treatment with only one stage of reward, more cooperation
is found in that treatment. A large part of the results section of the treatment
with two stages of reward shows how subjects behave in more detail. It turns
out that the way in which rewards are used, provides insights in the social ori-
entation of the subjects. About one-sixth of the subjects behaves as rational254 Chapter 8: Conclusion
economic man would behave; they do not cooperate in the common pool re-
source and do not make use of the reward instrument. Half of the subjects
behave as strategic money maximizers. They free-ride in the common pool re-
source, but they make considerable use of the rewards in the ¯rst stage. These
subjects defect from sending rewards back in the second reward stage. One-
third of the subjects behave cooperatively in both the common pool resource,
and both reward stages.
Future research could extend this work in at least two ways. The ¯rst way is
by extending the research on the social orientation of subjects. In some studies,
researchers have tried to measure the social orientation of subjects directly (see
for example Fischbacher et al. (2001)). It turns out that the counter-reward
setup used in Chapter 4 also provides clear insights into the social orientation.
Therefore, it might be interesting to repeat the analysis of Chapter 4 while sub-
jects undergo the direct tests of social orientation proposed in the literature.
It is interesting to observe which measures correlate with the social orientation
blue print provided by the results of the counter-reward experiment. A second
way in which future research can be extended, is by making use of the di®erent
social orientation methods. If the measures correlate, this might be interesting
for a government. The direct measures on social orientation are likely to be
gathered at relatively low costs. A survey conducted among villages where re-
ward and counter-reward is the norm (for example, in the form of helping each
other with outside economic alternatives) could tell a government what propor-
tion of the subjects are making an unsustainable use of a natural renewable
resource. Government policy can be improved by having it targeted directly
at those resource users. However, before a government can rely on laboratory
methods, the external validity of laboratory experiments has to be understood
in greater detail. In chapters 5 through 7, I show that there are ¯eld settings in
which the results from the laboratory do not carry over.
A direct test of the degree in which laboratory results carry over to a ¯eld
setting is provided in Chapter 5. In this chapter, the external validity of the
Public Goods game is studied. A vast body of literature on the Public Goods
game shows two robust patterns; cooperation is positive at the outset of the
game, but declines as more and more periods are played (Ledyard (1995)). To
test whether such a pattern also exists in a non-laboratory setting, a related
¯eld experiment is conducted at a privately owned recreational ¯shing facility.
Fishermen are placed in groups of four and play a game consisting of six periods
of forty minutes each. In each period, a ¯sherman can catch up to two ¯sh. Each
¯sh caught is for the ¯sherman to take home. A social dilemma is created byConclusion 255
giving incentives to the ¯shermen not to catch ¯sh; each ¯sh not caught yields
a monetary payo® of e2 for each of the other three group members. Therefore,
if all ¯shermen cooperate by not catching ¯sh, each goes home with e72. The
results of this treatment are compared to a private incentive treatment, a treat-
ment with no incentives to reduce the catch of ¯sh. Each ¯sh caught in the six
periods is for the ¯shermen to take home, but no payo® is provided to other
¯shermen for ¯sh not caught.
In contrast with the received results from previous research on the Public
Goods game in the laboratory, there is no evidence of cooperation in any of the
periods in the ¯eld experiment. Fishermen catch the same amount of ¯sh in the
social dilemma treatment as they do in the private incentive treatment. Besides
the catch measure, an e®ort measure provides additional support for the con-
clusion. The ¯sh in the pond are rainbow trout, a hunting ¯sh. Therefore, the
number of times a ¯sherman casts his rod is correlated with catch. The results
show that ¯shermen cast their rod with an equal pace in both treatments. In
order to isolate factors that might cause a di®erence between the classical lab-
oratory results and the ¯eld experiment, a series of laboratory experiments are
conducted. The social dilemma ¯eld experiment is translated to a traditional
laboratory experiment, and conducted with students and a sample of the ¯sh-
ermen population. When both subject pools are brought into the laboratory,
¯shermen show to be more cooperative than students. Therefore, the subject
pool does not explain the lack of cooperation observed in the ¯eld. Additionally,
the translated laboratory game is conducted while ¯shermen are ¯shing in their
leisure time. Compared to the situation in which ¯shermen play the game in
the laboratory, more cooperation is found when the game is played at the pond.
The physical environment is therefore ruled out as an explanation for the total
absence of cooperation in the ¯eld. Two explanations remain: the di®erence
of the activity (¯lling in a number versus catching real ¯sh), or the di®erence
of the medium of reward (money versus money in the laboratory, but money
versus ¯sh in the ¯eld) might cause the absence of cooperation in the ¯eld. By
conducting an additional treatment in the ¯eld, the di®erence in reward medium
is ruled out as an explanation for the absence of cooperation. The treatment is
a dynamic social dilemma game; catching more ¯sh in one period results in a
loss of ¯sh in the next period. Also in this treatment, ¯shermen do not attempt
to lower their e®ort levels and catch as much as they can.
The lack of cooperation in the ¯eld experiment, as opposed to positive but
diminishing cooperation in the laboratory, has one important policy implica-
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possible without government intervention. However, the results of Chapter 5
show that in scenarios where no communication is possible, or norms cannot
be enforced otherwise, cooperation might not spontaneously emerge. Although
the results do not provide insights which factors might improve cooperation,
the result do suggest that a government should try to avoid that a natural re-
newable resource is confronted with an institutional setup like the one tested in
Chapter 5. The results of Chapter 5 do not only relate to natural resources, an
absence of cooperation might be found in all social dilemmas in ¯eld settings
where communication is not possible, or where norms are absent.
Future research on social dilemmas in ¯eld settings is necessary to better
understand the external validity of laboratory experiments. The setting used in
Chapter 5 provides one environment in which external validity does not hold,
but there might be other settings where the laboratory does have great pre-
dictive power of the ¯eld. Research from laboratory experiments has shown
that, in contrast the theoretical predictions of zero cooperation, subjects be-
come more cooperative in social dilemmas if the gains from doing so increase
(see for example Marwell and Ames (1979), and Carpenter (2007)). These re-
sults might carry over to the ¯eld experiment of Chapter 5, ¯shermen might
become more cooperative when the incentives to do so change. Other avenues
of future research could lie in the use of formal or informal instruments that can
enforce cooperation. There have been no previous attempts to study the e®ects
of informal institutions on behavior in social dilemmas in a setting outside a
laboratory. In chapters 6 and 7, the research on social dilemmas is extended by
explicitly testing the e®ects of punishment and reward in a ¯eld setting. The
bulk of the laboratory experiments on punishment and reward studies the ef-
fects of monetary punishment (see, for example, Fehr and GÄ achter (2000, 2002),
Nikiforakis (2008), and Rand et al. (2009)). Subjects are endowed with money,
to reduce or increase the monetary earnings of other group members. In chap-
ter 6, the robustness of monetary punishment is tested by adding a punishment
stage to the setup described in Chapter 5. Then, in chapter 7, a di®erent social
dilemma game is conducted where subjects have a non-monetary way to punish
or reward other group members. The subjects in the experiment of Chapter 7
are allowed to reduce or increase the ¯shing time available to others. Let me
address the two chapters in more detail.
Chapter 6 studies the e®ects of monetary punishment on cooperation in the
static and dynamic ¯eld experiments conducted in Chapter 5. After each period,
subjects receive information on the catch and individual earnings of each group
member. Subjects then receive an endowment of e3 which they can keep, orConclusion 257
spend to reduce the earnings of group members. Each euro spent, reduces the
earnings of a group member with e3.
The results show that, unlike many laboratory results, punishment does not
promote cooperation. Subjects ¯sh with the same intensity, and catch similar
amounts of ¯sh, in a treatment with punishment as they do in a treatment
without punishment. Monetary punishment is used rarely by the subjects, which
suggests an aversion against the use of it. It seems as if the subjects have
no problems to reduce the potential earnings of group members, because no
cooperation is observed in the social dilemma phase. However, when it comes to
reducing actual earnings, the subjects don't do so. An alternative explanation
for the lack of punishment might be due to respect that ¯shermen have for
skillful group members. Perhaps the participants believe that skillful ¯shermen
deserve to catch a lot of ¯sh, and that punishing them is unfair. Such e®ects
are found to play a role in the Ultimatum Game (see Ho®man et al. (1994)).
The results of Chapter 6 give rise to some policy implications, as well as
scope for future research. In contrast to conventional results from the labo-
ratory, a government should be warned that relying on monetary punishment
alone might not yield the desired e®ects. If the conjecture is true that subjects
are averse to use monetary punishment, and if it extends to di®erent environ-
ments with di®erent subject pools as well, then a breakdown of cooperation in a
social dilemma situation can be expected in some situations. Anticipating that
no use of monetary punishment will be made, the users of a resource have all the
incentives to harvest at unsustainable levels. In real life however, an interplay
of di®erent informal institutions can be expected. For example, in a situation
where resource users can punish each other, it is expected that they can also
communicate. From past laboratory research, it is known that the combination
of punishment and communication can be extremely e®ective in promoting co-
operation (see Ostrom et al. (1992)). Perhaps this result carries over to the
¯eld experiment of Chapter 6 as well. Past laboratory research also shows that
subjects are sensitive to the cost-bene¯t ratio of the punishment instrument
(see for example Carpenter (2007), and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)). It
might be the case that when punishment has a bigger impact, more subjects
fear that they will be the target. Although the use of the instrument can still
be at relatively low levels, anticipating an extreme reduction of income might
persuade resource users to act cooperatively. Alternatively, when subjects have
the opportunity to reduce a group member's stock of ¯sh, rather than money
earned, could have the desired e®ect on cooperation. Finally, it is possible that
the rare use of punishment is due to characteristics of the ¯shermen. Laboratory258 Chapter 8: Conclusion
experiments that study monetary punishment in a social dilemma could test the
degree in which this in°uences the results of Chapter 6. Those results can be
directly compared to a similar experiment where students form the subject pool.
Chapter 7 extends the literature by considering an alternative punishment
or reward instrument: Time rather than money is the medium of reward. In
almost all laboratory experiments, money is the medium of reward. However,
in real life, time is a scarce resource that is of great value as well. Punishment
or rewards are as easily provided in terms of time, as they are provided in terms
of money. The social dilemma game studied in Chapter 7 resembles the Public
Goods game, but it is di®erent than the setup studied in Chapters 5 and 6.
Fishermen are placed in groups of four, and play a game that consists of two
parts. In part 2 of the game, each ¯sherman is allowed to catch as many ¯sh
as possible, and each ¯sh yields an additional bonus of e2. After each half
hour, the stock of ¯sh is replenished to give the ¯shermen all the opportunities
to catch as much as they can. Part 2 takes up to 150 minutes, but the time
which a ¯sherman is allowed to ¯sh, depends on the behavior of the other group
members in part 1. The social dilemma aspect of the experiment is introduced
in the three thirty minute periods that make up part 1. In each period, each
¯sherman is allowed to catch up to two ¯sh; each ¯sh caught must be taken
away from the pond. Catching ¯sh has a negative externality, because each
catch results in a ten minute reduction of ¯shing time in part 2 for each of the
other three group members.
Like the results reported in Chapter 5 and 6, there is no evidence of (partial)
cooperation in this baseline setup. Fishermen always try to catch the ¯rst
¯sh, and conditional on catching one ¯sh, ¯shermen always try to catch their
second ¯sh. Moreover, e®ort levels in part 1 of the experiment are greater than
those observed in part 2. The fact that ¯shermen do not exert more e®ort
in part 2 provides extra support for the lack of cooperation found in part 1.
In two additional treatments, the e®ects of either punishment, or rewards are
examined. At the end of each period in part 1, subjects receive feedback on the
individual catch of each group member. Then, ¯shermen can decide to spend
up to three ¯ve-minute intervals of part 2 ¯shing time to reciprocate fellow
group members. In the punishment treatment, each ¯ve-minute interval spent
reduces the part 2 ¯shing time of a targeted group member with ¯fteen minutes.
A ¯ve-minute interval spent in the reward treatment results in an increase of
¯fteen minutes. Again, like the results reported in Chapter 6, also non-monetary
punishment has no in°uence on cooperation. Fishermen ¯sh with the same
intensity and catch similar amounts of ¯sh in the punishment treatment as theyConclusion 259
do in the baseline treatment. Similar results hold for the reward treatment; no
increase in cooperation is found, neither in terms of catch nor in terms of e®ort.
Interestingly, rewards are used more often than punishment. However, a detailed
analysis on the mechanism behind both instruments shows that punishment is
directed towards free-riders. No correlation between free-riding behavior and
rewards is found. Some studies in the area of neuroeconomics show that subjects
derive joy out of the act of punishment (see for example de Quervain et al.
(2004), and Fehr and Camerer (2007)). The results reported in Chapter 7 are
consistent with this view; subjects observe that they cannot enforce cooperation,
yet they do punish group members who catch many ¯sh.
The results from Chapter 7 provide a robustness check on the results of
Chapter 5 and 6; when ¯shing time is the medium of reward, rather than money,
no cooperation is observed. Additionally, also non-monetary punishment or
reward does not promote cooperation. Hence, there are ¯eld settings in which
the results from the laboratory do not hold. Policy implications derived from
this chapter are therefore much in line with those of Chapter 6. Relying on a
mechanism of punishment or reward might prove ine®ective. In scenarios where
resource users are anonymous and cannot interact with each other, perhaps
formal institutions are the only way in which sustainable use of a resource can
be established.
Future research should provide more insights in the latter claim. An inter-
play of di®erent informal institutions can shift behavior to the social optimum.
Communication has proved to be very successful in the laboratory, and this
might well be the case in the ¯eld setting of Chapter 7. Alternatively, giving
resource users the option to vote to exile free-riding group members could pro-
vide the necessary incentives to act in line with the social optimum (see for
example Cinyabuguma et al. (2005)). A mix of all those informal institutions is
likely to be found in ¯eld settings, rather than just one institution in isolation.
The ¯eld setting of Chapter 7 provides ample opportunities to dig deeper into
the question how cooperation can be established in a controlled ¯eld setting.
Finally, since the e®ects of time as the medium of reward are not well under-
stood in laboratory experiments, future research should address this issue as
well. Perhaps the results found in Chapter 7 can be replicated in the laboratory
when somehow choices in a social dilemma game e®ect time use, rather than
monetary earnings.
The debate on whether cooperation can be found in social dilemmas in the
absence of government intervention is still ongoing. Although many scholars
take the view that cooperation is possible in such cases, this thesis challenges260 Chapter 8: Conclusion
this view by providing some examples in which cooperation breaks down. Con-
ventional results from laboratory experiments, which show that peer-to-peer
regulation can enforce cooperation, are not robust to just any change. This
point has been made before in the case of punishment; allowing for the possi-
bility to take revenge causes a breakdown of cooperation (see Denant-Boemont
et al. (2007)), and Nikiforakis (2008)). In the case of rewards the message
is similar, as is shown in Chapters 3 and 4. Counter-rewards do not lead to
an improvement in cooperation, because rewards shift the focus away from the
social dilemma towards a bilateral exchange of rewards with other group mem-
bers. This ¯nding is robust to several design changes in which the anonymity
of subjects is varied. Additional support for the view that cooperation does not
arise spontaneously in ¯eld settings is provided by Chapters 5 through 7. Using
a non-laboratory ¯eld setting, a recreational ¯shing pond, the results of Chap-
ter 5 show no evidence at all of cooperation in a voluntary contribution game.
The reason for its absence is the decision variable; whereas subjects do display
cooperative behavior when doing so requires the sacri¯ce of a monetary payo®
only, cooperation disappears when a reduction in ¯shing e®ort is needed. In the
¯nal two chapters of this thesis, the issue is raised how the e®ects of informal
institutions, which have proven to work well in laboratory experiments, carry
over to a non-laboratory setting. The two instruments that are considered are
punishment and reward. When taken to the ¯eld setting, the e®ectiveness of
both instruments vanishes. The results show that subjects rarely use punish-
ment or rewards, and that any punishment or rewards received does not change
their behavior in the social dilemma. Proponents of peer-to-peer policy design
should keep in mind that the external validity of laboratory experiments is poor
in settings where the decision to cooperate or not involves a laborious activity.
The instances of such social dilemma situations, such as many environmental
problems, are widespread. Therefore, relying on peer-to-peer policy design could
prove to be dangerous in some situations.References
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In dit proefschrift wordt een antwoord gezocht op de volgende vraag: "Hoe hangt
gedrag in sociale dilemma's, zoals de conservatie van vernieuwbare natuurlijke
hulpbronnen, af van de geldende informele instituties en wat zijn de implicaties
voor overheidsbeleid?" Meer algemeen wordt er een antwoord gezocht op de
vraag hoe het gedrag in sociale dilemma situaties afhangt van informele institu-
ties. Een sociaal dilemma doet zich voor wanneer het belang van een individu
niet overeenkomt met de belangen van een groep. De problematiek die zich
voordoet bij veel situaties aangaande het milieu is een voorbeeld van een sociaal
dilemma. Wanneer een individu een vis vangt, dan zullen delen van de kosten
afgewenteld worden op de maatschappij. Het wordt voor anderen moeilijker om
een vis te vangen, omdat er minder vissen voorradig zijn. Daarnaast zal de
visstand minder snel groter worden naarmate er minder vissen aanwezig zijn.
Omdat een deel van de kosten voor het vangen van een vis niet voor rekening
zijn van degene die de vis vangt, is het in het belang van de visser om meer
vissen te vangen dan wat vanuit sociaal oogpunt optimaal is. In economisch
jargon wordt gesteld dat een individu prikkels heeft om te `free-riden' in plaats
van om samen te werken. De overheid is een voorname kandidaat om er voor
te zorgen dat individuen niet te zelfzuchtig handelen. Door middel van bijvoor-
beeld belastingen of boetes kan er voor gezorgd worden dat de belangen van
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een individu overeenkomen met de belangen van een groep (bijvoorbeeld omwo-
nenden rondom een meer met vissen). Echter, inzichten uit wetenschappelijke
studies en voorbeelden uit de praktijk laten zien dat individuen onderling, in
afwezigheid van een overheid, tot een oplossing van een sociaal dilemma kunnen
komen. Een belangrijke schakel die zorgt voor een uitkomst zijn zogenaamde
informele instituties: de set van zelf-opgelegde locale regels die het gedrag van
gebruikers van een hulpbron stuurt. In dit proefschrift wordt een antwoord
gezocht op de hoofdvraag door middel van het uitvoeren van economische ex-
perimenten. Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 zullen economische experimenten beschrijven
die uitgevoerd zijn in het traditionele laboratorium. Vanaf Hoofdstuk 5 zullen
de conventionele methodes van laboratorium experimenten getest worden in een
veldsituatie, een recreatieve visvijver.
In Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift wordt de literatuur samengevat die ingaat
op de vraag hoe individuen samen kunnen werken in een sociaal dilemma in
afwezigheid van een overheid of informele instituties. In een sociaal dilemma
heeft een individu altijd een prikkel om niet samen te werken. Daarom zullen
sociale dilemma's niet gekenmerkt worden door altruÄ ³stisch gedrag: gedrag van
een individu dat zorgt voor een toename in ¯tness voor een ander individu, ten
koste van een afname van de ¯tness van de weldoener. Sterker nog, klassie-
ke economische theorie voorspelt dat altruÄ ³sten een lagere kans hebben om te
overleven, omdat zij kosten maken die `free-riders' niet maken. In de literatuur
worden drie argumenten gegeven waarom het op de lange termijn toch loont om
samen te werken. `Kin-selection' is de eerste verklaring: wanneer een familielid
voor voldoende nakomelingen zorgt, dan kan altruÄ ³sme in iemands belang zijn.
Op indirecte manier worden dan de genen van een altruÄ ³st doorgegeven naar de
volgende generatie. De tweede verklaring wordt `directe reciprociteit' genoemd.
Dit is gebouwd op het principe dat wanneer ik iemand nu help, deze persoon
mij in de toekomst helpt. Zodoende kunnen we allebei beter af zijn op de lange
termijn. De derde verklaring is `indirecte reciprociteit'. Het geldende principe
in deze stroom in de literatuur is dat wanneer ik iemand help, iemand anders
mij in de toekomst helpt. Reputatie is het bindende element, alleen degenen die
een goede reputatie hebben verworven zullen hulp ontvangen van anderen. Tot
slot wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 ingegaan op de informele institutie stra®en. Wanneer
individuen de mogelijkheid hebben om asociaal gedrag van anderen te stra®en,
dan kan altruÄ ³stisch gedrag overleven. De reden is dat `free-riders' een lagere
¯tness hebben, omdat ze gestraft worden door altruÄ ³sten.Samenvatting 277
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt ingegaan op de e®ecten van belonen en wederbelonen op
samenwerking in een sociaal dilemma, een common pool resource. In een labo-
ratorium worden studenten geplaatst in groepjes van vijf. Elke deelnemer heeft
de mogelijkheid om tot 13 eenheden uit een natuurlijke hulpbron te putten. De
winsten die behaald kunnen worden uit de hulpbron hangen af van de mate
van extractie van anderen; hoe minder de extractie van anderen, des te hoger de
opbrengsten voor het individu dat een hoge extractie heeft. Echter, als alle deel-
nemers een hoge mate van extractie hebben, dan zijn de totale winsten lager dan
wanneer iedereen een matige extractie heeft. Het experiment bestaat uit twee
delen. In het eerste deel worden vijftien periodes van het bovengenoemde spel
gespeeld. Het tweede deel is een herhaling van het eerste, met de uitzondering
dat aan het einde van elke periode de mogelijkheid tot belonen en wederbelonen
wordt gegeven. Elke deelnemer krijgt informatie over de extractiekeuzes van alle
groepsgenoten. Daarnaast ontvangt ieder twaalf tokens die ingezet kunnen wor-
den om groepsgenoten te belonen. Ieder token dat aan een groepsgenoot wordt
gegeven, levert drie tokens op voor de ontvanger. Na de eerste mogelijkheid tot
belonen, ontvangt elke deelnemer informatie over hoeveel beloningen ontvangen
zijn door anderen. Dan volgt een tweede fase waarin iedereen opnieuw twaalf
tokens ontvangt die gebruikt kunnen worden om groepsgenoten te belonen. De
invloed van de mate van anonimiteit op het beloningsgedrag vormt de basis van
Hoofdstuk 3. In een treatment blijven dezelfde deelnemers in dezelfde groepjes
van vijf. De identiteit van iedere deelnemer blijft onveranderd gedurende alle
periodes. In een tweede treatment blijven de deelnemers gepaard met dezelf-
de groepsgenoten, maar de identiteit van iedere deelnemer wordt veranderd na
a°oop van elke periode. In een laatste treatment wordt de samenstelling van
de groepen veranderd na a°oop van elk van de vijftien periodes. De resultaten
van het experiment wijzen uit dat belonen en wederbelonen niet voor samen-
werking in het sociale dilemma zorgen. In de eerste twee treatments proberen
de deelnemers met elkaar uitwisselingsverbanden van beloningen aan te gaan.
Dit is opmerkelijk in de treatment waar de identiteit van de deelnemers wordt
veranderd tussen de periodes. De subjecten lossen dit probleem op door in de
common pool resource altijd dezelfde mate van extractie te hebben. Daardoor
kunnen ze kenbaar maken wie ze zijn en kan op veilige wijze een uitruil van
beloningen aangegaan worden. Het gevolg is dat de mate waarin beloningen
gebruikt worden erg hoog is en dat daardoor de deelnemers niet meer afhan-
kelijk zijn van winsten uit de common pool resource. In de treatment waarin
deelnemers steeds in nieuwe groepen worden geplaatst, is deze strategie niet
mogelijk. Dientengevolge worden beloningen nauwelijks gebruikt en is er geen278 Samenvatting
samenwerking zichtbaar in de common pool resource. Een groot deel van de
subjecten die wel beloningen gebruiken, verdeelt ze gelijkmatig over alle groeps-
genoten in de eerste beloningsfase. Op deze manier hopen deze subjecten dat
hun investeringen worden terugverdiend in de tweede beloningsfase.
Hoofdstuk 4 is een uitbreiding van Hoofdstuk 3. Er wordt dieper ingegaan op de
treatment waarin deelnemers in ongewijzigde groepen blijven, maar waarin de
identiteit van elke deelnemer wordt veranderd na a°oop van alle periodes. De
resultaten van deze treatment worden vergeleken met een treatment met slechts
een fase van belonen (die resultaten zijn genomen uit een eerdere studie). Twee
bevindingen springen uit het oog. Ten eerste, hoewel meer beloningen gebruikt
worden in de treatment met twee fases van beloningen, is de samenwerking tus-
sen groepsgenoten hoger in de treatment met slechts een fase van belonen. Ten
tweede, het blijkt dat het beloningsgedrag inzicht geeft in de sociale oriÄ entatie
van de deelnemers. Een zesde van de deelnemers gedraagt zich als homo econo-
micus, zij werken nooit samen in de common pool resource en ze maken nooit
gebruik van het beloningsinstrument. De helft van de deelnemers gedraagt zich
als strategische winstmaximaliseerders, zij werken niet samen in de common
pool resource, maar ze belonen wel in de eerste fase van belonen. Vervolgens
maken ze geen gebruik van de tweede fase van belonen, om zodoende te pro-
¯teren van diegenen die hen wel belonen in die tweede fase. Een derde van
de deelnemers is pro-sociaal, zij zijn sociaal in de common pool resource en ze
maken gebruik van beide mogelijkheden om te belonen.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt bestudeerd in welke mate het gedrag in sociale dilem-
ma's van studenten in het laboratorium voorspellend is voor gedrag in niet-
laboratorium omgevingen. De Public Goods game, een populair sociaal di-
lemma experiment uit het laboratorium, wordt uitgevoerd aan een privaat be-
heerde recreative visvijver om een antwoord te krijgen op deze vraag. Uit de
vele voorgaande laboratorium onderzoeken van de Public Goods game blijken
twee robuuste patronen. Deelnemers beginnen met gematigd sociaal gedrag,
maar naarmate de periodes vorderen, handelt men steeds meer naar het eigen-
belang. Om te onderzoeken of dergelijk gedrag zich ook voordoet in een niet-
laboratorium omgeving, worden vissers in groepen van vier geplaatst. Er wordt
een spel gespeeld dat bestaat uit zes rondes van elk veertig minuten, waarin
de deelnemers niet mogen communiceren. In elke ronde is iedereen toegestaan
om tot twee regenboogforellen te vangen. Elke vis die gevangen wordt, moet
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laat zwemmen, levert e2 op voor elk van de andere groepsgenoten. Een visser
wordt daarom gedwongen om een afruil te maken: of een visser vangt een vis
voor eigen plezier, of de visser werkt samen en ziet af van het eigen plezier om
de winsten van anderen te vergroten. Aan de vijver vissen de vissers op regen-
boogforel, een vis die actief op aas jaagt. Dit kenmerk geeft de mogelijkheid om
moeite van vissers te meten. Hoe vaker een visser zijn aas uitgooit, des te meer
vissen er worden gevangen. Om samenwerking te meten, worden de resultaten
van deze treatment vergeleken met een treatment waarin geen prikkels worden
gegeven om de visvangst te verminderen. Elke vis die gevangen wordt, moet
mee naar huis genomen worden, maar er wordt geen geldbedrag gegeven aan
groepsgenoten als een vis niet wordt gevangen.
In tegenstelling tot wat meestal wordt gerapporteerd uit laboratorium onderzoe-
ken, is er geen enkele vorm van samenwerking te vinden in het veldexperiment.
Vissers vissen met dezelfde intensiteit en vangen dezelfde hoeveelheid vis in de
sociale dilemma treatment als in de treatment zonder dilemma. Mogelijke ver-
klaringen voor het verschil in gedrag tussen het laboratorium en aan de vijver
zijn de aard van de subjecten (studenten versus vissers) en de fysieke omgeving
waarin het onderzoek wordt gehouden (laboratorium versus vijver). In drie ex-
tra treatments worden de invloeden van elk van die factoren onderzocht. Het
spel in het veldexperiment wordt vertaald naar een `pen en papier' laboratorium
experiment. Dit experiment wordt vervolgens uitgevoerd onder studenten in een
laboratorium, vissers in een laboratorium en vissers aan de vijver terwijl ze aan
het vissen zijn. Uit de resultaten van deze laboratorium experimenten blijkt
dat alle deelnemers zich gedragen zoals meestal wordt geobserveerd: men werkt
samen in het begin, maar naarmate de periodes vorderen, handelt men meer en
meer naar het eigenbelang. Twee laatste verschillen tussen het laboratorium-
en veldexperiment blijven bestaan. In het laboratorium is de afruil die gemaakt
wordt altijd in termen van geld, of men samenwerkt of niet. Echter, in het
veldexperiment is deze afruil verschillend, handelen in het eigenbelang levert
visplezier op, terwijl samenwerken geld oplevert voor anderen. Een ander ver-
schil is dat in het laboratorium geen activiteit ondergaan wordt, er hoeft slechts
een cijfer omcirkeld te worden. In het veldexperiment moet moeite gedaan wor-
den om een vis te vangen. Om te onderzoeken welk van deze twee factoren
bepalend is voor het verschil in gedrag, wordt een laatste veldexperiment uitge-
voerd. Dit experiment bestaat uit vier periodes van een uur en vissers worden
geplaatst in groepen van vier. In het eerste uur mag een groep maximaal acht
vissen vangen, hoe dat verdeeld wordt binnen de groep maakt niet uit, maar280 Samenvatting
er mag niet worden gecommuniceerd. De hoeveelheid vis die gevangen wordt,
bepaalt het aantal beschikbare vissen voor de volgende periode. Hoe meer er
wordt gevangen, des te minder er beschikbaar is. Dit spel is een dynamische
variant van de common pool resource game uit Hoofdstuk 3 en 4. In dit spel
is de afruil die de deelnemers hebben van gelijke aard, in plaats van geld en
visplezier is de afruil hier louter in termen van visplezier. De resultaten van dit
experiment geven eenzelfde beeld van samenwerking als die in de Public Goods
game. Vissers doen maximaal hun best om zo veel mogelijk vis te vangen, on-
geacht de hoeveelheid die nog beschikbaar is. De conclusie van deze treatment
is dat het verschil in gedrag tussen het laboratorium en het veld moet zitten in
de activiteit. Zodra samenwerken gepaard gaat met (de afwezigheid van) een
activiteit kan het zijn dat samenwerking niet wordt bewerkstelligd. In tegen-
stelling tot de resultaten uit het laboratorium zijn er dus veldsituaties waarin
samenwerking niet spontaan wordt bewerkstelligd.
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt onderzocht of het informele instituut stra®en voor sa-
menwerking kan zorgen in de twee veldexperimenten uit Hoofdstuk 5. Aan het
einde van iedere periode wordt aan de deelnemers verteld hoeveel elk van de
groepsgenoten heeft gevangen en wat hun verdiensten zijn geweest. Vervolgens
ontvangt elke deelnemer een bedrag van e3. Elke euro die ingezet wordt, ver-
laagt de verdiensten van een gekozen groepslid met e3. Niet elke euro hoeft te
worden gebruikt, geld dat niet wordt gebruikt wordt toegebracht aan de totale
verdiensten van een deelnemer. Het maakt niet uit hoe een deelnemer het bud-
get verdeeld, zolang niet minder dan e0 en niet meer dan e3 wordt gespendeerd.
Uit onderzoeken die gedaan zijn in het laboratorium, blijkt dat dit instrument
erg succesvol is in het verhogen van samenwerking. Echter, het blijkt dat de
vissers aan de vijver net zo veel moeite doen en net zo veel vissen vangen in
de treatment met stra®en als dat zij doen in treatments zonder stra®en. Dit
resultaat geldt voor zowel de Public Goods game, als het dynamische sociale
dilemma spel.
Tot slot worden de invloeden van belonen en stra®en in een variant van de Pu-
blic Goods game uit Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 bestudeerd. Het instrument bestudeerd
in Hoofdstuk 6 is er een van monetaire aard, terwijl een deel van de keuzes die
de vissers maken een andere aard heeft: visplezier. In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt de
invloed van stra®en op gedrag in sociale dilemma's bestudeerd wanneer de aard
van stra®en die van visplezier is. Daarnaast worden de invloeden van belonen
op sociaal gedrag gemeten.Samenvatting 281
Het experiment uit Hoofdstuk 7 bestaat uit twee delen. In het tweede deel mo-
gen vissers onbeperkt vissen voor maximaal 150 minuten. Elke vis die wordt
gevangen, moet mee naar huis genomen worden en levert tevens e2 op. De
voorraad vis wordt om het half uur aangevuld om de vissers alle mogelijkheid
te geven om zo veel te vangen als mogelijk is. Echter, de tijd die beschikbaar is
voor de vissers in deel 2 hangt af van wat er gebeurt in deel 1. Deel 1 duurt drie
periodes van dertig minuten en vissers worden geplaatst in groepen van vier.
Communicatie is niet toegestaan. In elk van de drie periodes mag een visser
maximaal twee vissen vangen. Elke vis die wordt gevangen, moet mee naar huis
worden genomen, maar de tijd waarin elk van de drie groepsgenoten mogen
wissen in deel 2 wordt met tien minuten verkort. Een visser heeft daarom de
volgende afruil: of er wordt naar het eigenbelang gehandeld door te vissen, of er
wordt niet gevist, zodat anderen langer kunnen vissen in deel 2. De resultaten
van dit experiment komen overeen met de resultaten uit Hoofdstukken 5 en 6:
er zijn geen sporen van samenwerking. Vissers proberen altijd de eerste vis te
vangen en, conditioneel op het vangen van de eerste vis, proberen ze altijd de
tweede vis te vangen.
In twee andere treatments worden de e®ecten van belonen en stra®en gemeten.
Aan het einde van elk van de periodes in deel 1, ontvangt iedere deelnemer in-
formatie over hoeveel vis elk van de groepsgenoten heeft gevangen. Vervolgens
wordt de mogelijkheid geboden om tot drie intervallen van vijf minuten uit deel
2 te spenderen. In de straftreatment verlaagt elk interval dat wordt gespendeerd
de vistijd in deel 2 van een gekozen groepslid met vijftien minuten. In de be-
loningstreatment verhoogt elk interval de vistijd van een gekozen groepslid met
vijftien minuten. Het maakt niet uit hoe een deelnemer de intervallen verdeeld,
zolang niet minder dan nul intervallen en niet meer dan drie intervallen worden
gebruikt in elke periode. De resultaten van deze niet-monetaire instrumenten
zijn overeenkomstig met die uit Hoofdstuk 6. In de treatment waarin groeps-
genoten elkaar kunnen stra®en, wordt geen samenwerking gevonden. Vissers
vissen met dezelfde moeite en vangen dezelfde hoeveelheid vis in de straftreat-
ment als in de treatment zonder stra®en. Dezelfde conclusie wordt getrokken
voor de beloningstreatment.
Een gedetailleerde analyse van het gebruik van beloningen wijst uit dat er geen
verband bestaat tussen het geven van beloningen en de vangst van vis. Een
deel van de beloningen wordt gelijk verdeeld over de deelnemers, wat sugge-282 Samenvatting
reert dat vissers anderen belonen in de hoop om zo beloningen terug te krijgen.
Het gebruik van stra®en komt overeen met eerdere bevindingen van laborato-
rium onderzoeken: degenen die de meeste vissen vangen ten opzichte van het
groepsgemiddelde, ontvangen de meeste stra®en. Het feit dat vissers het stra¯n-
strument blijven gebruiken, terwijl ze ondervinden dat het geen e®ect heeft om
samenwerking, is interessant. Dit suggereert dat vissers het stra¯nstrument ge-
bruiken, omdat het goed voelt. Stra®en geeft de deelnemers de mogelijkheid om
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